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PMC's and PSC's in the Global Military Bazaar

Introduction

The issues of privatization of warfare and outsourcing of military responsibilities and activities to private military companies (PMC's) and private security companies (PSC's) are topics of tremendous importance as we examine both the shape of current conflicts and what the Western way of war may look like in the future. The privatizations of more and more military responsibilities, from intelligence and logistic support to direct involvement in combat related activities such as bodyguard duties and convoy protection, are ones that have, to date, attracted little public attention and surprisingly little discussion within the security community itself. But this is too important a trend for it not to be subject to a more thorough and complete analysis of the impact this growing phenomenon is having on the ability of Western states to wage war, and operations short of war, including peacekeeping, peacemaking and nation building tasks. It is past time for the so far limited discussion on these issues to receive wider attention from decision makers, opinion formers and the general public.

The Implications of Privatization

The implications that are surfacing as a result of the increased tendencies of Western military establishments to privatize many aspects of warfare and military operations are profound. Recent scandals in Iraq and Afghanistan have thrown unaccustomed light on an explosive trend: the growing use by Western governments, military establishments and private companies active in conflict zones of private military contractors in a host of roles that have long been the traditional provenance of armies. The use of such firms allows governments to accomplish public ends through private means, with the seemingly additional advantage that such activities can take place without much oversight by legislatures or even the press. This lack of scrutiny may be expedient, even extremely useful, but whether or not it is efficient, cost-effective or good for democracy is much more open to question.

It may well be the case that the privatization of certain tasks which have traditionally been carried out by the armed forces can benefit everyone involved,

the PMC's, the governments that employ them, overstretched military establishments, some of whose responsibilities the PMC's and PSC's are shouldering, the taxpayers who pay for their services and even, in the case of non-combat related activities, the local recipients of their services. But these benefits only accrue if the outsourcing of what have customarily been military activities is undertaken in a thoughtful and systematic fashion. Privatizing military tasks is not like the privatization of a phone company or a failing publicly owned industrial plant. Different criteria, ones that are sensitive not only to economic or personnel considerations but which also take account of the national security implications that are inherent in some of these decisions, must be applied. The political, military and economic calculations that are involved in making any particular decision on the privatization or the outsourcing of military responsibilities cannot and should not be a question of simply how many euros or dollars can be saved or what armed services personnel and equipment can be cut or redeployed. The process should also focus on the ability of the state and its armed services to conduct the types of military operations they consider most effective against a putative foe, not the ones that the outsourcing of military capabilities may force them to engage in because they no longer possess fully capable armed forces. It is just these types of overarching national security considerations that have so far been missing from the privatization and outsourcing process. But they are ones that must be fully addressed if this process is going to continue and if it is to be implemented in the correct manner.¹

All too often, the tales of combat, profit, greed, sacrifice, heroism and honour that emerge from the often hyperbolic press coverage of private military contractors read like something out of a Tom Clancy novel, a Hollywood movie or a James Bond screenplay. When some of these wild tales may be true, they obscure the fact that the reality of PMC's and PSC's is not the stuff of traditional mercenaries, freelance adventurers or a new breed of soldiers of fortune. Instead, if we look beyond the surface hype and bravado, we find that the true story is one of billion dollar, trans-national corporations chasing multi-million dollar contracts, as part of a well-honed strategy to build franchises whose value will outlast any particular conflict or emergency.

There is an extremely chequered history to the privatization and outsourcing that has occurred in other areas where government has attempted to devolve its

¹ D.D. Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 57–70.

traditional responsibilities onto the private sector. It seems only reasonable, not to say logical therefore, to begin any examination of issues such as private military companies being engaged with intelligence gathering and analysis, weapons maintenance, combat engineering responsibilities and many of the other traditional core tasks of the armed forces, including combat itself, from a position of profound scepticism about what the tangible advantages and benefits that are going to accrue from such a privatization process are, and make a critical assessment as to whether or not they might outweigh the potential disadvantages.

The Lessons of History

In looking at all of these issues, some historical perspective may prove to be a useful starting point. The role and history of mercenaries in warfare is well known. From Xenophon's 10,000 and the auxiliaries of Rome's legions to the Condottieri of Renaissance Italy and the Landsknechts of the Thirty Years' War, the armies of Britain's East India Company, the Hessians of the American Revolution and the Dogs of War of post-colonial Africa, mercenaries seem to have always played some role in nearly every war that humans have fought. It was understood, however, that the expectations an employer could have for the mercenary troops in their service were limited. They might fight hard, but preservation of the combat strength of a mercenary unit was more important than achieving a costly victory for their employer. So the commitment one could expect from mercenaries was never going to be unconditional. And because they fought only for pay and plunder, any failure to meet the full provisions of their contract could lead to a refusal to fight, or worse, a willingness to change sides if the prospects on the other side of the hill looked greener.

Because of these realities, and because even an employer who met the demands of his mercenary troops often found themselves trapped in an upward spiral of ever escalating demands and requirements from a rapacious mercenary leader or his unruly troops, as national consciousness and patriotism grew in the modern age, so too did the idea of a soldier who fought only for pay, not out of patriotism or ideological commitment, begin to take on pejorative connotations. But it was only after their bloody behaviour in Africa's internecine strife during the 1960's and 1970's that the term 'mercenary' finally lost any of the positive resonance it may once have enjoyed.²

² See: M.L. Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Military Companies*, Presidio Press, 2005.

In the same way, it has only been relatively recently, starting with the American Civil War and most notably through the First and Second World Wars, that armed services began to take on responsibilities that did not primarily involve actual combat. Before the twentieth century, in nearly all countries, logistics, that vast tail of services and capabilities that are such a vital necessity for any military force that hopes to be able to march, manoeuvre and fight, was long a largely private undertaking. The key role that logistics has always played in warfare is hard to overstate. In any war, keeping armies in the field has always demanded enormous amounts of food and ammunition for the soldiers and fodder for their animals. All of these had to be manufactured, transported to the theatre of war and then distributed to armies in the field. But in spite of its vital role, logistics were long the Cinderella of military operations. While generals and their soldiers might bask in the glow of victories won or suffer the opprobrium of campaigns gone wrong, the successes and failures of their supply train, the jumble of individuals and services that enabled the armies to fight, received little attention until the advent of mass armies and total war. The reality of military operations, as opposed to the way that they are often presented, is that great armies do not simply appear on the battlefield, fully equipped and ready to fight. Before the advent of railways and motor transport, moving and supporting an army was frequently an almost insuperable task. While infantrymen and cavalry troops could manoeuvre on their own, the vast array of services needed to keep them fed, supplied and combat capable was largely in the hands of civilian contractors, often locally hired and of doubtful competence, honesty and reliability.

Such inconsistency could be tolerated as long as battles lasted only a day and the campaign season was short. But as the needs of armies grew and soldiers could no longer carry more than a few days of campaign supplies on their backs, as armies expanded and became too large to simply live off the land, and as more and more of the essential materials of war, such as ammunition and replacement equipment, were produced far from the battlefield and then transported to the actual arena of combat, civilian contractors could no longer provide the type of support modern mass armies required. As the battlefield spread, and the ranges of small arms and artillery increased, the civilians who made up the train found themselves, often unwillingly, in harm's way. As they had not signed up to fight, when faced with danger, their tendency was to bolt for the rear, leaving soldiers in the firing line unsupported and starved of ammunition and other vital supplies. As more and more armies faced this situation, the role of soldiers in providing armies with logistical support grew until the small civilian component

that was left in the system was clustered far from the combat zone or restricted to non-essential tasks. The lesson was that civilians who were not subject to the strictures of military discipline could not be relied upon to stay at their posts if they felt themselves to be in imminent danger of life or limb, a risk that with the advent of aerial bombing could fairly be said to exist at all points in the military's supply chain. Privatization and outsourcing seeks to reverse this lesson of history. It seems to assume that human nature and the realities of the battlefield have changed. How realistic are these assessments and what are the implications if the lessons of history of logistics remain current?³

The current situation with regard to the activities of PMC's and PSC's is difficult to assess clearly and definitively. One source claimed in 2002 that in the previous eight years, the US Department of Defence (DoD) had signed 3,061 contracts, valued at more than \$300 billion, with 12 US-based PMC's. Furthermore, 2,700 of these contracts had been given to just two companies: Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a subsidiary of the Halliburton Corporation, and to Booz Allen Hamilton, a management and technology consulting firm. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which produced the report that gives these figures, was unable to determine what percentage of these contracts was for training, security or logistical services. This, it was stated, was because of both the breadth of the military-related services offered by the larger corporations and the paucity of information on the contract award process provided by the Pentagon.⁴ It is obvious just from the raw data, however, that the use of PMC's by the DoD is widespread and cuts across all areas of military activities. And as the report was written in 2002, before the heaviest involvement of PMC's in Iraq and Afghanistan really got underway, it is obvious that both the number, dollar value and the breadth and scope of PMC involvement in supplying aid and support to the US armed services and their coalition partners has substantially increased over the past four years. As has been pointed out, the launching of the war on terror has been a windfall for PMC's: "Successive Federal budgets have allocated billions of dollars for

³ J.A. Lynn, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 9–31, 103–109.

⁴ L. Peterson, *Privatizing Combat, the New World Order*, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Washington, 28 October 2002, www.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=148, quoted in: M. Khan, "Business on the Battlefield: the Role of Private Military Companies," *Corporate Research E-Letter*, no. 30, December 2002, www.corp-research.org/dec02.htm.

improved intelligence gathering, enhanced law enforcement capabilities, improved border security and tracking of visitors, the procurement, stockpiling and distribution systems for vaccines and antibiotics, better aviation security, along with a wide range of other counter-terrorism programs.”⁵ Much of this work has landed in the laps of a wide variety of PMC’s. The Bush administration has refused to provide a dollar figure for the total amount of contract work that is currently being awarded to PMC’s. The US government claims that many such agreements must remain secret in order to protect national security interests. But experts on the activities of PMC’s have estimated that contracts given out for jobs in Iraq alone cost the Pentagon tens of billions of dollars a year, and cite as examples DynCorp, the largest PMC operating in Iraq, which currently has DoD contracts worth more than \$2 billion to provide “post-conflict police training” and other tasks around the world⁶ and a single contract that was awarded by the Pentagon in 2006 to the United Kingdom’s AEGIS Specialist Risk Management company that was worth \$293 million.⁷

The Viability of Privatization for Peripheral Military Responsibilities

There are a number of major areas that need to be examined in making any assessment of the efficacy of privatizing military responsibilities and outsourcing specific military tasks. In undertaking such an examination, caution needs to be exercised when it comes to making judgments about the utility and effectiveness of some of the privatization processes now underway, as too optimistic a reading of the current situation could lead to false conclusions as to just how worthwhile privatization has been in increasing, or even maintaining, the military’s effectiveness on the battlefield.

The rationale behind the privatization of government functions and responsibilities has been claims about the ability of the private sector to achieve marked increases in the efficiency of delivering goods and services, thus reducing the cost of such provisions. This in turn saves governments costly expenditures by allowing them to withdraw from the direct provision of certain

⁵ I.M. Cuthbertson, “Peering into the Abyss: Understanding and Combating NBC Terrorism,” in: H. Gaertner and I.M. Cuthbertson, *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p. 75

⁶ G. Guma, *The Quiet Rise of National Security*, Toward Freedom, April 2006, <http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/449/69/>

⁷ N. Robertson, *Iraq Contractors Make Billions on the Front Line*, CNN, 13 June 2006, www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/contract/2006/0613billions.htm.

goods and services, based on the belief that a bureaucratic system is not optimal for delivering them efficiently and cost-effectively. In addition, privatization can be a revenue provider for governments when infrastructure and service provision rights are auctioned off to the highest bidder. There is, of course, no doubt that the military, as with many other areas of governmental activities, is rife with inefficiencies and waste. Without a pressing need to bow to the efficiencies that are held to be inherently part and parcel of a freely functioning market economy, the armed services frequently operate as if careful budgeting and competition are completely alien concepts. Western militaries have a well established reputation for consistently overrunning budgets for weapon procurement projects, a lack of fiscal reality in buying goods and services, a characteristic made infamous by the US Air Force's \$800 hammer, and by a seeming inability to ensure a timely and reliable supply of many of the most important items troops need in modern combat, from additional armour for vehicles to ceramic plates to add to the flak jackets of ordinary soldiers.

From uneatable food, to irregular mail deliveries, to what often appear to those caught up in them wholly arbitrary personnel policies, everyone from politicians to the business sector to soldiers in the field have a pet complaint about the way the military conducts itself both on and off the battlefield. The question, however, is how far any process of privatization of functions or outsourcing of responsibilities and activities can go towards addressing these often legitimate complaints? There is undoubtedly a good deal of leeway for private military firms to step in and provide some of the goods and services that the armed services currently undertake using uniformed personnel. Service such as base catering, providing laundry services, rear area hospital and medical facilities, base vehicle maintenance and such tasks as inventory management are all functions that are important to the smooth and efficient running of any military establishment and which may be more efficiently provided through a greater use of private companies.

The Inherent Shortcomings of Relying on Private Military Companies

However, it is important not to overestimate the scope and nature of the type of privatization or outsourcing of current military jobs and responsibilities that can actually take place. Many, if not all of the tasks that the military currently provides through its own personnel that are the most suitable for privatization are ancillary services. While important, most, if not all, are on the periphery of the armed services core responsibility, which remains to make war. Thus, while many of the tasks that could be privatized are important for the morale of service

members and some can directly affect the readiness level of the military as a whole and in at least some cases, even impact the combat capabilities of individual units, none are core warfighting tasks.

There is also the reality that PMC's and PSC's operate outside of the military chain of command and are therefore not automatically responsive to military orders, instructions or even suggestions.⁸ While this may not be a crippling problem where the PMC's are engaged only in peripheral activities, it becomes a much more serious problem as they become engaged in missions that are more vital to the safety and security of troops in a conflict zone and those elements of the military that take part in actual combat operations. While PMC's sign binding contracts with the government and the armed services that employ them, disobedience and a refusal to follow orders bring none of the draconian penalties that would attach to such behaviour if it were to be indulged in by regular troops. Instead, it is merely a contractual dispute that can only be settled through a long and arduous process of civil litigation. In a combat zone, where delay can cost lives and a refusal to follow orders and fulfil commitments can lead to both soldier and civilian deaths, a court case that is resolved two or three years down the line is hardly an adequate response to such a dangerous situation.⁹

Thus, if such outsourcing is going to occur, there will have to be strict supervision of contractors to ensure that contracts are properly let and fulfilled, to ensure that services which often still have an important role in ensuring military readiness, power projection and combat capabilities are properly delivered. Careful monitoring of contract commitments is also a necessity to ensure quality control and to prevent over-billing. Criminal sanctions, including imprisonment and heavy fines, for both the individual civilians involved in an incident and the local managers and corporate officers who are responsible for fulfilling a contract's provisions, must be part of any outsourcing or privatization process and their attendant contracting procedures. The current situation, where a PMC or its employees can simply refuse to carry out a task if going forward appears to them too dangerous, is not a situation that can be sustained in a combat zone. When a private firm bails out of a contractual commitment or refuses to carry out the military's orders, it is the armed services and their

⁸ D. Isenberg, *A government in search of cover: PMCs in Iraq*, British-American Security Information Council, March, 2006, www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/pmcs0603.htm#02.

⁹ A. McColl, *The not-so-white Companies: PMF's and Perceptions of Legitimacy*, University of Durham, 2004, pp. 9–10, www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/cmsconference/2005/proceedings/criticalinternational/McColl.pdf.

personnel that are left to scramble to fill the unanticipated shortcomings in their overall capabilities. To impose such a burden on military forces that are already experiencing overstretch and mission creep is both unfair and dangerous. It is clear from the extensive evidence of over-billing and sub-par services that have emerged in both Iraq and Afghanistan, from Halliburton overcharging for fuel supplies¹⁰ to contractors and their civilian drivers refusing to take their slots in convoys that they feel are at serious risk of ambush, that not all contractors are meeting their contractual commitments.¹¹ When they do not, it is the military as a whole, and individual service personnel in particular, who have to step into the breach and take up the slack that the PMC's and their staffs have left in the wake of their unreliable or dishonest behaviour.¹²

Serious questions have also been raised about both the quality and qualifications of many of the staff that PMC's and PSC's have hired to fulfil military contracts. As private companies are primarily concerned about profit, the pressure is always to keep personnel costs as low as possible, as they are usually the biggest item in any company's budget in what is frequently a labour-intensive industry. The danger lies in such companies skimping on the quality of the personnel they hire to keep costs low. Some PSC's have hired former military personnel at very generous salaries, with bodyguards able to earn between \$100,000 and \$200,000 for some of the riskier close protection jobs in Iraq. But these highly qualified and carefully selected individuals are the elite of the PMC and PSC personnel pool. Further down the employment food chain, there is widespread evidence of insufficient screening in an application process that should be tailored towards ensuring that those who are hired are both qualified and suitable to do the often arduous work required even in rear area base facilities and the frequently dangerous tasks they are called upon to carry out in more forward areas. Instead, the process seems more geared to finding warm bodies with the minimum amount of skills and experience necessary to fill a particular job slot. Thus while the military has significantly increased the amount of training it gives its truck drivers and maintenance personnel before sending them to Iraq, PMC's remain content to hire American

¹⁰ D. Jehl, "A Region Inflamed: Reconstruction; U.S. Sees Evidence of Overcharging in Iraq Contract," *New York Times* of 12 December 2003.

¹¹ P. Chatterjee, "Driving Into Danger," CorpWatch, 29 March 2005, www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12010.

¹² Lou Dobbs Tonight, "Bin Laden Associate Surrenders," CNN, 13 July 2004, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0407/13/ldt.00.html>.

truck drivers with no military experience, knowledge of desert driving conditions, training in driving in convoys or the ability to perform even emergency maintenance on their rigs and then ask them to drive vital supplies through the cauldron of the Sunni Triangle in Iraq.¹³

Standards are even more lax when it comes to PMC's and PSC's hiring locally engaged staff and nationals of third party states. From Indian truck drivers, to Filipino chefs, from Thai laundry workers to South African cleaning staffs, all have found employment servicing coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are in addition to the literally thousands of Iraqis and Afghans who have found employment in every job imaginable, from security guards and bomb disposal specialists, to cooks and bottlewashers. Even if amongst these enormous cadres of non-military personnel that are employed in operational zones there is no-one with a dubious background, which is impossible to imagine, there is still the additional danger that these people, most of whom are citizens of less developed nations, are less well educated and trained than the military personnel they are substituting for or replacing. There are also claims that many of these workers unwillingly end up working in combat zones because they were tricked by unscrupulous recruiters who failed to properly explain what their duties would be.¹⁴ In addition, because of the wide variety of nationalities that may be thrown together by PMC's and PSC's to meet a particular need, and because many of the individuals involved are employed on contracts that vary dramatically in length, some of them being very short, they may never have met before they start working together, may not share a common language and may never have the chance to build the type of small group cohesion and mutual confidence that can be so vital to successfully carrying out a mission or task in a dangerous or stressful environment.

There is the additional disadvantage that where it is the PMC's and PSC's that employ local staff for a variety of jobs in an area of active military operations, the armed services personnel who might otherwise have interacted with such locals have much less direct day-to-day contact with such locals and thus miss out on regular opportunities to build personal relationships with them. By failing to build such relationships, military personnel may be cut off from a

¹³ S.I. Erwin, "Dangerous convoy duties prompt expanded training for truck crews," *National Defense*, December, 2004, www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/275382-1.html.

¹⁴ A. Eunjung Cha, "Underclass of Workers Created in Iraq," *The Washington Post* of 1 July 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19228-2004Jun30.html.

valuable source of information and intelligence on local attitudes and conditions. There is also the problem that where the screening of local or third party personnel is not fully in the hands of the military, but is left to the private companies themselves, there is no real way of knowing the background of some of the people who are being allowed into military bases and to mingle with military personnel. In the age of the suicide bomber, the types of background and security checks that PMC's and PSC's carry out on their personnel, individuals who may enjoy access to vital and important locations or offices where intelligence information and security plans are kept, are at best often perfunctory and sometimes non-existent. It does not give confidence that the same companies and a number of their individual managers have, in the past, been happy to do business with a range of dictatorships, insurgent groups, drug cartels and organized crime syndicates and even, on occasion, with jihadist groups with known links to al-Qaeda.¹⁵

While some have argued that such problems are isolated and simply the teething pains involved in getting a new paradigm for service provision up and running, worrying incidents are frequent and serious enough to beg the question if what successful military operations really need is more outsourcing and privatization. Does the most efficient and effective solution to plugging the gaps that the continuing shortage of the uniformed military personnel needed to fill all of the myriad of non-combat roles that the armed forces have to shoulder to conduct actual operations lie in the ever greater involvement of private military companies? The information available to us so far, based on the experiences of the coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and in peacekeeping and nation-building missions in many other parts of the world, suggests that the answer to the question of do we need greater privatization of military functions seems to be a resounding no.

PMC's and their Shortfalls with Regard to Their Legal Status, Oversight, and Their Long-Term Impact on Military Capabilities

The only realistic measurement, with regard to the value and feasibility of the privatization of what have previously been military tasks and responsibilities, are whether or not the viability, integrity and security of a given mission is being adversely impacted or is being carried out as well, or preferably

¹⁵ D.G. MacDougall, *The Potential of Private Military Companies (PMC's) in Hemispheric Security and Defense*, Colegio Interamericano Defensa, April 2004, pp. 22–23, <http://library.jid.org/en/mono43/Macdougall.doc>.

better, than it could or would have been had the introduction of PMC's and PSC's into the mission's components not taken place. It is highly doubtful that the advent of PMC's and PSC's is going to have a neutral effect on the ability of armed services to carry out the full range of missions with which they are routinely tasked. And while the use of PMC's and PSC's is still a fairly recent phenomenon, enough information has been collected on their performance, both collectively and individually, to allow some tentative conclusions to be drawn with regard to their effectiveness and value compared to having the military continue to perform the vast majority of tasks that have traditionally been part of their mandate.

While military trained technicians and logistical specialists have had their share of recruitment efforts of PMC's directed towards them, it is personnel with a background in special forces and operations that have been most aggressively targeted for recruitment by PMC's, with PSC's being at the forefront of the effort to attract special forces personnel into private sector employment. All of this is going on at a time when, given the pressing needs of both the war on terror in general, and fighting against the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, most Western countries have been aggressively recruiting from amongst their existing trained military personnel to increase the size and improve the capabilities of their special forces. The conflict of interest between governments and militaries on the one hand and PMC's and PSC's on the other is both obvious and potentially dangerous.

Initially, PMC and PSC recruitment took advantage of the considerable downsizing in military forces all over the world that took place as a result of the end of the Cold War, and recruitment was given another boost by the large reductions in Western armies that followed their victory in the Gulf War. But as time has passed, especially after 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent extensive counter-insurgency campaigns in both countries, any surplus of trained military personnel from major Western armies has long since been soaked up. Indeed, the two countries with the largest commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and the United Kingdom, are experiencing serious difficulties in meeting recruitment targets for their ground forces, particularly for the combat arms. In addition to their failure to attract new recruits, despite raising age limits and lowering educational standards, these same armed forces face an even more serious problem in retaining high-trained and skilled personnel after the expiration of their contracts. It is a problem that is particularly acute amongst senior non-commissioned and warrant officers and

field grade commission personnel, who are often the best trained and knowledgeable personnel in any active military unit and who provide the backbone of any military formation's structure, capabilities and readiness.

While part of these losses of personnel can be ascribed to people leaving the military profession altogether, there is also a significant component that can be ascribed to the outflow of highly trained personnel in particular, to the mere existence of PMC's and PSC's and their aggressive recruitment practices that are targeted on this small pool of highly trained, experienced and reliable military personnel. Thus the PMC's and PSC's are actively courting the same small pool of elite special forces soldiers, both officers and enlisted personnel, which the military is most anxious to retain in uniform. It is one thing for PMC's to provide lucrative employment for officers and senior NCOs at the end of their military careers. But the pool of retirees has not proven to be large enough to satisfy the voracious appetite of PMC's and PSC's for qualified personnel who are physically capable of being deployed into the actual combat situations. Thus the companies have instead aggressively targeted active military personnel who are close to the end of their contract period with the military in the case of enlisted men, or officers who are in a position to resign their commissions at a time of their choosing. A background in special forces means that personnel who have such experience tend to give PMC's and PSC's employees who are highly trained, self-disciplined and totally professional in their attitudes and actions, and in addition possess the experience and commitment necessary to carry out assignments under even the most difficult conditions. These capabilities contrast sharply with those of new military recruits and even trained soldiers who have recently joined their units, even the experienced personnel who join special forces formations, who are less capable of taking decisions or operating independently, without the close supervision of more experienced and senior personnel. Thus the PSC's are poaching from the armed services personnel who are in many ways the most valuable asset the armed services possess, soldiers in their prime, who have years of training and experience under their belts and who possess, in the case of special forces soldiers in particular, a unique understanding of not only how to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign but who are also fully versed in the intricacies of the civil-military relations that form the cornerstone of the types of 'hearts and minds' operations that are an essential component of gaining local allies to first cooperate against an insurgency and then participate in any nation-building activities.

Of course, the fact that many ex-special forces personnel are now employed by PMC's and PSC's means that their capabilities are not completely lost to the armed services. But while PSC's do represent one vehicle by which the wisdom and experience of seasoned former military personnel can continue to be available to the government and armed services, access to all of this valuable knowledge, which was gained on the government's payroll, can come at a steep price, both in financial terms and in the opportunity costs that the loss of such specialist personnel represents to the military. It is already clear that the aggressive recruitment by PMC's and PSC's has had a negative effect on retention rates among highly trained special forces personnel and in other areas where technical and specialist knowledge and experience is at a premium. The large salaries that the PMC's and PSC's pay their staff, especially former special forces personnel, are something of a special case, but the availability of good pay and fringe benefits is a phenomenon that stretches across the entire range of PMC jobs that require military training and skills, and one that has had an adverse impact on the morale of regular military personnel in conflict zones. Soldiers are often called upon to perform similar, or even more dangerous missions than those taken on by PMC personnel, but for a fraction of the pay and benefits, making them feel undervalued and unappreciated, which in turn adversely impacts morale and motivation.

The high salaries on offer in Iraq and Afghanistan have already caused elite soldiers from armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic to prematurely leave the military in record numbers. So serious have these losses become that in August 2006 the British government was forced to double the pay for all ranks that serve in their special forces, the SAS and SBS, in what will probably prove to be a forlorn attempt to keep the "older, wiser heads" amongst these elite soldiers in uniform.¹⁶ But with PMC's and PSC's in Iraq and Afghanistan offering annual salaries of up to \$200,000 for soldiers who have special forces backgrounds, which is double what the British Army will pay an SAS sergeant even after this latest large pay increase, military salaries are still far from competitive with those being offered by the private sector. The continued chaos in Iraq and resurgent Taliban activities in Afghanistan, the fact that bushfire wars continue to break out all over the globe and with the continued worldwide threat from terrorism and organized crime, all place an ever higher premium on those who can act as bodyguards, especially those trained in personal protection duties by

¹⁶ "SAS get 50% pay rise to halt quitters," *The Sunday Times* of 6 August 2006.

the military. When this reality is coupled with the continuing rise in the actual numbers of PMC's and PSC's in the market place, it is probably inevitable that armed forces all over the world are going to continue to see a haemorrhaging of their most high trained and motivated personnel. Governments and militaries will thus continue to face the conundrum that they are paying premium prices to employ trained personnel whose skills and knowledge they footed the bill to develop and hone, while the PMC's and PSC's continue to essentially reap the financial benefits of all of this training and experience which they themselves did nothing to develop.

The Legal Status of PMC's and PSC's.

A major issue in employing PMC's and PSC's and regulating their operations and behaviours is their ill-defined legal status in international law generally, and specifically with regard to the web of international treaties, in particular the Hague and Geneva Conventions, that seek to codify the laws of war and govern the conduct of governments and their armed services in a range of different types of conflicts. This ambiguity about the status of PMC's arises from the fact that the whole edifice of rules that are supposed to govern behaviour in wartime is largely based on treating the state and its military forces as the main elements to be regulated by the relevant international conventions. Thus there are clear lines of responsibility drawn in such agreements between governments and their legally constituted military forces, with armed services being given clear codes of conduct that they are supposed to follow and states being responsible for ensuring their armed services follow the international rules that governments have, by signing international treaties and agreements and having their provisions written in their military's laws and regulations, committed them to follow.

But while the laws of war are clear when they talk about the duties and responsibilities of regular armed services, and even when they deal with a wide variety of insurgent groups, there is little that deals either directly or indirectly with the status of PMC's. While traditional mercenaries do rate a variety of mentions in international conventions, mainly to de-legitimize their activities, the more ambiguous nature of PMC's and their relationship with the governments that employ them is never dealt with directly. It is an uncertainty about the actual status of PMC's that the parties involved, the PMC's themselves, their government employers and the armed services they operate alongside, all have a stake in preserving. The main players share a vested interest in not having the exact nature of their various interconnections too closely

investigated and regulated, especially by the international community. In their dealings with PMC's, governments want to be able to assert plausible deniability in connection with any scandal that may arise with regard to the behaviour of the PMC or its staff, be it Halliburton overcharging the military for fuel in Iraq or bodyguards employed by PSC's running private prisons and inflicting torture on suspected terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the same way, it is rarely in the military's interest to highlight the activities of PMC's, as this simply draws attention to their own shortcomings in a variety of different areas and their loss of their previous monopoly in exercising force to achieve their government's objectives.

Such studied ambiguity, however, leaves PMC's and their employees in a grey area with regards to their status as combatants under the Hague and Geneva Conventions if they are taken prisoners or accused of committing war crimes. While they are clearly combatants if they carry or crew weapons and are acting under the lawful authority of a government or its military command, questions arise if they as PMC's employees do not have a combat role, but rather service a country's military establishment in any one of the myriad of support roles that PMC's have assumed even in conflict zones. For example, do PMC's employees still qualify for the protection afforded to soldiers under the Geneva Convention if they are not in uniform and not part of a military chain of command? Should they instead be afforded protection as civilians under the Hague Convention? And while the citizen of a country who is employed by a PMC to support that country's armed forces is clearly not a mercenary, what is the status of third party nationals in either combatant or non-combatant roles working for a government and a military force that is not their own?¹⁷ The slow pace at which international law is made, and the unwillingness of many states to renegotiate or expand such key treaties as the Geneva Convention, means that it is inevitable that the status of PMC's and the individuals in their employ is unlikely to be clarified at any time in the near future. This is probably not a crippling burden, given the nature of the conflicts that have so far seen PMC's on the battlefield. It is highly unlikely that the insurgents in Iraq or the Taliban in Afghanistan would pay any attention to international agreements defining the status of PMC's, even were such treaties to be negotiated. However, in any future inter-state conflict, where the countries involved are all parties to the various conventions that

¹⁷ P. Carter, "Hired Guns: What to do about military contractors run amok," *Slate* of 9 April 2004, <http://slate.msn.com/id/2098571>.

constitute the laws of war, the lack of status of PMC's will become an issue, and the ones most likely to suffer from this ambiguity are the individual employees of the PMC's who find themselves captured in the conflict, either on the battlefield itself or in the rear areas where most PMC employees work.

Given this situation, what can be done to regularize the status of PMC's and PSC's in terms of international law in general, and the laws of war in particular? A number of international bodies, including the United Nations and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have raised concerns about the lack of effective and consistent supervision and monitoring of PMC's. Strict controls and oversight of PMC's are necessary, they believe, to ensure that such corporate entities and their staffs are scrupulously following the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The lack of any such supervision is one of the key areas where the United States, as by far the largest employer of PMC's, could move aggressively to change. It could be achieved through more careful supervision of the PMC's and their activities by creating an Ombudsman's office in the DoD, and in other states' defence ministries, that would cover all PMC's and PSC's, regardless of which of the country's armed services employed them. Such an Ombudsman's office would be armed with broad powers to terminate contracts or withhold payments should a PMC or its employees not be acting in conformity with the provisions of either its specific contract, more general governmental and military policies and finally national and international law. Individual investigative officers from the Ombudsman's staff would thus be assigned roving commissions in the field to carry out both announced and surprise inspections to investigate if a PMC was meeting both its specific contractual commitments and also to ensure that the PMC's operations were in conformity with the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and any other relevant international laws, including those that cover such issues as fair employment and environmental issues. And as far as the status of PMC and PSC employees goes in conflict zones, all should be declared to be members of armed services auxiliary forces, and given distinctive identification patches and identity documents to demonstrate this status. As armed forces auxiliaries, they would, in the event of capture, be entitled to the protections afforded to military personnel under the Geneva Conventions.

But Western nations who employ PMC's and PSC's have yet to face up to all of the realities of their mere existence, let alone begin to tackle some of the consequences of their actions. We face a situation where the activities of large military-related corporations which are increasingly taking on some of the key

aspects of sovereign states, including the use of large scale military forces in both defensive and offensive operations, face less public scrutiny and oversight, and are subject to fewer regulations, than the food and beverage industries. This is hardly an acceptable or sustainable situation. Indeed, questions remain whether effective control, similar to the oversight that the military faces from legislature and the rules of engagement that armed services operate under in conflict zones, can ever be imposed on PMC's and PSC's, because these types of restrictions are frequently contrary to the very idea of how a private business should be allowed to operate. Such a situation leads to a serious democracy deficit, because private corporations, with or without the sanctions of a government, are now in a position to undertake military actions without any legislative oversight or public knowledge about their activities. The implications for foreign and security policies of states from such a development are likely to be both significant and far-reaching.

We now face a situation where officially sanctioned non-state actors, whose financial and personnel resources outstrip the capacities of many nations, have the right to maintain what are in effect armed forces and deploy them without aggressive oversight from any state, including the country where they may be notionally headquartered. We therefore are faced with a situation where the most critical executive pillar of state authority, the monopoly on the use of military force, now has a private twin that is not subject to the same external restraints, public opinion, open government and freedom of information policies. Nor do PMC's face an aggressive media industry, because it continues to prefer to focus the majority of its efforts on investigative reporting on governmental, not corporate, activities. These are potentially very destabilizing developments whose long-term value remains dubious and open to debate and whose emergence can hardly be seen as a good or healthy sign for democracy and accountability. We need to ask how credible do Western democratic nations look to the rest of the world they attempt to introduce democracy into as well as other regions on the point of a bayonet wielded by private military forces who work in a legal, and to some extent moral vacuum. It is a contradiction that goes to the heart of democratic values and the rule of law.

It is open to question whether PMC's and PSC's, whatever value and expediency there may be in their short-term employment to help prosecute an unpopular war, can serve a long-term constructive role in a democratic society. It is this assessment, one that takes account of the potential damage to the democratic accountability that we routinely expect from those who wield military power in

the name of Western nations and their values, that we need to examine to get a true sense of all of the implications inherent in the growing reliance that Western governments and armed forces are placing on PMC's and PSC's. It needs to be recognized and clearly understood that there are a number of disadvantages and inherent limitations that are involved in employing PMC's and PSC's. Foremost amongst these drawbacks is the almost total lack of accountability that is associated with their operations and the behaviour of their employees. The shortcomings of international law with regard to the status and activities of PMC's have already been detailed. The domestic laws in major Western states also offer only incomplete and relatively easily circumventable rules and regulations to govern the activities of PMC's operating overseas. The only real sanction available to governments does not come from their statutory authority as a state, but rather from their role as the employer of a military contractor and the ability they have in that role to cancel contracts and perhaps invoke penalty clauses that impact the PMC's bottom line. But perhaps this power is more valuable than it appears at first blush, because as corporate entities, PMC's are only in business to make profits. Anything that compromises their ability to meet financial targets is more likely than anything else to get their attention and compel their compliance with their government employer's wishes. The problem lies in galvanizing governments into action against prominent corporate entities, many of whom spend a great deal of money lobbying both governments and legislatures to ensure that imposing sanctions on them can only occur with a heavy political price being paid by their opponents.

How then can greater transparency, accountability and oversight be imposed on PMC's that continue to prefer to operate in the shadows, even when employing thousands of staff to fulfil contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars? The task is not made any easier by the fact that PMC's usually operate in distant countries, where communications are sketchy, and the local press, which in the West is the most usual source of surveillance, is often weak and subject to both formal controls and informal intimidation. Western reporters attempting to monitor the activities of PMC's in conflict zones have also routinely been denied access to company sites and personnel, and unlike with the military, where such denials can be appealed to both politicians and public opinion to force more openness, private companies have a perfect right to deny such access. Traditionally, in such situations, the press and public rely on staff and employees of the corporation concerned to either come forward publicly to express concerns about what they view as shoddy services being provided by their employer or outright illegalities that they have either taken part in,

witnessed or, at the very least, have documented evidence about. However, the hiring practices of PMC's mean that the type of personalities who might take such actions in a more conventional corporate environment may either not be present, or have a stronger than usual interest in conforming to the prevailing corporate culture and the policies and behaviours that stem from it. This problem is demonstrated by the calibre of employees that PMC's and PSC's tend to hire, which slew towards two very different types. One type is senior ex-military personnel, who have strong professional loyalty towards the management structure, almost regardless of what that structure is. The other is a semi-skilled worker who is not very motivated or concerned about big picture issues. Both types of characteristics do not place a premium on ensuring corporate accountability, except when narrow personal considerations impact the decision-making process. While such highly specific, and usually anecdotal revelations may make for a good news report, they do little to improve the picture of the performance and behaviour of the PMC's as corporate entities.

There is thus a confluence of circumstances that come together to veil many, if not most of the activities being carried out by PMC's, from public attention, oversight and accountability. Basic rights that citizens and press have in their dealings with government entities, such as the ability to ferret out information through the freedom of information requests, are not possible with PMC's, whose corporate documents dealing with performance, auditing, profitability and failures remain hidden by the protections afforded to more conventional corporate entities. Contractual oversight, however, is not the only issue with regard to the monitoring of the activities of PMC's that we have to contend with. There are also a number of larger political and policy issues that come into play when a PMC is hired and given specific tasks in an operational zone. Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention earlier conflicts all over Africa, have highlighted the reality that sometimes the politicians who hired them and the military commanders who are their notional bosses are uninformed, or worse, unaware of some of the activities being undertaken by PMC's or their employees. Not only have PMC's been found to be bypassing the guidelines set for them by local commanders, there have also been instances, especially in smaller conflicts which attract less political or press scrutiny, where a PMC, or frequently its local staff, has different objectives in mind from other stake-holders. This divergence in objectives from the ones being espoused by both those that employ them and local elites, can end up with PMC's or renegade staffers implementing their own policies, not those of the government that employs them. On the other hand, there is the equal danger that PMC's have

little vested interest in securing any particular outcome in a conflict, even one favourable to their employers. The motivations of the PMC is to maximize profit, and a quick and easy resolution to a particular problem in a conflict, either at the local or at the national level, is unlikely to be helpful to ensuring a healthy bottom line for the PMC's who are involved in servicing the forces involved in such a conflict.

In addition to these military and political concerns, it needs also to be noted that PMC's may not always or even frequently represent the most cost effective solution. While some PMC's have achieved savings over the cost associated with having military personnel involved in supplying certain logistical services, especially those that lie at a distance from actual combat zones, often such savings have been achieved not by providing a better, more reliable and efficient service, but through radical cost cutting, hiring unqualified staff, diluted service provisions, substandard performance and in some cases, by a total or partial failure to supply the contracted goods and services. To cite Peter W. Singer: "The use of Private Military Firms in Iraq appears to be driven less by any supposed financial cost savings and more by political cost savings." What does this translate to on the ground? The death toll amongst the employees of PMC's and PSC's does not appear in the official statistics of military personnel who have been killed or wounded in a given conflict or even in the small death announcements published by such papers as *The New York Times*, which simply replicate official lists. This helps keep the death toll artificially low and may serve to lower the political costs of initiating or maintaining a particular mission or operation, as the real consequences of military engagement in a region or country are effectively obscured.

Beyond that, given the way that contracts are being let, with the vast majority of business going to a very small cadre of corporations with close and long-established ties to the Pentagon, we need to be aware that turning a public monopoly into a private monopoly needs not, and more often than not does not automatically translate into better service at lower costs: over-billing, padding personnel rosters, recruiting unqualified or under-qualified staff, covering up failure or incompetence and burden shifting of tasks back onto the military when they prove unprofitable can and does frequently occur. Indeed, it has been claimed that the use of PMC's can seriously hinder the military's ability to effectively fulfil its mission, and may actually increase the danger to military personnel. As an example of this, it has been claimed that the high number of

military-plane crashes in South America in recent years could be due to unqualified PMC mechanics and technicians working on airplane maintenance.¹⁸

The Return of the Condottieri on a Global Scale

Such is the power of the news and images coming from Iraq and Afghanistan that it is hard to remember that it was not these two large counter-insurgency campaigns, and the conventional wars that preceded them, that formed the template for the emergence of PMC's and PSC's. The involvement of the types of large scale corporate PMC's that are employed as contractors in Iraq in particular by the US and British governments, as well as the smaller PSC's that have found a lucrative niche both there and in Afghanistan, are something of a new development and may not necessarily signal how PMC's and PSC's may evolve in the future.

During much of the 1990s and well before 9/11 and the wars that grew out of it, PSC's were highly active and highly effective in a variety of operations they were involved in, in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. There are numerous countries with inadequate military structures that are subject to almost incessant insurgencies. A variety of PSC's, from Sandline in the UK to the South African based Executive Outcomes gained a reputation amongst African governments of being able to first stave off military disaster and then 'corset' government forces sufficiently to defeat rebels, criminal gangs and even incursions from neighbouring states. Deploying only a few officers and well trained enlisted personnel, and usually backed up by airpower in the shape of one or two helicopter gunships, these PSC's were able to stabilize situations and even deliver victory, albeit often only temporarily, to the governments that employed them. Indeed by employing local personnel, these PSC's could transform the status of what were essentially marauding armed gangs, whether they be government soldiers or rebel insurgents, and by dressing them in new uniforms, have them reclassified as part of a completely legal private security company. These freelance forces were then available to be hired by other governments to do the fighting that was beyond the capabilities of their own armed forces. There are serious implications that stem from any attempt to legalize and legitimize on a global scale this "new kind of armed forces," who are less than regular military forces but claim to be more responsible and responsive than traditional, and now illegal mercenaries. There exist a plethora of unstable governments with

¹⁸ J. Kurlantzik, "Outsourcing the Dirty Work," *The American Prospect* 14, no. 5, 1 May 2003, www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/V14/kurlantzick-j.html.

incompetent armed services who face aggressive insurgencies and would be only too willing to be customers of any corporation that could promise them victory, regardless of the financial and physical harm that might befall their civilian populations from any escalation in the usually low level insurgencies so many less developed nations face. The mere existence of such capabilities is a dangerous development, one whose full implications for the future health and stability of literally dozens of run-down and/or failed states is still to be fully explored. But if the experience of the use of PSC's by African states is any indication, the long-term effects of the deployment of PSC's are going to be less than happy. PSC's fight for whoever pays them, so they tend to end up keeping in power the very kleptocracies that have done so much to impoverish Africa and its people over the past forty years.¹⁹ It is all too easy to imagine this scenario being played out on a global scale.

Conclusions

First, it is important that we establish, once and for all, in both official and public perceptions, that when we are discussing PMC's and PSC's we are not talking about shopping mall security guards or laundry workers. Such companies may have on their books both of these types of employees but what we are really looking at is corporations, some of which are very large and complex, that have many of the characteristics of an integrated military force and which are sometimes in a position to exercise as much, or more, freedom of action as a sovereign state. Modern PMC's and PSC's operate in a grey area somewhere between private personnel, who carry weapons and carry out the sovereign tasks usually associated with military forces and the traditional mercenaries that populate the history books of all periods of history, in all the regions of the world. While it may well be the case that the employment of PMC's may have certain short-term advantages, this usefulness and their supposed effectiveness are often diminished by a number of serious drawbacks. The fact is that PMC's are largely unregulated, and the unacceptable reality of this lack of oversight is exacerbated by the lack of accountability and transparency that PMC's cling to as vital components of their corporate culture.

What is needed is prompt legislative action at both the international and national levels to alter this culture and minimize the risks posed by the endemic

¹⁹ E.B. Smith, "The new condottieri and US policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its implications," Parameters, 22 December 2002, www.highbeam.com/library/docFree.asp?DOCID=1G1:95447364.

secrecy that surrounds so much of the operations of private military corporations. Loopholes must be closed and the status of private military corporations must be clarified, with appropriate laws, legislative rules and legal accountability put in place to ensure, going forward, that there will be effective oversight of PMC's by the appropriate authorities. The aim must be to have effective mechanisms in place as quickly as possible to ensure verifiable compliance by PMC's with all relevant general laws and regulations, as well as the provisions of their commissioning contracts.

Beyond these steps, both politicians and military commanders need to take a deep breath and begin to calmly conduct a complete overview of all of their military operations to re-evaluate which of the tasks carried out by armed forces are so important to national security that they cannot and should not be outsourced. Given the explosive and largely unplanned growth which has taken place in the responsibilities and activities undertaken by PMC's over the past five years, it is very difficult to believe that there is not considerable scope to redefine their areas of appropriate activities and eliminate their involvement in those areas of war fighting and peace making which are more properly the responsibility of states and their properly constituted armed forces.

We should begin by accepting that replacing a state monopoly on the use of military force with a series of private monopolies in specific areas of military operations will not necessarily, or even be likely to bring about a sustained improvement in overall warfighting capabilities. In making such determinations, our starting point should be ensuring that the pursuit of private profits does not conflict with public policies and interests. To sum up, and to again quote Peter W. Singer, the director of the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution, on the creation and operations of PMC's:

“The outcome is a distortion of the free market that would shock Adam Smith, an interface between business and government that would awe the Founding Fathers, and a shift in the military-industrial complex that must have President Eisenhower rolling in his grave. Without change, this is a recipe for bad policy, and bad business.”

To make the point in a single pithy phrase: Never try to save a penny when core security issues are at stake.

Poland's Participation in the Stabilization Mission in Afghanistan

– The military operation in Afghanistan has its roots in the tragic events of 11 September 2001. It was the terrorist attacks launched on that day against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon¹ that triggered the establishment of the international anti-terrorist coalition. As a result, operation “Enduring Freedom”² (EF) was launched by the United States jointly with other countries. Overthrowing the Taliban regime and ridding Al-Qaeda led international terrorist groups of Afghan government support were the main goals of the operation.

The defeat of the Taliban regime enabled the international community to follow with actions for the reconstruction of the Afghan state. These are executed mainly under the operation carried out by ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).³ The operation began at the turn of 2001 and 2002 and primarily includes stabilization missions, intended to support the new government of Afghanistan (re-establishment of government institutions, armed forces and the police, expansion of the central government authority across the entire country). Initially, ISAF was led by individual allied states, including the UK (ISAF-I) and Turkey (ISAF-II), and jointly by Germany and the Netherlands

¹ It is worth recalling that, following 11 September 2001, for the first time in its history the North Atlantic Alliance invoked Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, where collective defence is authorized in case of an attack against any of the allied states. Referring to this article following a terrorist attack rather than (what was the original intent of the authors of the Treaty) an act of aggression by another state demonstrates an *ad hoc* accommodation of internal NATO procedures to face the threat of international terrorism.

² Operation EF is led by the US under Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizing the states' individual or collective self-defence, and under resolution No. 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 of the UN Security Council, where the main objective of the operation is specified, namely to combat terrorism, including the destruction of terrorist camps and powerbase in the territory of Afghanistan.

³ Operation ISAF is carried out under resolutions of the UN Security Council no. 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001, no. 1510 (2003) of 13 October 2003, no. 1563 (2004) of 17 September 2004, no. 1623 (2005) of 13 September 2005 and no. 1707 (2006) of 12 September 2006 as well as the agreement on the re-establishment of permanent government institutions in Afghanistan (the so-called Bonn Agreement) of 5 December 2001.

(ISAF-III). Following a decision by the North Atlantic Council of 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took command of ISAF operations as of 11 August 2003.

The actions under both the operations referred to above are coordinated (there is an ongoing debate within the Alliance on the ways and means to combine them). The increasing role of the stabilization actions carried out by ISAF translates into specific objectives for operation EF.

Stages of Involvement of the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan

Poland has been participating in the missions carried out by the international community in Afghanistan since March 2002. The decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of 22 November 2001, on the deployment of the Polish Military Contingent as part of the Allied Forces in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean⁴ is the legal basis for the participation of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) in the anti-terrorist operation “Enduring Freedom.” Under two amendments to this legal act, the territorial scope of operation of the Polish Military Contingent was subsequently expanded, initially including the Republic of Kyrgyzstan,⁵ and later also the Emirate of Bahrain (now known as Kingdom of Bahrain) and the State of Kuwait.⁶

PMC was composed of:

- A special operations force from GROM commando unit.
- The 1st Engineering Brigade based in Brzeg (engineering platoon).
- The 10th Logistics Brigade based in Opole (logistics platoon).
- The 4th Chemical Regiment based in Brodnica (counter-chemical platoon).
- A bacterial warfare detection unit (experts from the Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology in Puławy).
- Crew members of the logistics support warship “Kontradmiral Xawery Czernicki.”

In total, Poland deployed 300 soldiers to support the anti-terrorist operation “Enduring Freedom.” At the beginning of 2002, the PMC achieved combat readiness. Its inclusion for missions followed in March 2002, when 87 soldiers

⁴ MP 2001, no. 42, item 674.

⁵ MP 2001, no. 47, item 773.

⁶ MP 2002, no. 5, item 93.

were sent (engineers, logisticians, special force GROM commandos) to their area of operation, along with approximately 500 tons of military equipment.

In practice, approximately 100 soldiers with heavy-duty equipment were permanently involved in the operation EF in Afghanistan (primarily an engineer company along with the logistics and force protection component). They were deployed to the Bagram Base, near Kabul, where they are still stationed. Their basic tasks include clearing of explosives the area around the Bagram airfield, reinforcement of fortifications and infrastructure of the base, as well as distribution of fuel and water for the coalition forces. In addition, as already mentioned, a logistics support warship "Kontradmirał Xavery Czernicki" was deployed in the Arabian Sea in July 2002, and remained there until September 2003. It was involved in ship traffic control missions in the area.

Initially, the PMC's involvement in anti-terrorist operations was planned to continue for only six months. In order to enable further operations by the contingent the President of the Republic of Poland issued a new decision on 24 June 2002, extending the PMC's mandate until the end of 2002,⁷ and on 23 December 2002, extended it further until the end of 2003.⁸ The territorial scope of the contingent's operation as well as its headcount remained unchanged.

The decision of the President Aleksander Kwasniewski of 29 December 2003, on the deployment of the PMC in the Islamic State of Afghanistan⁹ drew the number of PMC soldiers down to 120, while their area of operation was restricted to Afghanistan. This decision resulted from the substantial involvement of the Polish armed forces in Iraq, where Poland took over command of the Multinational Division Centre-South, deploying a contingent of approximately 2,500 soldiers for the mission. Essentially, these limitations did not influence the direct participation of Poland in the operation in Afghanistan in a substantial manner, as the total number of Polish soldiers in the operational area of "Enduring Freedom" had not exceeded 100 since the beginning of the mission.

Particularly important in the decision of 2003, was the extended chain-of-command order. The contingent was no longer available exclusively

⁷ MP 2002, no. 26, item 430.

⁸ MP 2002, no. 61, item 853.

⁹ MP 2003, no. 59, item 921. Involvement to the same extent was specified in the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of 23 December 2004 on the extension of the deployment duration for the Polish Military Contingent in the Islamic State of Afghanistan (MP 2004, no. 56, item 926).

for operation EF. Part of it was moved to fulfil missions under ISAF operations. Initially, Poland joined ISAF, by delegating two officers in February 2004 (airfield support in Kabul).

The take-over of command of the ISAF operations by NATO in August 2003, forced the states of the Alliance to focus more on this specific mission. The marginal involvement of the Republic of Poland at this time was criticized in NATO Headquarters. There was pressure to increase participation in Afghan operation. By the beginning of 2005, the Polish government realized that Poland's involvement in NATO's stabilization actions in Afghanistan was not commensurate with the state's capabilities and importance within the Alliance. As a result, the Ministry of Defence started work on increasing the Polish contribution to the mission.

At the meeting held on 3 February 2005 in Szczecin, Ministers of Defence from the states in command of the Multinational Corps Northeast (Poland, Denmark and Germany¹⁰), the ministers declared their readiness to assume command over the 11th rotation of ISAF operations (from August 2007 to February 2008). According to a NATO decision of 9 February 2005, the command of the corps was subsequently incorporated into the rotation plan for ISAF command. The assumption was that, with the command over ISAF forces taken over by the Szczecin-based corps, the number of Polish soldiers within PMC in Afghanistan between August 2007 and February 2008 would rise to over a thousand.

This issue was discussed at a Council of Ministers' meeting on 23 August 2005, and in line with Poland's NATO obligations, the Council authorized the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to start preparations, for prolonged participation of the Polish armed forces in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The following was recorded during the Council of Ministers' meeting: "Poland will shoulder the main burden of effort related to filling posts, relocating the Command of the Corps along with the Support Brigade, and organizing the command posts in the mission area. It is planned that the PMC for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan will include up to 1,000 soldiers."

The plans for Polish involvement in Afghanistan were subsequently reformulated as a result of a decision by NATO to change the command structure for the operation. On 6 April 2006, NATO's Military Committee decided to

¹⁰ Representatives of the respective states were Ministers of Defence from Poland (Jerzy Szmajdziński) and Germany (Peter Struck) as well as the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Defence in Denmark (Kristian Fischer).

move away from the then corps-based model and approved the memorandum on the transformation of ISAF command into the so-called composite model (permanent NATO command structure, filled by member states depending on their contribution to the mission in terms of the number of troops on the ground).

Poland's involvement in ISAF operations intensified from September 2006 as a result of the Council of Ministers' decision of May 23rd, to increase the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan. 70 soldiers and additional civilian staff were deployed on 1 September 2006, to support ISAF force, specifically the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif and the Provincial ISAF Command stationed there. On 30 August 2006, the President of Poland, at the request of the Council of Ministers, signed the relevant authorizing decision.¹¹ Subsequently, on 2 November 2006, President Lech Kaczynski announced his decision to increase the Polish Military Contingent to 1,200 soldiers.¹²

Deployment of the manoeuvre battalion will be of key importance to enhancing the Polish presence in Afghanistan. Our unit will be based in the provinces of Ghazni and Paktika. It will support stability and security in the provinces and on the road section between Kabul and Kandahar. The battalion will also be tasked with providing protection to the reconstruction teams and CIMIC groups (Civil Military Co-operation). Polish soldiers in the mission area will co-operate with the American 82nd Airborne Division,¹³ the local police force and the Afghan army.

Poland decided to increase its involvement in Afghanistan substantially, realizing that this mission is of paramount importance for the future of NATO and a focal point for all decision-making structures of the Alliance. It is self-explanatory that it is in Poland's best interest to enhance the Alliance and continuously demonstrate its political and military credibility. NATO's fundamental importance to Poland's security policy results from the strategic document on the security of Poland (the National Security Strategy for the Republic of Poland of 2003). This fact has been undisputed since the beginning of the 1990s and has been a permanent element of the political consensus among

¹¹ MP 2006, no. 59, item 623.

¹² MP 2006, no. 84, item 862.

¹³ The co-operation of Polish military units and the 82nd Airborne Division has a rich tradition. During World War II, the American division and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Stanisław Sosabowski, jointly participated in the Operation Market Garden in the Arnhem area (the Netherlands) between 18 and 26 September 1944.

key political players in the country. Such uniform perceptions of the importance and role of the Alliance necessitate active involvement of Poland in international missions undertaken by NATO.

Therefore, Poland is willing to participate in the stabilization activities in Afghanistan. The success of the operation will undeniably reaffirm credibility and enhance NATO's potential to act as one. If the NATO-led ISAF mission was to become a fiasco it would inevitably weaken the Alliance, thus undermining one of the foundations of our own security. We should not let this happen.

Poland's involvement in Afghanistan has an important historical and moral aspect to it. We should remember that had it not been for the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Moscow would have probably suppressed the "Solidarity" movement by force. Furthermore, having spent over 100 billion dollars on the Red Army's involvement in Afghanistan, the USSR was practically bankrupted, which among other factors, led directly to the collapse of the entire communist bloc. We do not know whether, had the Soviet Union been more robust economically at the time of transformation in Europe in 1989, the changes could have adopted the Chinese model, with the launch of a market economy but the preservation of a non-democratic political system.

Aside from military operations, the stabilization of the situation in the Islamic State of Afghanistan requires humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction of the country. Currently, Afghanistan remains one of the largest receivers of international financial aid for reconstruction and re-establishment of the state structures. The aid is offered by individual states as well as international organizations and institutions. Three big international conferences focused on this issue: Tokyo (21–22 January 2002), Berlin (31 March–1 April 2004) and London (31 January–1 February 2006).

Poland is also playing a role in these additional actions. Since 2004, Afghanistan has been a priority state for the Polish programme of co-operation for development. In 2006 alone, a total of 1.6 million Polish zloty was sent to fund projects submitted by Polish non-governmental organizations. The Polish NGOs present in Afghanistan at the moment include the Polish Humanitarian Organization, the Polish Medical Mission and the association "Schools for Peace." In addition, Poland contributed 100,000 dollars to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund and \$295,000 to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, both as part of payments channelled multilaterally and intended for Afghanistan.

The political process is in progress in Afghanistan with a view to expand the central government's authority over the entire state territory. The assumption of

responsibility for eastern provinces of Afghanistan by the international force ISAF (this is where the core element of the expanded PCM is to be deployed) is yet another element in the process. Poland wants to help with these actions, since if NATO left Afghanistan to its own fate, all too soon we would see the emergence of a radical, fundamentalist state making enormous profits out of drug trafficking. The funds thus raised would be spent on terrorist actions all over the world. Hamid Karzai's government is also acutely aware of this threat. That is why the Afghan authorities appeal to the international community for increased efforts for the stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

National Limitations

The operation in Afghanistan involves 37 states. They have provided some 37,000 soldiers in total to serve under ISAF. Table 1 presents detailed data in this respect.

Table 1. States—participants in ISAF operation (as of April 12, 2007).

State	Number of soldiers
United States	15,000
United Kingdom	5,200
Germany	3,000
Canada	2,500
Netherlands	2,200
Italy	1,950
France	1,000
Turkey	800
Romania	750
Spain	550
Australia	500
Denmark	400
Norway	500
Belgium	300
Sweden	180
Hungary	180
Greece	170
Poland	551
Czech Republic	150
Portugal	150

Croatia	130
Lithuania	130
Macedonia	120
Bulgaria	100
New Zealand	100
Estonia	90
Finland	70
Slovakia	60
Slovenia	50
Latvia	35
Albania	30
Azerbaijan	20
Ireland	10
Luxembourg	10
Austria	5
Iceland	5
Switzerland	5

Source: Polish Ministry of Defence

When we take a closer look at the table, it is evident that Poland's involvement in Afghanistan is steadily increasing. Reinforcement of the PMC to up to 1,200 soldiers, is taking place now and will significantly strengthen our position within the Alliance.

When seconding our forces for the ISAF mission, Poland provided them to be available to the mission commanders without any national limitations imposed. This allows a more flexible utilization of the PMC in areas where its presence is required at a given time. This is of particular importance for operational activities as it helps to fill gaps in the international force, based on the requirements of the day. Apart from Poland, the following states—participants in ISAF have not imposed any national limitations: Australia, Estonia, Finland, France, Canada, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, Norway, Romania, the US, Switzerland and the UK. Disappointingly enough, many states have reserved such limitations, which hampers the effective execution of the mission. It applies to a lesser extent to the states introducing such national limitations for their forces due to them lacking proper operational capabilities. Some missions in Afghanistan are performed during the night, some in adverse weather. Some states simply do not have the

appropriate equipment at their disposal to carry out missions in challenging mountain regions.

More acute problems arise as a result of national limitations imposed by individual countries for political reasons. These result from the fact that the states are reluctant to leave command of their military forces entirely to the NATO operational commanders. This prevents their utilization in particularly dangerous regions and, consequently, prevents them from effectively fulfilling missions, thus undermining NATO's credibility. National limitations have been imposed both by members of the Alliance (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary and Italy) and non-members participating in ISAF missions (Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Macedonia, New Zealand, Sweden). The limitations primarily apply to the territorial scope of operations of individual contingents and introduce restrictions in terms of operational activities, rules of engagement, as well as requiring abstention from counter narcotics actions.

The effort of the international force has led to a situation where more people in Afghanistan now die in car accidents than as a result of military operations. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the death toll amongst soldiers of the international forces in the ISAF and EF operations totals 455,¹⁴ including 296 from the US, 44 from Canada, 44 from the UK, 19 from Spain, 18 from Germany, 9 from France, 9 from Italy, 4 from the Netherlands, 4 from Romania, 3 from Denmark, 2 from Sweden, 1 from Australia and 1 from Portugal. In addition, it should be remembered that 62 Spanish soldiers died in a plane crash in Turkey, whilst returning to their home bases following their mission in Afghanistan.

Political Process in Afghanistan

Since the defeat of the Taliban regime, the political process has continued in Afghanistan, with the ultimate objective being a stable state that co-operates with the international community and has its own security forces, capable of ensuring security for the country, both internally and externally.

The foundations for the political process were presented at the conference organized in Petersberg, in the vicinity of Bonn, in December 2001. The conference took the form of an Afghan "round table," with representatives of

¹⁴ As of 9 January 2007.

major ethnic groups in Afghanistan, representatives of the Northern Alliance, and Afghan emigrants. The former King of Afghanistan—Zahir Shah, who was overthrown in 1973 also attended the conference. During the discussions, the appointment of an interim government, headed by Hamid Karzai, was agreed upon. He represents the Pashtuns, who are in the majority among Afghani ethnic groups.¹⁵ Posts in the individual ministries were filled based on the criterion of the share in the total population of particular ethnic groups. At the same time, a general framework for the political process was approved, with such milestones as the incorporation of a constitution, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections.

Subsequently, leaders of all the major Afghan political and ethnic groups met in Afghanistan between 11 and 20 June 2002, to attend Loya Jirga (historically, the Assembly of the Tribal Elders), and agreed on how the constitution for Afghanistan would be drafted. In addition, Loya Jirga approved the composition of the state authorities that had been agreed upon six months earlier. The presidency was granted to the interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai. The primary task for the government was to prepare a draft of the constitution, one that could be adopted at the next Assembly.

The meeting of Loya Jirga which was devoted to the constitution took place at the turn of December 2003 and January 2004, and on 4 January 2004, the Assembly adopted the new constitution for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The constitution provides the foundations for the new state. The main systemic principles are similar to those adopted in presidential systems (e.g. the US). The constitution divides power between three branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. While the president, who is the head of the government, holds the supreme executive power, the legislative branch is composed of the Afghan parliament, further divided into two chambers—Wolesi Jirga (House of the People, 2,249 deputies) and Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders, 51 senators). The judiciary branch is represented by the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Appeal Court. No provisions for Sharia were introduced to the constitution, in spite of efforts by the more radical Islamic groups.

Subsequent stages of the Bonn process were the presidential and parliamentary elections. Presidential elections were held on 9 October 2004, in

¹⁵ Pashtuns account for some 38% of the total population in Afghanistan. Other major ethnic groups in the country are: Tajiks (25%), Hazaras (19%), Uzbeks (6%), Aimaks (4%), Balochis (0.5%).

Afghanistan and in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. 16 candidates stood for the presidency, including the interim president Hamid Karzai, who eventually won with 55.4% of votes. It should be noted that the voter turnout was high, coming to 70% of those eligible to vote (women accounted for 40% of all voters). Presidential elections followed democratic principles, and those irregularities that occurred, resulted from difficult conditions and the many technical obstacles, rather than from any premeditated manipulation.

The elections to the lower parliamentary chamber (the first elections since 1969) were held together with the elections to 34 provincial councils on 18 September 2005. The turnout fell slightly below 50%. As with the presidential elections, no cases of blatant infringement of the election rules were identified, therefore international observers agreed that the elections were compliant with democratic principles. The first parliamentary sitting, held on 18 December 2005, marked the end of the Bonn process, which had continued since December 2001, and provided the framework for the transition period in Afghanistan.

Despite the successful political process, the security status of Afghanistan has been deteriorating for some time now. This is connected with the transfer of various methods used in Iraq to Afghanistan (suicide attacks, improvised explosives) and stirred primarily by the Taliban groups and the radical Hizb-i-Islami faction (headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), and to a lesser extent, by Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic militants from abroad. These groups are particularly active in the eastern and southern provinces of the state (where one can even speak of a Taliban offensive) and in these regions the number of ISAF forces rose throughout 2006.

The deteriorating security status is aggravated by a permanent weakness of local administrative structures and frequent instances of corruption among central government officials. This, linked with the ethnic divisions within society, enhance the feeling of deteriorating security. Karzai's government has also been unable to embrace the entire state territory within their authority, and the President himself fails to enjoy stable support across all of the major ethnic groups.

One of the key threats to stabilization in Afghanistan is the production of drugs and the profit it provides, which is being used to fund rebels and anti-government groups. The *World Drug Report 2006*, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indicates that 4,100 tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan in 2005, which accounts for 89% of the drugs' global production. Such large quantities of opium can be used to produce 410 tons of pure heroin. Some 90% of the heroin in the Polish market comes from Afghanistan. Furthermore, based on tentative projections of UNODC, the

volume of the opium poppy harvest in 2006 totalled approximately 6,100 tons. The scheme for compensating those farmers who destroyed their poppy crops failed (approx. 400,000 hectares are used annually to cultivate poppies, of which, for technical reasons, only 10% can be destroyed). The limitation of drug production in Afghanistan can only become a reality if there is full co-operation from local leaders with the government. This, however, will be extremely difficult to achieve, as the leaders are keenly interested in keeping this illegal activity going. For both them and the terrorists it is a sizeable source of profit.

In addition, problems with security and border controls, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, the poor economy and education provision also exert a negative influence on the security situation. A particularly formidable challenge is to ensure the proper control of the border with Pakistan, a significant portion of which runs through inaccessible, mountainous areas, populated by nomadic tribes, whose place of residence changes frequently. Moreover, it is through this border that Islamic extremists, having previously attended numerous Koranic schools in the frontier regions of Pakistan, trickle into the country.

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For a long time Afghanistan has been a place of permanent rivalry between neighbouring states. Influence on the country was also sought by empires from outside Central Asia. In the past, it was invaded by the Mongols and, between the 18th century and 1947, was the scene of a struggle for control between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia (later the Soviet Union). By subduing Afghanistan, and subsequently Baluchistan, the Kremlin wanted to secure a safe path to the Arabian Sea. Britain on the other hand, had been interested in expanding its Empire.

In an effort to achieve its geopolitical objectives, the USSR launched a military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. In the 1979–1989 time-frame, some 80,000 Russian soldiers were stationed in the country permanently (at its peak, that number rose to 150,000). However, despite such a substantial engagement, they never managed to gain control over the entire country.

The present operations in Afghanistan are of a totally different nature. The ISAF mission is purely a stabilization one. Forces that operate under ISAF are to provide support to the legally elected authorities of Afghanistan. However, the mission's success depends not only on the military progress, but rather requires a comprehensive approach, not only combating the drug business, but also

covering border control, road construction, education and the adjustment of clan and tribal bonds so that the various ethnic groups can co-exist in one Afghan society. That is why reconstruction and re-establishment, executed under Provincial Reconstruction Teams, are vital for the ultimate success of the operation. The task of ISAF is to help with the training of the Afghan security forces, so that the latter are able to assume more and more responsibility for the state's security. This leads to a positive perception of ISAF forces by the Afghan community. They are not viewed as invaders, but rather as guarantors of stability and security. Poland's participation in ISAF will contribute to the success of the entire mission. It will help stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, and ensure that Afghan people are hosts in their own country.

The stabilization process in Afghanistan will be neither quick, nor painless. Plans for comprehensive actions must provide for a long-term effort, supported by appropriate financial outlay. It is important that the expected outcome of the mission is not defined in European terms. The international community must acknowledge the cultural difference of Afghanistan and the entire region.

The operation in Afghanistan is a new challenge to Poland in the 21st century. It is currently the most serious and the most challenging mission embarked on by the Polish armed forces. However, this mission strengthens NATO, hence it enhances Poland's security. Moreover, the mission will generate valuable experience for the Polish armed forces as they are operating in challenging combat conditions. It will also enhance the capabilities of the modular operation of the Polish forces (part of its modern force structure), as well as help them to gain further experience as part of a multinational task force. Our units are well-trained and well-equipped, which assures us that their mission will be successfully accomplished.

World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective)*

The most important trend of contemporary global civilization is the ever strengthening interconnections between events; those that take place in some regions of the globe resonate, directly or indirectly, in others. This results from tremendous technology growth, notably in communications and transport, which enables quick and relatively easy flow of information, capital, goods and unrestrained movement of people. With the latter, the matter is more complicated, although no insurmountable obstacles exist in this respect. We should finally note the technological advance in military means of destruction, and ever more acute problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. Modern weapons are available not only to states with relatively reasonable political systems, but also to those, whose actions are unpredictable and difficult to control. In addition, those states are often located in key strategic regions of the world. Combined, all these factors determine the nature of threats that humankind faces at present.

This paper often refers to “stabilization” and “destabilization,” and the terms themselves may create some interpretational confusion. They both refer to the state of balance in the system where subcomponents interact: the disturbance of the balance may either lead to the systemic collapse and chaos, or give way to a new order. In economy, distinction is drawn between static and dynamic balance. In the former case, destabilization necessarily leads to decay, while in the latter, the change in status of one component, which involves disturbance of the balance, is followed by accommodating actions which restore the balance in the system. However, even in dynamic systems, the tolerance for disturbance has its limits, the transgression of which leads to disintegration.¹

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¹ As exemplified by the analysis of the rise and fall of civilizations in Arnold Toynbee’s monumental work *A Study of History*. Oxford University Press, 1961.

The basis of the world order is formed by institutions. These are formal or *de facto* adopted rules of conduct for specific situations, or systems of such rules, usually extremely complex ones (the state, market economy, etc.). The stabilization-destabilization dichotomy applies to the will of the actors, or lack of it, to respect the rules that govern the order. After a certain limit of tolerance is exceeded, deviating actions necessarily lead to the global destabilization. The power of institutions is measured by the sharpness of limits, i.e. the ability to eliminate actions that contravene the adopted rules.

Evolution of the World Order and Functional Types of Threats

World order here is understood as a system of formal and custom-based institutions that govern the behaviour of states and their mutual relations. Such institutions are international and supranational organizations, as well as international legal regimes in the form of bilateral and multilateral treaties. A threat to the world order is defined as any actions taken by states, international organizations as well as any illegal, criminal or terrorist groups, intended to undermine such order.

The contemporary world order has not followed a natural path of development. On the one hand, it is the result of a spontaneous development of the Euro-American civilization. On the other, this very development has led to the emergence of relations in which an intentional act of shaping their environment by people has become a rule: to a large extent, the contemporary societies live in the world of artefacts.

Initial globalization processes are linked with the exploration and conquest of other continents by European states that started in the 16th century.² The event that marks the start of globalization is the British domination in the nineteenth century, which ended with the First World War. It was mainly Great Britain that transferred the stimulus for modernization from Europe onto other continents.³ After the period of *interregnum*, continuing for twenty-five years, hegemonic functions were slowly taken over by two states: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Their political systems were mutually exclusive; therefore the relations between world systems that they gave birth to had the nature of zero-sum games. Since either of the superpowers had the military potential that

² More on this issue in A.Z. Kamiński and B. Kamiński, *Korupcja rządów: państwa pokomunistyczne wobec globalizacji*, Warszawa, 2004.

³ See N. Ferguson, *Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World*, London, 2004.

would allow total annihilation of the opponent, even in the case of the complete destruction of their respective territories, they had to come up with the rules to prevent a direct military conflict. This gave way to a peculiar order. The final effect of the clash between alternative world orders was the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989, followed in 1991 by the collapse of the USSR.

In either case, the state with hegemonic roles imposed components of their internal order on the outside world. This was providing the hegemonic state with an advantage over the remaining actors, yet it was accompanied by responsibilities and burden that other states did not have to shoulder. Obviously, tools used by the respective hegemonic states were markedly different, as was the total balance of costs and benefits for the participants in the two world orders.

The present world order is based on the system of international institutions, the emergence of which was largely inspired by the United States in the final acts of World War II, or shortly thereafter. The institutions comprise economic organizations that were to ensure smooth operation of the world economy and crisis management to mitigate the ramifications should prevention fail, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and GATT, transformed in the nineties into the World Trade Organization. Political conflicts were to be prevented by the United Nations Organization. As planned by its authors, from the very inception, disputes among states were to be resolved by negotiations, rather than wars.

With the progressing functional integration of the world, next to political and military interrelations, other links have appeared that are changing the nature of threats for external and internal security of contemporary states. In the twenties, Europe was afflicted by the “Asian” flu—epidemics grew global. The economic crisis of the thirties made the world aware that economic interrelations exist that no modern country can be free from. Financial crises of the late nineties in the markets of Asia and Latin America disturbed the operation of the global financial system.

The advance in information technology and the development of communication technologies, opening up new expansion prospects for global financial markets by the migration of capital flows to the IT realm, has vastly increased the economic integration of the world. Simultaneously, the dependence of the modern civilization on information flows renders information a sensitive component of the international cooperation. Effective disturbance of information flows may result in economic chaos on an unimaginable scale.

The development of transport and relative openness of borders have given rise to mass population migrations, notably to the states of the civilizational “core,” where the incomers have problems with acculturation, and their isolation continues to haunt subsequent generations.⁴ Under the circumstances, increasing numbers of people perceive the culture of the West as external, or even hostile.

Widespread access to mass media means that people all over the world, also in its poorest regions, can find out about living standards in the wealthiest societies. Thus, their aspirations grow without the chance of ever being fulfilled. This, in turn, provides grounds for migrations to richer countries, and also stirs up envy and hostility. Centres of unassimilated immigrants, pervaded by the sense of alienation, envy and hostility, offer fertile soil for global terrorism. If they also happen to be targeted by certain ideologies, they may easily become a threat for the society that has accepted them. Terrorist networks and international criminal groups are using modern means of contact to communicate and coordinate their actions. Thus, political and economic globalization is accompanied by the globalization of criminal activity and terrorism.

Increased intensity of international criminal activity necessitates not only the global-scale coordination of efforts by national law enforcement agencies, but also cooperation in terms of tracking financial flows, in order to identify channels through which crime-generated funds become legal. Criminal organizations are often closely cooperating with terrorist centres, and terrorists often engage in criminal actions to raise the funding they need.

The development of industry and the related external effects have led to the situation where resources that have been considered free thus far, such as air, water, climate, condition of the stratosphere, etc, have lost this characteristic. Individual states began to pay attention to the condition of the natural environment (global warming), initially to the pollution generated by their own industries, later to that from the neighbouring states, and finally to the pollution from remote states. The general public of highly developed countries is worried both by the impact of the Amazon forests and Indonesian jungle being cut down, and the pollution generated by the industry in China, the US, and India, on global climate conditions. External effects that are generated by some countries are internalized by others. The lack of effective regulatory system at the

⁴ “Civilizational core” is understood as highly developed capitalist states, next to North America and the EU, Australia and New Zealand, also Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

international level must lead to a peculiar vicious circle, and finally to a global environmental disaster.

On the one hand, the West has come up with an expansionist, innovative civilization, open to all societies that are willing to adopt the values and institutions that enable their inclusion in globalization processes. On the other, its primary locations are marked by the presence of groups that do not want, or cannot accept the civilization, and feel no ties with it whatsoever.

As a side remark, let me refer to the issue that is of significant importance in the context of “lasting existence,” namely the symptoms of exhaustion of the Western culture’s spiritual potential, the loss of confidence in its values, solidifying opposition against the principles that form it and determine its existence.

The global order, in all areas referred to above, has grown to be the common “public good”—when the “produce” and “supply” are there, everybody benefits irrespective of the outlays made, but when they are absent, everybody unavoidably loses.

East-West and North-South: Axes of Threats

Global threats can be located along two axes: East-West and North-South. While the East-West axis draws a dividing line in terms of political stability, the North-South axis does so in terms of wealth. We should remember, however, that these are general trends only, and cannot provide the basis for a definite classification of states as belonging to either extremity of the axis. This, in turn, leads to several reservations that must be made. The East-West division does not correspond to hemispheres of the Earth, as e.g. Europe is located in the western regions of the eastern hemisphere, while Australia and New Zealand are in the south-eastern hemisphere. On the eastern side of the East-West axis there are Japan, Taiwan and South Korea which, in terms of political systems and the level of economic development, and hence political stability, belong to the global “core,” even if in terms of geography they are located in the east.

In the geopolitical sense, the East-West axis encompasses regions of different significance for global security: the Atlantic region stretches between North America and Europe, and the Pacific region is located between the western coast of North America on one side and Australia and New Zealand, along with China, Japan and Russia, as well as many other states in the Pacific Ocean, on the other. In most general terms, the axis distinguishes between regions marked by their recent high rate of economic growth and growing consumerist aspirations of the population, which struggle with the establishment of political and economic

institutions required to ensure lasting growth, and the states where such institutions have been developing for centuries, which enabled their high level of affluence. Regions to the east of the axis include, among others, old civilizations that subsequently fell victim to European colonialism, or were threatened by it, which are ready to adopt institutional models from the West in order to achieve the same level of development. Political and intellectual elites in those regions are following Western patterns, protecting, to the extent possible and desirable, their own cultural traditions, cherishing local aspirations which sometimes evolve into strongly nationalist phenomena. The level of identification of those societies with the order based on the civilization of the West has its limits, although this type of order is prerequisite for the fulfilment of their development aspirations.

On the eastern side of the axis, institutions of government have thus far been working efficiently, although the tension between their limited capacity to embrace the change and high pace of economic development, combined with tensions resulting from accelerated modernization of those societies, may lead to political and economic destabilization, the containment of which within regional boundaries may prove impossible. Therefore, if we consider the role of the region in the global economy, the consequences of the crisis there for the global order may prove disastrous.

Thus, the East-West axis separates the states of Asia, where the relations are still governed by the balance of power (where military potential plays a pivotal role), from a more cooperative, governed by international and supranational institutions, system of links between states where the rule of law prevails. This does not imply that the military potential has lost all its significance here, although it definitely is less important than on the eastern side of the axis. On both sides of the axis, power in states is held by coalitions that determine conflicting strategic objectives of the states. Applying Ethel Solingen's classification, the nationalist-etatist coalitions, with strong ideological overtones dominate regions to the east of the axis, while the West is dominated by internationalist coalitions focused more on economic cooperation and conciliatory resolution of conflicts.⁵ They are also marked by an inherently different model of the state.

⁵ E. Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*, Princeton, 1998.

The North-South axis separates regions of fairly stable political systems and economic growth from poorer areas.⁶ Africa in particular is experiencing problems of social disintegration and decay of political institutions. It is in Africa where the number of “failing states” and “collapsed states” is the highest. Their inability to build relatively effective political institutions is a component of their general ineptitude to establish the institutional order in any dimension. Those states are entirely, or partially, controlled by criminal cliques that generate profit from oppressing the population or legally trading in natural resources, or are involved in drug, or even human trafficking. Those countries are also the source of a significant number of migrants heading for the developed states.

Regions located on the opposite extremity of the axis are heterogeneous. South America is different from Africa. On the northern side, next to the highly developed West and rapidly developing East, there are states of Central Asia, bearing many characteristics of the southern end of the axis. A separate sub-region, located in the southern sections of the axis, are Islamic states, stretching between North Africa and South East Asia. This sub-region, heterogeneous as it appears, is influenced by Islamic fundamentalism and its hostile attitude towards the civilization of the West. Here, the threat of proliferation of atomic weapons and their use for attacking the West or Israel is the highest (the issue of rogue states). Middle East should also be treated as a separate region, both in the geopolitical as well as institutional and cultural aspects.

Global Geopolitical System

Acknowledging all its deficiencies, the classification presented above characterizes threats to the global order that emerge in individual areas. However, it presents a static picture of the threats only. The dynamic view is revealed by the geopolitical approach. Raymond Aron presents it in the following manner: geopolitics combines the geographic organization of diplomatic and strategic relations, geographic and economic analysis of resources, and interprets diplomatic attitudes which are a function of the way of life and environment.⁷ The following proposition is partially inspired by the works of Zbigniew

⁶ David Landes points out that if we take a look at the world map, where production or income per citizen is indicated, it turns out that wealthier states are located in moderate zones, notably in the northern hemisphere, while poorer ones are in the tropics and subtropics. D. Landes: *Bogactwo i nędza narodów: dlaczego jedni są tak bogaci a inni tak ubodzy*, Warszawa, 2000, p. 23.

⁷ R. Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nation*, Paris, 1962, p. 197.

Brzeziński, although it departs from his ideas substantially.⁸ Brzeziński looks at the world from the perspective of the United States, and the topic of this paper is Central European security. There is one more reason why the geopolitical perspective assumed here differs from other theories: the division of the world presented here has a geofunctional nature. We are interested in how the geopolitical situation of states that belong to functionally classified areas affects the stability of the world order, that is the supply of the global public good, and the security of Central Europe. For this reason, the approach presented here may be called subgeopolitical.

The contemporary world order has a Euro-American nature, as it evolved as a product of the civilization born in Western Europe, later developing under overwhelming influence of the US. It can also be argued that the order is essentially Anglo-Saxon, since the states that have formed it, namely Great Britain and the United States, belong to the same Euro-Atlantic culture. Therefore, let us treat the US and the EU as the Core Area. The second area, located outside the European cultural circle, that has gone through enormous transformations in the last fifty years while retaining its relative political stability, is Eastern and South Eastern Asia, here called the Accelerated Development Area. The third one is the Neutral Area, composed of a mosaic of states from Africa, South America, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. These states, for various reasons, have a limited number of political choices. Despite their potentially significant geopolitical roles, they are mostly the arena of power games between global actors.⁹ The fourth area, namely the Antagonistic Area, is composed of backward states that use various tools of sabotage in order to enhance their influence in the political dimension of the global system, or to undermine the system itself.

The Core Area covers the northern, in geographic terms, part of the Euro-Atlantic region, that is North America and Western Europe. The contemporary global civilization was born and developed here. The relations within this area, and the relations of this area with the Accelerated Development Area will largely determine the future of the world.

⁸ Z. Brzeziński, *Wielka szachownica: główne cele polityki amerykańskiej*, Warszawa, 1997. Probably the first author to use the approach in a scientific manner was H. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in Politics and Reconstruction*, New York, 1919 and "The Round World and the Winning of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, 1943, no. 4, pp. 595–605.

⁹ Ukraine is a good example here. The role of the state in European politics as the "keystone in the arch" was accurately described by Sherman W. Garnett *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, 1997.

As already stated, the present world order has been built based on the project that expresses the American approach to global problems. The United States, owing to its location, economic, as well as political and military potential, is an independent actor in the global system, playing the role of the hegemon, similarly to Great Britain in the past. World leadership is always multidimensional, although each dimension can be represented by a different actor. In this case, the American hegemony encompasses all dimensions: the US is the top political, military and economic superpower, the leader in scientific research and institutional innovation, exerting the strongest influence on cultural models and standards that dominate contemporary societies irrespective of their location and civilizational affiliation. This may arouse resentment, envy, or even hostility from other nations, yet it is the American lifestyle that has become a model to follow in their life aspirations.

It can be stated that a hegemonic state extrapolates basic characteristics of its internal order onto its environment and, in the international realm, aims to be the element that tips the scales either way, in order to pursue the policy of maintaining the balance of power with relatively little financial and human effort. To maintain the stability of the system under these circumstances becomes *raison d'état* of the hegemonic state. The change of the leader always brings about deep-reaching disruption in international relations. This general comment applies to the British leadership prior to World War I, and to the USSR's hegemony in the Soviet bloc, although the latter was primarily of political and military nature.

The contemporary world order is a product of *Pax Americana*, although the undisputed advantage of the US in all areas of social life has already reached its climax. We might have some reservations concerning the way Washington is performing the functions of the leader, even the ability of the US to play the role of the leader may be debatable, but at present no other state exists that could relieve America of its leadership duties. No European state is able to do that, neither is the EU as a whole, as it fails to possess the required institutional and military potential, without even mentioning the vision of global politics, required to perform the role. Therefore, threats to the leading position of the US undermine the stability of the world order. It is not important whether the threats originate from the policy of Washington as such, or policy of any other state, or group of states.

Recently, it has become clear that the most important threat to the position of the United States is the United States itself—its imperial arrogance, which no empire in history has been able to avoid, and which generates overconfidence in

its power, leading to the so called imperial overstretch of the economic potential of the state in the longer run.¹⁰ This inclination has been acutely felt during George W. Bush's first term in office, following the successful campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Its symptoms are the adoption of the "pre-emptive strike" principle for the American defence doctrine, reliance on their own resources (unilateralism) rather than on broad alliances, and on bilateral agreements rather than on deeper cooperation within institutions, the establishment of which was promoted also by the United States, as well as the conviction that to smash the obstacles facing the American policy with military tools will automatically offer political solutions. The fiasco of Washington's policy during the first term in office of George W. Bush led to the change of the policy in the second term, while the losses suffered by America, namely enfeebling its global role, will be difficult to make up for.

In the case of the attack on Iraq, launched in spring 2003, the military success in the short run proved to be a political trap. Washington had no political solutions to the problems that must have surfaced after the military victory. The assumption that overthrowing Saddam Hussein's dictatorship will automatically create conditions for the emergence and development of democracy and market economy was naivety at its peak. An artificial patchwork of groups that are hostile to one another (Shia, Sunni, Kurds), kept in order by the state's terror apparatus, proved impossible to control with peaceful means after the apparatus had been brought down, even more so, given disadvantageous regional environment. Problems with controlling the internal situation in Iraq lead not only to destabilization in the region, making the threat of war with Iraq's neighbours tangible, but also keep Washington's eye on the Iraqi problem and tie its military force and massive funding in the region, thus preventing the United States from performing the role of the world leader.

The reinforcement of the US position in the world may prove difficult, if possible at all. The precondition for success in this respect is pulling the military force out of Iraq, simultaneously ensuring stability to the state, and consequently the region. Furthermore, the United States must keep the present pace of economic growth and its innovation levels, deepen transatlantic cooperation and strengthen, or at least keep at the present level of efficiency, the political and military presence in the Pacific region. As a result, keeping the hegemonic

¹⁰ P. Kennedy in particular emphasizes the impact of this factor on the fate of empires, *Mocarstwa świata: narodziny, rozkwit, upadek. Przemiany gospodarcze i konflikty zbrojne w latach 1500–2000*, Warszawa, 1994.

position in the global system requires from the US government a formulation and consistent application of a clear strategic concept, and close cooperation with other democracies, notably with the European Union. This, however, requires good will and commitment of the EU and democratic states in other regions of the world, including those from the Pacific region. With the Union, this will not be an easy task to accomplish.

The western part of the European continent is the most integrated region of the globe in terms of political and economic bonds. It is marked by a high average wealth figure and political stability. The evolution logic of the integration processes was initially focusing on joining the economies, which was regarded as a precondition preventing military conflicts that ravaged Europe in the twentieth century, and a step towards a closer political integration. Supranational integration for Europe is provided by the European Union, the essence of which is common market for goods and services (first pillar), partially common currency (euro) and common borders (Schengen treaty). The progress in integrating the economies forced the member states to strengthen their political bonds. Furthermore, the prospects of enlarging the EU with Scandinavian states and Austria, and subsequently with eight post-communist states, Cyprus and Malta, generated the requirement of strengthening the European institutions. The Treaty of Maastricht was intended to serve that purpose, as a result of which the economic pillar was joined by the pillars encompassing internal state security as well as common foreign and security policy. The level of the Communities' integration in the latter field probably still leaves a lot to be desired.

Three factors provided the impetus for European integration: a) two world wars, which were triggered off by the mechanism of the balance of power between empires of the continent, linked with the Westphalia order; b) consistent pressure from Washington to develop multilateral cooperation between states of the western part of the Continent; c) threat of the Soviet invasion. The concurrent operation of all three factors spurred the effort to reorganize European relations in a fundamental manner.

Fundamental for the process of the integration was the change in the relations between France and Germany, necessitated by historical circumstances. France's *raison d'état* since Richelieu's times until after World War II was to enfeeble Germany. The rise of its power was the most serious threat to France. Hence all diplomatic efforts from Paris both after World War I, and immediately after World War II, intended to weaken the opponent to the largest extent possible. It was the United States, assisted by Great Britain, that managed to

change France's stance. The US, in the face of the communist threat, irrespective of their traditional preference for multilateral solutions, was aiming at the political stabilization and military reinforcement of Western Europe. Ultimately, Paris also discovered that the European integration was an effective political tool to control the neighbour. From Germany's perspective, its participation in the peaceful reconstruction of Europe became an opportunity for internal rearrangements and modification of its image among the nations of the continent. With the passing of time, owing to its key role in the policy of the united Europe, Germany regained the position of the continental power.

The primary problem for European integration has become the necessity to reconcile sovereignty of national states with subordinating them to decisions by supranational institutions, which, until that time, had been totally controlled by the states. Therefore, the very essence of the concept of national sovereignty has been evolving.¹¹ The EU states must, by the very fact of their accession to the EU, pursue most of their interests in supranational institutions, and therefore consider interests of other partners and use varying coalitions to achieve their individual objectives. The government's reputation has therefore grown to be a resource. Stable governments, able to cooperate with other governments, predictable in action, manifesting their sense of responsibility for the interest of the community, are much more likely to achieve the desired effects than those driven by their own interests only, paying no attention whatsoever to needs and opinions of others.

The European states, focusing their attention on the economy and conflict-solving through negotiations, have ensured peaceful co-existence for themselves.¹² Concurrently, the significance of Western Europe for global politics has dwindled. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, Europe survived the times of the Cold War under the protective umbrella extended by the Washington Treaty and the United States. Secondly, the actual adoption of the status of the American protectorate has deprived Europe of the global vision and the sense of responsibility for global affairs. In global terms, Europe has become a traveller without a ticket of sorts. This is expressed not only by the European states'

¹¹ See A. Kamiński, "Suwerenność państwa polskiego w nowym układzie europejskim," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2003, no. 4, pp. 5–37.

¹² Jan Zielonka convincingly explained how the factors that led to the described state of affairs, at the same time hinder the establishment of the common European foreign and security policy. See *Explaining Euro-Paralysis, Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*, London, 1998.

volume of spending on defence, but also by policies of individual states in Europe.¹³

Recent years have seen a major shift in the European situation, notably in terms of transatlantic relations and Russia's international role, whose effects on European institutions are still difficult to assess. The end of the Cold War triggered off changes in the European geopolitical (Russia's withdrawal from the centre of Europe) and institutional system (enlargement of NATO and the EU). Here, however, the European concept has been exhausted. The attempts to make another step towards the institutional reinforcement of Europe fell through. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected in referenda by France and the Netherlands as under the bureaucratic cover of a collection of the treaty provisions accumulated thus far no attractive vision of common Europe could be found.

The US involvement in Iraq, without the support of the UN Security Council and in the face of active resistance from France and Germany, initiated the latter countries' rapprochement with Russia on many issues, not only the Iraqi problem. This revealed the weakness of Euro-Atlantic bonds and deep divides within Europe itself concerning the EU's role in global politics and preferred vision of the global order. France and Germany, or at least Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government, opted for a multipolar order, under which Euro-Atlantic bonds would be significantly looser.¹⁴ The effect would be the restoration of the traditional system of the balance of power. This was actually reflected by the American concept of unilateral actions and changing bilateral alliances entered into based on specific Washington's interests (the first term of Bush's presidential policy). States of Central Europe as well as many states of the "old Union" took the stance that opposed German and French proposals, by opting for closer Euro-Atlantic cooperation. This is how their support for the American campaign in Iraq should be interpreted.

The shift in the German policy, initiated during Chancellor Schröder's term, is vital for the future of the European integration. The change is evidenced by:

- 1) strong anti-American overtones, independently of the discord on Iraq;

¹³ This is exemplified by the attempt of the governments of France and Germany to lift the embargo on the sales of state-of-the-art military technologies to China, motivated purely by their present economic interests.

¹⁴ In this respect, their attitude came close to that of China and Russia. As pointed out by Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the concept of the multipolar world is "nothing else than politically correct presentation of the proposal to divide the world into areas of influence." See A.D. Rotfeld, *Polska w niepewnym świecie*, Warszawa, 2006, p. 63.

2) rapprochement with Russia, a symptom of which was the agreement on the construction of the Baltic pipeline; 3) Germany's attempt to achieve the status of the UN Security Council's permanent member. While the basis of Germany's policy until recently was the European integration as a manifestation of the German *raison d'état*, the ambition of Schröder's government has been to ensure for Germany the position of a self-reliant player in the global system, independent of the EU. The cooling of relations with the US, the rapprochement with Russia, and the shift in the European aspects of the state policy were used as means to attain this objective.

When taking over as German Chancellor, Angela Merkel introduced significant changes to German policy, notably in terms of relations with the United States. However, the rapprochement with Russia, even if slightly less intensive, appears a relatively stable component of Berlin's policy. The threat it generates undermines not only the interests of Russia's neighbours, but also the very idea of the European integration (focus on direct, short-term national interest) and the stability of the global political order, as an important European state initiates independent actions without the sense of responsibility for the global order and without a global strategic vision.

The shift in Germany's policy, if maintained, will deprive Europe of its natural leader. The rejection by France and the Netherlands of the Constitutional Treaty, growing indifference among the societies on the continent for the European project, and purely utilitarian attitude towards the EU of the governments of the new member states aggravate the paralysis of European institutions. A major task for the Union, if it is to evolve gradually into something different than a mere free trade zone, is to restore leadership and instil new life into the European project. Both issues are interconnected. The reinforcement of European institutions may materialize only on the foundations of the community of values and strategic objectives, which translates into the need to offer a precise definition of the institutional boundaries and principles of cooperation with the outside world. Since global interrelations are deepening, the European vision of the world must be worked out, and means provided to implement the vision. This would provide grounds for the transatlantic cooperation for the stabilization of the Antagonistic Area. The European Union represents a natural partner in leadership for the US, as no other partner in this respect is emerging, but if the EU is to become one, it must shoulder the joint responsibility for global affairs.

Thus, Europe is caught between possibly insurmountable difficulties. On the one hand, it is not able to make a decision whether to continue towards

federalization, or be happy with the strengthening of the economic community, retaining political unity at the minimum level, required for economic unification. On the other, whether to remain loyal, yet autonomous partner for the US in global politics, or to play its own game, building coalitions with Russia, or China, or both, depending on the nature of the particular issue, being more of an opponent of America than its ally. Opting for strategic partnership with the US would require tighter political and military integration of the EU, increase in military spending, establishment of Europe's proprietary concept for global politics, solidification of the foundations of the Atlantic cooperation, that is reaching with the cooperation beyond the geographic area that obligations within NATO have covered thus far, and closer strategic cooperation with the United States, also in other areas. This choice would also have its consequences for the evolution of the internal system of the European Union, bringing with it the requirement of closer internal coordination. Even assuming that the will to proceed with this project exists in Europe, the will of Washington to accept the offer would also be necessary, which is not a foregone conclusion at all, as also here the lack of a clear vision for the global strategy and the role that Europe could play in it, is evident.

Accelerated Development Area. Global geo-economic and geopolitical changes in progress over the last decades indicate that the centre of gravity in terms of global development has started to move to the Pacific region, and that the process is mainly operating in PRC and India. The role of the two states in scientific research and application of modern technologies has also been on the rise, not even mentioning their economic dynamism. It is a vital issue in terms of preventing the shocks, inevitable in case of any change in the global leadership, to what extent the states of the Core Area are able to enhance international organizations before it happens, in order to achieve a relative smoothness of the change.

Post-war transformations in East Asia were triggered off in the late sixties by a dynamic expansion of the Japanese economy, joined several years later by South Korea and Taiwan, and in mid-seventies by the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. The eighties marked the beginning of an unprecedented growth, continuing until today, of one of the two Asian giants, namely PRC, while the nineties saw a rapid development of the economy in India. This is how the entire subcontinent of East Asia, with few exceptions, has entered the fast track of modernization. This has far-reaching consequences for the global strategic situation in all its aspects.

In terms of the economic dimension, the imbalance in trade exchange, between the highly developed North West and Asia is repeating itself, with the latter as the beneficiary. Cheap and relatively well-educated labour force, combined with the economic growth, has created advantageous conditions for foreign capital investment. Asian governments are not only copying Western technologies, but also send tens of thousands of young people to the best universities of the world. This opens up opportunities for Asia to join the global technology race. This fact has convinced many observers that it is reasonable to forecast a gradual overstretch of the leadership potential of the West, to the benefit of Asian superpowers. However, the issue appears to be much more complicated.

Firstly, the accelerated development of Asia is a sudden leap from poverty and backwardness to modernization. In the case of China and India, the leap is unprecedented. The resultant effect is the co-existence of islands of wealth and the ocean of backwardness and deprivation. The opening of the states in economic terms offers to the states the prospects of economic advance on an unparalleled scale, but has occurred within an extremely short time frame. The price tag that this progress carries is the mutually interacting imbalances of economic, social and political nature. In China and Vietnam, an additional factor is the underdevelopment of political and economic institutions. A deep economic crisis appears extremely likely here. This would lead to the crisis in the world economy which owes its present dynamism largely to the energy coming from Asia. This would also have unimaginable repercussions for the political and military security not only in the region, but also globally.

Secondly, political and military relations in the Pacific region are based on the balance of power. The Asian modernization ideology draws on nationalist sentiments—they form the basis for the legitimacy of authorities. The purpose of China's expansion is not only the economic progress, but at least domination in the Pacific, which does not make the consensus in the region any easier.¹⁵ A potential counterweight for expansionist China is Japan, although it fails to have either the territory, or the demographic potential, to allow it to play the role in the future. The historical factor, namely demilitarization of post-war Japan, but

¹⁵ Chong-Pin Lin claims that “one of Beijing’s key ambitions in terms of (...) the emerging concept of national security (...) is to dominate in East Asia by depriving the United States of its leadership role in the region.” [Quotation retranslated from Polish] *Formująca się wielka strategia Chin: ku dominacji w Azji Wschodniej, ale bez walki*, lecture at the Warsaw School of Social Psychology in Warsaw, 14 November 2006.

also complex relations with the neighbours, whose suffering under the Japanese occupation in World War II was abominable, renders the adoption of the role by Japan difficult. Thus far, Tokyo has done little to appease the historical disputes with the neighbours.

India also has imperial potential, and Indonesia might have it in the future, too. However, several decades have to pass before India achieves the modernization level on a par with China. Indonesia, in turn, is marked by weak institutional structures. Here, the role of the state that tips the balance, similar to the role Great Britain played in the “Europe’s concert” in the 19th century, is played, whether it wants it or not, by the United States, which may limit the political expansion of China.

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modern economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan’s status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

The effect of China’s development is the diminishing political significance of Japan, perceived by Beijing as a rival in the region. Japan’s and Taiwan’s security, in turn, requires a strong political and military presence of the United States. The withdrawal of the US from the Pacific region would necessarily involve remilitarization of Japan, the arms race and, considering the weakness of institutions for regional cooperation that regulate emerging issues, the escalation of political tension. One of the main priorities of China’s foreign policy is a gradual limitation of the American presence in the Pacific, also in Central Asia, where PRC has Russia as its ally in this respect.

It is often emphasized that India is the biggest democracy in the world. Until recently, the problems the state was experiencing after pulling out of its backward past, were ascribed to this fact. However, with its present dynamic growth, the democratic foundations of the system might give India an edge over China, although the state is still struggling against massive social and political problems. It is also worth recalling that in both countries there are tendencies for a spontaneous decentralization of government, which may even lead to their collapse. However, the likelihood of this scenario is not too high.

India, bordering China in the north, belongs to a different sub-region, namely South Asia, linked with the Indian Ocean. Its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir's affinity still awaits resolution, which, until recently, was effectively used by the Chinese diplomacy. Recent years have seen a *détente* in relations between India and Pakistan, as well as between India and China. Regardless, the conflicts of interests continue to exist, and may escalate, notably in the latter configuration, since, over time, India is likely to try to counterbalance the Chinese influences in South East Asia.

Both, relatively different, regions of Asia, namely the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, will probably combine into one political and economic supra-region, deciding on the dynamics of the global development. States in the region will attempt to counter China's might, by intensifying contacts with India. For the subsequent decades, the US policy in the region will be of pivotal importance, while the significance of Japan, whose island-based location ceased to be a source of geopolitical advantage, is likely to diminish.

The Neutral Area is composed of states which, to a varying degree, are dependent on key actors of global politics, and the subject of their fight for influences. Their value is determined by the resources they have, namely their geopolitical location or natural deposits, as is the case with Central Asia and some African countries (Nigeria, Angola).

A common feature of South America, Africa and Central Asia is their postcolonial heritage. In all other respects, the regions are markedly different. South America is more developed in social and economic terms than central and southern parts of Africa and Central Asia, as the independence of the states on the continent has continued for over 100 years longer than in the case of African states, and for 150 years longer than in the case of Central Asia. Each of the regions has a different culture and historical experience. For demographic and institutional reasons, the developmental potential of South America is greater than that of Africa, while Central Asia's problem is its location in the centre of

the continent, transport problems, and being squeezed in between two powerful states, namely Russia and China. All these areas have a limited number of options at their disposal since their political systems are rather unstable, although the states of Latin America, and Central Asian states, are still more stable than Africa. While there are many failing states (Congo, Sudan, Zimbabwe), or collapsed states (such as Somalia) in Africa, they are not present in Latin America or Central Asia, although, were it not for the assistance from the US, e.g. Columbia could become one.¹⁶

All of these regions have relatively close ties with their former mother countries: South America with Spain and Portugal, although the states there achieved their independence already in the first half of the 19th century; Africa with Great Britain and France, and Central Asia with Russia. The ties have a varying impact on the policy of the individual states: it is marginal in the case of Latin America, more significant for African states, and substantial for Central Asian states. What these states have in common is their significance for the world system depending on their economic and political situation. Their importance is rising if the competition among global actors is stiffening. This was the case in the times of the Cold War and continues to be so at present, when China has entered the world scene, solidifying their political and economic status as superpower. This area has not been active thus far. Based on this fact, it is a periphery, but also an important region and the arena of the games among global powers, whose objective is to secure open access to natural resources.

South America and Africa are also the main sources of immigration to North America and Western Europe, respectively. The majority of the immigrants in the US come from Latin America, while Western Europe continues to be the destination for citizens of African countries, notably Arab states, and those located in the central and southern parts of the continent. As already mentioned, the influx of representatives of other cultures, who find it difficult to assimilate with the new environment, represents a source of serious threats for their host states: there is a surge in ethnic and religious conflicts, criminal activity and terrorist threats.

Finally, these regions are the base for Antagonistic Area, i.e. the area on the borderline between Neutral Area and North America and the European Union. They are a peculiar source of destabilization for the global system, utilised by

¹⁶ The terminology applied by the Anglo-Saxon literature is used here.

the states that intend to undermine it in order to improve their standing in the global order of political and economic influences.

Antagonistic Area covers states and nations displaying a markedly negative attitude towards the existing global order. The antagonisms may be of various intensities, but may also be represented by ambivalent attitudes, as is the case with Russia which cannot finally decide whether it is part of the West, or whether it is to aim at its destruction in the name of “Russian and Slavic ideals.”

This area stretches north of the equator and covers Central America, North Africa, Asia Minor, Russia, Pakistan all the way up to Indonesia, but excluding India. This a border strip between the southern and northern hemisphere, although its borders are rather blurred, which prevents a definite classification of states into the individual categories.

Government in the Antagonistic Area is authoritarian or “electocratic,”¹⁷ easily transforming into leftist-populist, or theocratic regimes. The states’ views are unfavourable, or even hostile, towards the present world order, notably the United States. We can distinguish four types of states within this area, remembering that the classification does not provide clear-cut boundaries, since some states belong to more than one type, and their specific features may change. Each of the cases described below poses different threats for the global order.

1. States, the governments of which are unable to control their entire territory, such as Sudan, Burma, Afghanistan, Columbia and many states of central Africa. Portions of their territories are controlled by revolutionary guerrilla groups, drug lords, or rebel tribes. They are marked by the presence of lasting conflicts that take the form of civil war. Human rights are violated there, mass murders, rapes and robberies, etc, are also reported. Acts of aggression towards their own citizens give rise to mass flights and migrations, involving international humanitarian organizations and causing immigration problems for the neighbouring and Western states.

2. States, governments of which give up control over some social groups. For instance in Saudi Arabia, the government has limited control over the movement of Wahhabis. Here, we look at the case of a state that is fairly effective, strategically important, but at the same time forced to tolerate phenomena that are conducive to the rise of global terrorism. Attempts to

¹⁷ The term “electocracy” has been coined by K. Davisha, “Electocracies and the Hobbesian Fishbowl of Postcommunist Politics,” in: S. Antohi, V. Tismaneanu (eds.), *Between Past and Future: The Revolutions and Their Aftermaths*, Budapest, 2000.

convince such states to liquidate such dissenting groups could lead to internal problems, which would deteriorate the global situation. Also, no control of the Russian government over its law enforcement agencies (here, the latter seem to control the former) can be viewed as another example of such phenomena. In the case of Russia, this leads to the emergence of systems that are formed where the worlds of politics, business and crime meet, which undermine both the internal and external order.

3. States, for which the source of internal integration is gathering support for the ideological and political sabotage against an imaginary enemy, be it “global capitalism,” or “American imperialism.” The states form alliances intended to overthrow or enfeeble the world order. States that belong to this category are Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, recently also Bolivia and Russia. The government of the latter attempts to establish a global cartel of states-exporters of natural gas, which contravenes the principles of market economy. Governments of these states are often promoting the various revolutionary movements, while trying to maintain an appearance of lawfulness. The deficiency of those states lies in the fact that the sources of their legitimacy in the society are always negative values.

4. Rogue states, where the ruling elites profit from supporting criminal activities, as is the case in North Korea, Sudan, Burma, Afghanistan under the Taliban rule, as well as Transnistria and Abkhazia, unrecognized by any government in the world. According to many observers, similar actions are taken by the Russian army in Chechnya, profiting from the drug trade and abducting people for ransom. Governments in those countries, often intentionally, engage in money laundering, support international crime, smuggling drugs and people, as well as human trafficking, etc.

The deficiencies of those states enfeeble the world order, even if not as a result of their intentional actions, by virtue of their limited control, unintentional or apparent, over their own territory.

Neutral Area poses negligible threats to the West, while Antagonistic Area is a source of incomparably more serious dangers. This claim is corroborated by a number of interrelated factors:

1) Hostility towards the Christian (or Western Christian) civilization, deeply rooted in their culture, and/or resentment of the former colonies towards their former mother countries;

2) Natural deposits that give economic power, not accompanied by the sense of responsibility for the global situation;

3) Institutional backwardness, preventing the utilization of their resources for the political and economic development;

4) Resistance of traditionalist communities against modernization that Western influences bring;

5) Regarding the “American imperialism” and “global capitalism” as reasons for all troubles (poverty, social inequality, no prospects) which, in fact, result from bad government.

The frustration of the societies in those countries with the world order and with the hegemonic state that dominates that order transforms them into a peculiar type of enemy. The states in this area are not able to oppose the West militarily and, as a rule, they do not intend to do so. Also, they do little to prevent the widespread of the various terrorist groups, and members of their governments are often involved in international criminal activities.

While the Neutral Area mainly generates humanitarian problems for the West, the Antagonistic Area turns them into more serious threats by adding proliferation of nuclear weapons, violating the principles of international co-existence, or at least by providing discreet support to the states that violate them. Natural resources provide the funding, and source of energy—the tools for blackmail. Their funds may also come from criminal activities, and are often spent on terrorist projects. There is a host of examples of government-tolerated involvement of terrorist-leftist or terrorist-religious groupings in drug trafficking, money laundering, money extortion, etc.

The states in this area are often supported, covertly or overtly, by states that aspire for global leadership, or at least the status of the world power, mainly by China and Russia. They fail to attach any importance to humanitarian issues, therefore the problems that the violation of human rights generates for wealthy Western states serve their interests, as they draw the attention of the world away from their violations of the rules of co-existence. Destabilizing effects of the policies pursued by the states of Antagonistic Area worry the West, which sometimes leads to their direct political and military involvement. Drawing the Western states’ attention to this area, draws it away from other issues, thus increasing the number of options for Russia and China. Finally, good relations with the states of Antagonistic Area enable them to sign advantageous trade contracts. PRC’s activities in Africa and Latin America are a good illustration of such actions.

Contrary to appearances, the contemporary world order is not unshakable. If it collapsed, it would probably fail to return to the state of dynamic balance. Reasonable economy is not a universal value. The states that utilize the benefits that the present global order has on offer, are often turning into passengers without tickets, while others try to generate profits by breaking the rules that form the basis of the order. An alternative to the present global system would be a disaster and unimaginable regression in the development of humankind.

Central European Security

There is a significant diversity of problems related to security, and perspectives on the world order, among Central European states,¹⁸ even if we narrow them down to the Visegrad Group and the Baltic states.¹⁹ A feature that the states of Central Europe share is the history of the last seventy years, although their relation to Nazi Germany was different, as were their places within the communist bloc, reactions to the system they offered, and their exits from communism. Poland, bordering on the Russian Federation, shares, by virtue of this neighbourhood, more interests with the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), than with Hungary, more focused on the neighbours in the south and east. Slovakia is preoccupied with itself, while Poland and the Czech Republic share some problems in their relations with Germany.

The liberation of those countries from Moscow's rule, and their return "to Europe" was connected with the collapse of the communist bloc, and inclusion in the globalization processes. In terms of ensuring security, the key framework for the states in the international system has become their membership of NATO. In all other respects—it is their membership of the EU. Irrespective of the level of comprehension by their leaders of this fact, the *raison d'état* for the states of Central Europe is a lasting *status quo*, which involves: 1) enhancement of European institutions, also in the area of foreign and security policy, and 2) close cooperation between the European Union and the United States. Finally, it is in the interest of Central Europe to see stabilization and democratization of relations in the area of CIS, although this issue is naturally more sensitive for

¹⁸ For simplicity, Central Europe is understood here as the states that acceded to the European Union after 2004, except Cyprus and Malta.

¹⁹ These issues are tackled in detailed, and from various viewpoints, in the work edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *New Europe: The Impact of the First Decade*, vol. 1 and 2 (*Trends and Prospects*), Warszawa, 2006, pp. 57–90.

Poland and the Baltic states, as well as Romania, than for the remaining countries.

From the standpoint of the level of world order organization, Central Europe currently faces the following threats: 1) to the global order which, to a varying degree, may be experienced by the sub-region; 2) to the process of the European integration, 3) of sub-regional nature, haunting only those states that are located in Central Europe, and directly adjacent areas²⁰. The listed threat types may be mutually enhancing or enfeebling, leading to a virtuous, or vicious circle.

Ref. 1 The global order is a system of interrelations. No region and no country can isolate themselves from the processes and phenomena that take place within the system. However, the level of mutual dependence is undeniably changing. In general terms, the more autarkic the economy of a given state, the less dependent the state is on the world order. Autarky is usually a measure of backwardness, but even the states that are least dependent in economic terms cannot defend themselves against global disruptions. In terms of economy, Central European states belong to the category of emerging markets, thus strongly rely on exports and direct capital investment. The global economic recession, even not to mention a slump, could have serious economic and political repercussions for those states.

In terms of military security, Central Europe is among the most crucial regions of the world. It was here that massive military conflicts of the 20th century began, and it was this region that the biggest European powers were fighting for. It was finally Central Europe that had to bear the majority of the cost of those conflicts. The turning point, following the “new opening” as a result of the fall of communism, was the accession of those countries to the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO is of paramount importance for regional security.

However, in the face of growing anti-American sentiments in Europe, and defiance of the American leadership by France and, to a certain extent, also Germany, as well as growing influence of Russia on the European policy, the value of NATO as a guarantor of security for Central Europe appears to be dwindling. No significant progress as regards the establishment of common foreign and security policy of the EU may also put a question mark over the significance of this factor. The third safeguard is the independence of Ukraine, although its lasting status also becomes less and less certain. There are worries

²⁰ The real danger that these threats pose depends not only on objective, external conditions, but also on the quality of the system's institutions.

that following a period of international relations that have been advantageous for the region, a less favourable change in trends is beginning to emerge.

Ref. 2 and 3. Membership of the EU sealed Central Europe's affiliation with the Western European, political and economic community of states, with the core of the global system, which means that the threats are the same for Europe as a region, and Central Europe as its sub-region. What is more, the community also covers the United States and the remaining states of Core Area.

In political and economic terms, Central Europe is part of the European Union, therefore the sub-region's role is a function of the EU's importance in global politics and economy, as well as influences of the sub-region within the EU. However, we should remember that Central Europe is heterogeneous, which means that it is difficult to expect that it will represent a uniform front in the EU as regards the majority of key issues, although short-term alliances in different make-ups may be formed for specific issues. In some respects, Poland's interests are closest to those of the Baltic and Scandinavian states, as the Russian policy and the relations between the EU and Russia are of paramount importance for all these states.

Policy towards Russia is one of the key European problems, and applies notably to Poland, as the largest among the states that border Russia, and the region that Russia wants to subordinate, namely Belarus and Ukraine. Poland is therefore most sensitive to the shifts in the Russian policy and most susceptible to hostile actions by Moscow. Strategic interests of the Russian federation, as regards the issues of top relevance for the EU, include: 1) subordination of states that broke away from Russia as a result of the collapse of the USSR (except the Baltic states), in particular Ukraine and Central Asian states; 2) enhancement of its role in European politics by strengthening political and military cooperation with Germany, and later France, preference for bilateral relations and marginalization of Brussels, as well as consistent enfeebling the transatlantic bonds, i.e. "pushing the US out of Europe;" 3) monopolization of natural gas supplies, becoming the main supplier of crude oil for Europe, and control over the access to the deposits in the Caspian Sea. Regaining the dominant position in Ukraine would automatically restore Russia's control over the Caucasus and Central Asia. The latter is where European interests meet the Chinese ones. China cooperates with Russia in blocking the US access to Central Asia, although the relations between the two states are marred by problems over, among others, crude oil supply. The Chinese are not interested in Russia's comeback to control the area, although they are aware that the population of

Central Asia is more distrustful of them than of the Russians. Greater intensity of the EU's actions in Central Asia would be beneficial for Beijing.

In every of the issues mentioned above, Russia's strategic objectives conflict vital interests of the European Union. Russia is pursuing its goals by using the interests of the governments currently in power, which is clearly evidenced by the case of Germany under SPD rule. The closer the relations between Russia and Germany, the greater the marginalization of Central Europe, notably Poland, as the largest state of the sub-region. Poland appears to be one of the major obstacles that obstruct the achievement of Russia's objectives in Europe. Therefore, Moscow's actions to marginalize the state in European politics are a natural consequence of the Russian *raison d'état*. It also appears that Warsaw has not yet managed to find effective tools to protect itself against this policy.

Russia's achievement of its objectives is facilitated by the United States' involvement in the Middle East and Asia Minor, notably the operation in Iraq. There is no indication that the US can quickly reduce its involvement in the region and, by virtue of this, it is losing all global advantages won in the nineties. From the perspective of Europe's interests, the falling importance of Washington and restored power of Russia in the present shape of the situation, is decisively adverse. At present, it is in the EU's interest to act to enhance the global position of the United States as well as the Union's foreign and security policy, as well as to strengthen cooperation with the US within NATO.

Long-term interests of Central European sub-region require the support to multilateral systems, where Central European states have their stake, notably the EU and NATO, as well as the consolidation of the democratic system and market economy in Eastern Europe. The consequent reinforcement of NATO would ensure closer cooperation in the area of security between the integrated Europe and the United States.

Russian Policy towards Ukraine: Tools of Influence

The relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine are an important component of the international situation in the area of the former Soviet Union. In terms of population and GDP in the region, Ukraine is second only to Russia. The majority of Russian elites and society have never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine, believing that it is the eternal part of the Russian empire and that control over it is a precondition for Russia's strong international position. Finally, both states remain closely interconnected, which allows the stronger partner, which is Russia, to exert pressure on the counterpart, and thwart its attempts at independent policy making.

Political Instruments

After gaining independence, one of the prioritized objectives for Ukraine's policy was to strengthen its independence from Russia. Russia, in turn, was struggling with the problems connected mainly with its imperial past. Despite the differences, both countries developed comparably in the 1990's, which facilitated Russia's influence on its Ukrainian neighbour. A similar political system developed in both countries, marked by the presence of a strong presidential centre. In both countries common roots and similarities between the political and economic leaders enabled the establishment of a pragmatic, often informal, cooperation, and finally, in both countries modern civil society failed to develop.

Starting from 2000, dissimilarities between Russia and Ukraine began to accumulate. Central government solidified in Russia, while in Ukraine there was a growing disappointment with Leonid Kuchma's rule, which prevented the establishment of a strong authoritarian system. In the 2004 elections, the Russian authorities openly backed Viktor Yanukovich, not only because of his pro-Russia image, but also because he, as Kuchma's candidate, the winner of rigged elections and receiver of support from the eastern, Russia-inclined part of the country, would have to rely on cooperation with the northern neighbour. By supporting Yanukovich, Russian authorities suffered a painful defeat. The "Orange Revolution" took Viktor Yushchenko to power and was a proof that

Ukraine and Russia follow separate development paths, which may limit the latter's potential in terms of influencing the Ukrainian neighbour.

Relations at the top level. During Kuchma's rule (1994–2004), direct contacts between the Russian authorities and the Ukrainian leader and his associates played an important role in the bilateral relations. Kuchma's policy in the nineties did not exactly match the definition of "pro-Russian." At the turn of this decade, the position of the Ukrainian president both domestically and abroad weakened significantly. Under these circumstances, Kuchma decided to change sides in foreign policy in exchange for Russia's support. Frequent meetings between Putin and Kuchma, or keeping the prices of the Russian gas at a low level, carried the price tag of limitations to cooperation with the West and growing dependence on Russia. In October 2001, a long-term agreement was signed on additional actions to secure the passage of Russian gas through the Ukrainian territory. In September 2003, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan jointly decided on the formation of a new integrational structure—the Common Economic Space. In July 2004, the intent to become a member of NATO and the EU was crossed out from the military doctrine of Ukraine.

Oligarchic groups. At the turn of the century, an important instrument of influence for Russian authorities was the collaboration with the Ukrainian oligarchic clans. The clans based their power on traditional sectors of the economy, such as the power sector, whose efficient management would not be possible without cooperation with Russia; therefore the interest in establishing closer ties with the northern neighbour was there. Russia cooperated with all the most important clans: from Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk, whereas the latter, and its sister Party of Regions, continue to play a special role, which results from two factors coming into play. Firstly, Party of Regions managed to receive the largest support of Ukrainian voters. Yanukovich got 44.2% of the votes in the final round of presidential elections in 2004, while Party of Regions secured 32.14% in the elections of 2006.¹ Further, Yanukovich was the Prime Minister of Ukraine twice already, from 2002 to 2005 and again from 2006. Party of Regions advocates closer ties with Russia and opposes Ukraine's accession to NATO. In practice, however, its policy is less clear-cut. Main activists of this political group are pragmatically-minded. In addition, there are serious divides

¹ Вибори Президента України. Повторне голосування 26.12.2004. Результати голосування по Україні, www.cvk.gov.ua; Вибори народних депутатів України 26 березня 2006 року. Відомості про підрахунок голосів виборців в межах України, *ibidem*.

within the party itself. One of its wings, tentatively called “political” (with Mykola Azarov as the leader) supports closer ties with Russia. The second, “business” wing (Rinat Akhmetov), primarily wants more efficient state mechanisms and developing cooperation with the Western states, as they are interested in selling to European markets, using new technologies, etc.

Anti-establishment parties. Of relatively little significance in the past were pro-Russian anti-establishment parties, such as the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU). The former, self-proclaimed successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was for years the main pro-Russian power in Ukraine (24.65% of the votes in 1998 elections and 19.98% in 2002 elections²), however failed to become the primary partner for Russia, notably due to president Yeltsin’s aversion to communists. The latter party, established in 1996 and since 2002 part of Nataliya Vitrenko’s bloc, promotes populist and pro-Russian slogans, advocating, among other things, Ukraine’s accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus. The importance of CPU and PSPU in Ukrainian political arena is dwindling. Natalia Vitrenko’s bloc remains out of the Verkhovna Rada, while CPU managed to get a mere 3.66% of the votes in 2006 elections.³ Nevertheless, following the “Orange Revolution,” their importance from the Russian viewpoint grew. PSPU were the co-organizer of protests held against the presence of American soldiers in the Crimea. In July 2006, CPU joined the “anti-crisis coalition,” with Party of Regions and Socialist Party of Ukraine. Based on unofficial information, suggestions of Russian authorities had a significant impact on its position on the issue.

Direct interference with the electoral process. In the past, Russia was involved in presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, providing political, financial or “technical” support to pro-Russian political parties or candidates. In 1994 and 1999, Russia backed Leonid Kuchma in the presidential elections, while in the parliamentary elections of 2002 Russia encouraged Ukrainian voters to vote for “pro-Russian” candidates. In 2004, Russia explicitly supported Viktor Yanukovich.

In the past, Russian “political technologists” also played a major role in the elections—they were formally independent, but actually linked with the Russian

² T.A. Olszański, “Wybory parlamentarne na Ukrainie. Wyniki, przebieg, konsekwencje,” *Prace OSW. CES Studies*, no. 8 (2003), p. 31.

³ *Вибори народних депутатів...*

authorities. Their activities were not limited to advising their clients only. An important part was undermining the credibility of their political opponents (“black PR”), which was possible owing to the cooperation with mass media in Ukraine and Russian and Ukrainian special forces. During 2004 elections, the most prominently featuring individuals in this respect were: Gleb Pavlovsky, adviser to president Putin, and former deputy director of the state-owned TV station ORT, Marat Gelman.

Following the “Orange Revolution,” Russia continued to use tools of influence on Ukraine, as evidenced by the gas crisis or unrest in the Crimea. However, it did not decide to support, in open terms, any of the Ukrainian political groups in the parliamentary elections of 2006.

Economic Instruments

To a large extent, the Soviet economy was centrally governed, autarchic and ineffective. As a result, strong economic bonds between RSFSR and USSR developed. In 1988, over 39% of Ukrainian GNP were deliveries to other Soviet republics.⁴ Following the collapse of the USSR, these links failed to disappear in most cases, as economically uncompetitive post-Soviet states found it difficult to find new partners beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Energy sector. The power industry is a key economic tool of Russia’s policy towards Ukraine for two reasons. Firstly, Ukrainian economy is very power-consuming.⁵ Secondly, Ukraine imports the majority of fuels—mainly from Russia or from Central Asia, yet through the Russian territory. In 2005, Ukrainian imports totalled approx. 54bn cubic meters of natural gas (74% of total demand) and 14.6m tons of crude oil (85%).⁶ An important factor in its dependence on Russia in terms of energy supply is the fact that Ukraine imports the Russian and Central Asian gas at a price that is much below the price paid for the same by European states.

⁴ “Ukraine,” [in:] *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, London, 1992, p. 518.

⁵ Per 1 dollar of gross domestic product, Ukrainian economy uses 20% more energy than Russian economy, 60–70% more than Polish and 8 to 10 time more than G7 economies—С.І. Пирожков (ed.), *Забезпечення енергетичної безпеки України*, Київ: Рада національної безпеки і оборони—Національний інститут проблем міжнародної безпеки, *Стилос*, 2003, p. 5.

⁶ Итоги работы топливно-энергетического комплекса в январе-декабре 2005 года, Минтопэнерго Украины—www.energo.net.ua; *Quantifying Energy. BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, BP, London, June 2006, pp. 24, 27.

Russia was taking advantage of the situation in the energy sector on numerous occasions in order to get from Ukraine the concessions it could benefit from. To that end, in most cases it manipulated the prices for exported energy resources, or imposed limits on their supplies to Ukraine. Rising prices for energy resources and the resultant state debt were also intended to facilitate Russia's acquisition of the Ukrainian energy sector. This objective has been achieved only to a marginal degree.

Energy issues played an important role in the periods that preceded and followed the "Orange Revolution." In summer 2004, Yanukovich agreed to sign agreements on cooperation in the area of energy that solidified Russia's dominance over Ukraine. In exchange, Russia stopped collecting 18% VAT for gas and crude oil exported to Ukraine and other CIS states. The decision was intended to save \$800 million a year, which Yanukovich could turn into his advantage before the elections.⁷

In January 2006, Russia suspended its gas supply to Ukraine. The gas crisis was to serve a number of important political and economic goals. Russia wanted Ukraine to agree to higher gas prices (up to \$220–230 per 1,000 cubic meters) as, after Yushchenko's victory, it did not want to subsidize Ukrainian economy any longer. In addition, it expected the crisis to weaken Ukraine's position in international arena and discredit its new authorities. The objectives were achieved only partially. Ukraine did not agree to the gas price rise proposed by Russia. However, both countries signed agreements on cooperation in the gas sector (January 2006) that were unfavourable to Ukraine. The gas crisis led to destabilization of Ukrainian political scene, and mistrust of the majority of Ukrainian society towards the Russian neighbour.

Trade. Since 1991, Russia has been the most important trade partner for Ukraine, while the latter occupies second rank in terms of exports to Russia, and is fifth in terms of imports from that country. In 2005, Ukrainian imports from Russia totalled approx. \$13.8 billion, and exports \$8.6 billion.⁸ Ukraine's imports from Russia are economy-critical goods (energy resources, machinery, chemicals). Russia is a large importer of machines, boilers and other types of engineering equipment produced in Ukraine (45.9% of total Ukrainian exports in this sector, 14% of total exports to Russia), metals (12.3% and 27%), chemical

⁷ A. Sarna, "Rosyjska ofensywa naftowo-gazowa z ukraińskimi wyborami w tle," *Komentarze OSW* of 28 August 2004—www.osw.waw.pl.

⁸ Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі товарами за 2006 рік – www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

products (16.7% and 9.1%) as well as food and agricultural products (39.6% and 19.2%)⁹ As a result, Ukraine attaches greater importance to mutual trade relations than Russia.

Ukraine advocates trade liberalization in the post-Soviet region, expecting that its uncompetitive industries are going to secure new, ready markets. Russia takes a different position, intending to protect its domestic manufacturers. That is why it delays and limits measures for trade balance liberalization. The Russian-Ukrainian agreement on free trade, signed in June 1993, is of no major importance owing to its numerous exceptions.

Russia is also attempting to take advantage of Ukraine's dependence in trade. Starting from 1999, anti-dumping measures were frequently employed to serve that purpose. In 2000–2002, investigations concerning dumping practices covered e.g. Ukrainian pipes, freezing equipment compressors, bearings, poultry, molasses and starch. The Russian side suggested solving the problems by a bilateral agreement to introduce quotas for Ukrainian exports to Russia. In 2000, the mechanism was adopted for the products of Ukrainian metal industry. The decision benefited Russian manufacturers, who were increasingly concerned about growing imports from Ukraine. For the latter state, the decision to accept quotas was a significant concession, as approx. 45% of metal industry exports headed to the Russian market at the time.

In some cases, Russia's actions also serve political agendas. At the turn of 2006, the state reintroduced anti-dumping measures to apply to pipes imported from Ukraine. It also prohibited meat and dairy products imports from the country, justifying the decision with sanitary requirements. Particularly acute for Ukraine were the restrictions on the dairy sector which markets over 60% of its exports in Russia.¹⁰ This little trade war was planned to weaken Ukraine's new authorities and destabilize the situation in the country on the eve of the elections.

Direct investment. Based on the official data, the aggregate value of Russian direct investment in Ukraine at the beginning of 2006 totalled \$799.7

⁹ 2004 data. Author's calculation based on Товарна структура зовнішньої торгівлі України за 2004 рік—www.ukrstat.gov.ua; V. Astrov, Z. Lukas, J. Pöschl, "The Ukrainian Economy between Russia and the Enlarged EU: Consequences for Trade and Investment," *WIIW Current Analyses and Country Profiles*, no. 23, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, March 2006, pp. 25–27.

¹⁰ R. Bryl, "After Gas Dispute Ukraine, Russia Start Trade War. Long Live WTO?," *IntelliNews—Ukraine This Week* of 6 February 2006—www.securities.com.

million, and Ukrainian direct investment in Russia came to \$102.5 million.¹¹ The figures are not too reliable, though, as some financial transactions take place outside the official channels and/or involve intermediaries from third countries, such as Cyprus (aggregate value of their investment in Ukraine totals \$1.56 billion).

Big Russian corporations entered Ukraine at the turn of the centuries. Clearing Ukrainian debts in the energy sector, Russians received a significant number of shares in four out of six large Ukrainian refineries. Lukoil took control over the refinery in Odessa (9.7% of the processing potential of Ukrainian oil sector), TNK took the refinery in Lysychansk—(36.2%), Alians group acquired a 28% stake in the Cherson refinery (14%), and Tatneft—18% (present share: 8.6%) in the refinery in Kremenchuk (40.8%).¹² Despite the fact that Russian corporations began to exert a significant impact on the oil sector in Ukraine, the state government did not lose control over it, as they remained, jointly with Naftohaz Ukrainy company, the largest shareholder in the largest refinery, located in Kremenchuk. In 2000, Russian Aluminium group acquired the controlling stake in the aluminium plant in Mykolaiv. In 2005, SUAL group purchased another aluminium plant in Zaporizhia. In 2002, MTS, a Russian mobile phone operator, became the majority stakeholder in UMC, the largest Ukrainian mobile phone network.

The involvement of Russian investors in Ukraine is conducive to rapprochement of both states in the political dimension. It could also be used by Russia as an instrument of influence on its southern neighbour. In practice, however, the Russian authorities are not using Russian companies abroad to pursue their political goals, which results from the lack of coordinated investment policy, troublesome relations between the authorities and the business world and ever-closer relations between Russian corporations and their Western partners. It seems, however, that some Russian companies are increasing their involvement in Ukraine, as the country offers a more advantageous business environment than Russia.

Dependence on Russia in economic terms has its negative consequences for Ukraine. Firstly, it offers opportunities to Russia to influence its Ukrainian

¹¹ Прямі іноземні інвестиції в Україну на 1 січня 2006 року—www.ukrstat.gov.ua; Прямі інвестиції з України в економіку країн світу на 1 січня 2006 року, *ibidem*.

¹² 2005 data after “Ukraine: Energy and Electricity Background,” *EIU IndustryWire—Background* of 10 November 2005—www.securities.com.

neighbour. Secondly, it results in Ukraine's dependence on the economic situation in Russia. Thirdly, the effect of economic problems is that a portion of Ukrainian society longs to return to the good old times of the USSR, approaching the independent state of Ukraine with increasing scepticism.

Russia does not, however, hold a dominant position in the Ukrainian economy, lagging behind the European Union in this respect. Investment from the EU 25 (aggregate value at the beginning of 2006 totalled \$11.7 billion¹³) exceeds Russian investment in Ukraine several times. Also, Ukraine's trade balance in dealings with the Union (\$19.76 billion in 2004, \$21.51 billion in 2005) has been greater than the trade balance with Russia (\$17.7 billion and \$20.34 billion respectively) for several years now.¹⁴ The energy sector is peculiar in this respect, since the EU, similarly to Ukraine, is dependent on the supply of Russian gas. However, we should remember that Ukraine has an important asset that limits Russia's freedom in the energy sector, namely the fact that 80% of Russian gas supplies to European countries flow through the Ukrainian territory.¹⁵

Security and Defence Instruments

Shortly before the demise of the USSR, approx. 780,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed on the Ukrainian soil.¹⁶ Soviet nuclear arsenals were also located there. Even before the formal disintegration of the USSR, Ukrainian authorities took control over the armed forces in garrisons all over Ukraine, except for strategic units. Ukrainization of the armed forces was the next step. By April 1992, 483,000 soldiers took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.¹⁷ However, two problems remained unsolved: post-Soviet nuclear arsenals and the Black Sea Fleet. The first issue was solved in mid-nineties. The problem with the Fleet continues to appear as a vexed issue in relations between Ukraine and Russia.

¹³ Прямі іноземні інвестиції в Україну з країн ЄС на 01 січня 2006 року—www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

¹⁴ Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі товарами за 2004 рік—www.ukrstat.gov.ua. Географічна структура...

¹⁵ A. Łoskot-Strachota, *Rosyjski gaz dla Europy*, Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, October 2006, p. 4.

¹⁶ The figures do not include the forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and border protection units (A.J.K. Bailes, O. Melnyk, I. Anthony, "Relics of Cold War. Europe's Challenge, Ukraine's Experience," *SIPRI Policy Paper*, no. 6, November 2003, p. 36).

¹⁷ A. Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Factor," *Foreign Affairs*, 1992, no. 3, p. 93.

Black Sea Fleet. Following 1991, the post-Soviet Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Ukraine, remained totally under Russia's control. From the perspective of the Russian authorities, the Fleet was important for at least three reasons. Firstly, its retention was to protect Russian interests in the region and ensure that Russia had the desired position among other Black Sea states, notably Ukraine. Secondly, preserving Russian armed forces in the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea would testify to Ukraine's weakness and materially hinder the development of the Ukrainian navy. Thirdly, the presence of Russian bases in Ukraine was for Russia an important argument in the context of the developments and tense situation in the Crimea. Russia's determined stance on the future of the Fleet could also be interpreted as a token of potential support to Crimean separatists.

In June 1995, an initial agreement on the division of the Fleet was signed: Russia received 81.7% of its ships, equipment and facilities, while Ukraine got 18.3%.¹⁸ In May 1997, a compromise was reached on the most contentious points, such as mutual financial settlements, or the Fleet's stationing in the territory of Ukraine. The Russian Federation made a few concessions to its neighbour, e.g. it agreed to sign a treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership. The agreements, however, benefited the Russians. Ukraine acknowledged the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea until 2017. Russia achieved its primary objective: retained control over the majority of the Fleet and its infrastructure in Ukraine.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine still generates some problems. Firstly, the agreements of 1997 do not precisely state the principles for their termination, or the order that the exit of the Russian forces from Ukraine would follow. Secondly, the command of the Fleet fails to respect arrangements between Russia and Ukraine, namely it refuses to submit to Ukrainian authorities information on the headcount and equipment listings, carries out exercises beyond the hired areas and refuses access, contrary to the decision of Ukrainian courts, to Crimean lighthouses which may be of strategic importance in case of a military conflict in the region. Thirdly, concerns linger that Russia might want to use its military to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, or to protect its interests in the country. This is particularly worrying, since problems that have divided Russia and Ukraine loom over the Crimea and its immediate surrounding (the Russian minority on the peninsula, the border in the Strait of Kerch). We cannot

¹⁸ Угода між Російською Федерацією і Україною щодо Чорноморського флоту, Сочі, 9 червня 1995 року—www.rada.gov.ua.

rule out the possibility that the Fleet command was fuelling the protests against NATO in the Crimea in June 2006. Fourthly, the question remains open on the impact of the Fleet's presence in Ukraine on the country's integration with NATO. The Washington Treaty does not prohibit members from admitting third-country armed forces. Representatives of NATO states are also declaring that the presence of Russian forces in the Crimea is not regarded as an obstacle in Ukraine's path towards the Alliance. In practice, however, the presence of Russian bases in the territory of the state may adversely affect its credibility as a member of NATO, in particular that Russia opposes Ukraine's accession to the organization.

Industrial and arms sector. Ukrainian arms industry's share in the total production volume of the sector in the USSR came to 17%, offering employment to 2.7 million workers.¹⁹ However, it was catering for the needs of the Red Army only, and dependent on cooperation with sites in other Soviet republics. As a result, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the industry was unable to meet the requirements of the Ukrainian army on its own, due to a small number of complete production processes being operated there (currently, it is able to provide 15 to 18% of the required arms types). At the same time, the industry reported production surplus of some arms types. Under the circumstances, the most appropriate solution was export-gearred production, based on cooperation with Russia.

At the beginning of this decade, approx. 60% of the Ukrainian arms industry output was exported to Russia. The Ukrainian arms sector was 70–80% dependent on supplies from Russia, while the corresponding sector in Russia depended in 50–60% on supplies from other CIS states, notably Ukraine. In 2001, both states were bound by some 40 agreements on arms industry cooperation which flourished in particular in aerospace and missile sectors. In economic terms, cooperation between Ukraine and Russia has a certain justification: specialization and access to the market of the partner state enables them to cut production costs and maximize profits. At the same time, it inhibits the development of Ukrainian arms corporations that could actually compete against their Russian counterparts, rather than work as their subcontractors. In the political dimension, the dependence on Russia has its negative ramifications. Cooperation between the states in the arms sector limits options for Ukraine's cooperation with Western partners and its involvement in European projects

¹⁹ A.J.K. Bailes, O. Melnyk, I. Anthony, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

(other than projects inclusive of Russia) and, in addition, hinders arms imports from other states and the country's compliance with NATO arms standards. Of significant importance is also the problem of the continuity of arms supplies from Russia in case of a conflict between the states.

Ukraine's dependence on Russia has grown to be an instrument of pressure for the latter following the "Orange Revolution." President Vladimir Putin openly warned that if Ukraine establishes closer ties with NATO, Russia will withdraw from cooperation in the most sensitive areas of the military industry complex.²⁰ In 2005, the decision was taken on the production launch by Russian arms companies of, e.g. missiles for R-27 fighter aircraft, engines for RD-36 missiles and VK-2500 helicopter engines, thus far imported from Ukraine. At the beginning of 2006, Russian partners withdrew from cooperation with Zorya Mashproekt and Motor Sich production plants. In July, Russia pulled out of the project for the construction of a transport aircraft An-70. Thus far, Russia's policy has failed to affect, in an adverse manner, the Ukrainian industrial and arms complex, whose exports to Russia in 2006 totalled \$357–385 million (55% of production sold abroad).²¹ A reasonable line of thinking is, however, that in the coming years Ukraine will suffer tangible losses in this respect.

Problem of the Ukrainian border. From the very beginning, that is from the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been impeding the final resolution of the Ukrainian border issue, as some Russian top officials find it difficult to accept that the territory of Ukraine covers regions that did not belong to the Ukrainian state in the past. The borders issue represents another vital instrument of influence on Ukraine. The unsettled border status is conducive to smuggling and illegal immigration, prevents Ukraine from establishing closer cooperation with the EU (in line with Russia's interests) and finally, the dragging talks on the issue facilitate winning concessions from Ukraine in other areas.

The existing borders in the post-Soviet area were confirmed by the declaration of Alma-Ata (December 1991). As a result of Russia's unwillingness, an international treaty that confirmed the inviolability of the border between Ukraine and Russia was signed only in May 1997. This, however, failed to solve all the problems: delimitation and demarcation of the common border was dragging. Following

²⁰ И. Хисамов, Н. Талалай, "Военный чемодан без ручки," *Эксперт Украина* of 4 June 2005—www.expert.ua.

²¹ "Ukrainian Arms Exports to total \$700 million in 2006, Forecast Says," *Interfax Ukraine Business Panorama* of 13 November 2006—www.securities.com.

Ukraine's pressure, delimitation of the land border was finalized in 2000. In January 2003, an agreement was signed on the land state border. Still, no agreement was reached as to the sea border.

In autumn 2003, this issue generated a crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, as Russian authorities started to build a causeway in the Strait of Kerch, to connect the Taman Peninsula (Krasnodar Krai) with the Ukrainian isle of Tuzla. The isle is of strategic importance, as the Strait of Kerch connects the Sea of Azov with the Black Sea. In the face of a resolute response from Ukrainian authorities, Russia stopped building work. However, both presidents agreed in December that the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch are internal waters of Russia and Ukraine, where merchant vessels and warships under the banner of either country may sail. This was a significant success for Russia. Remarkable is also the fact that the dispute met with a peculiar response in Ukrainian society—over 75% of respondents claimed that Ukraine may not use force to defend its territory, which testifies to the special status Russia continues to enjoy in Ukrainian minds.²²

Of a slightly different nature are the problems generated by the conflict in Transnistria. The Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, unrecognized by the international community, and existing since 1991 owing to genuine support from Russia, poses a challenge not only for Moldova but also, to a lesser extent, for Ukraine. It is reasonable to surmise that Russia supports the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic in an attempt to influence both of these post-Soviet republics which declare their intent to integrate with European structures. The conflict in Transnistria generates adverse consequences for Ukraine in two dimensions. Firstly, the existence of a secessionist republic is conducive to the development of organized crime, which destabilizes the situation in the entire region. Secondly, the unsettled status of the border between Ukraine and Moldova (or, actually between Ukraine and Transnistria) may, in the future, impede Ukraine's attempts at accession to NATO and the EU, which matches Russia's intents.

Social and Cultural Instruments

The specific characteristics of Ukraine and its dependence on Russia are largely a consequence of the perceptions of Russia in Ukrainian society and instruments of influence that Russian authorities have at their disposal.

²² W. Radziwinowicz, "Ukraina jako gubernia," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 3 November 2003.

Historical, religious, language and cultural links between Ukraine and Russia run deep. Their bilateral relations are also marked by the post-colonial syndrome, sometimes referred to as the “Little Russia syndrome.” Many inhabitants of Ukraine whose national awareness level is low still regard Russia as the natural leader for East Slavic nations and perceive the Ukrainian nation and its culture through the spectacles of negative Russian stereotypes.²³

The Russian minority and the Crimean problem. According to the general population census of 2001, there are 8.33 million Russians in Ukraine, which accounts for 17.3% of the total population.²⁴ The largest concentration of Russians is in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (58.3%), and in the oblasts of Luhansk (39%) and Donetsk (38.2%); while slightly smaller populations live in the oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa and in Kyiv. Sevastopol is a largely Russian city (71.6%).²⁵ Russians, contrary to Ukrainians, mostly live in cities, and are better educated than Ukrainians. In 1989–2001, the number of Russians fell by over 3 million.²⁶

The presence of the Russian minority in post-Soviet states is a convenient tool of influence on those states for Russian authorities, as it allows them to interfere with the internal affairs of their neighbours, in the defence of allegedly, or genuinely, discriminated diaspora. Russia supports its citizens abroad also because the state counts on their reciprocal support. Ukrainian Russians’ identification with the contemporary Russia is rather poor. An exception from this rule is the population of the Crimea, and Russia used them specifically to weaken the Ukrainian state.

After the formation of the USSR, the Crimea was initially part of the RSFSR. In 1954, it was joined to the USSR as a region (oblast). In the Soviet times, this decision had its symbolic meaning only. Inhabitants of the peninsula

²³ Mykola Ryabchuk estimates that this group covers two-thirds of Ukrainian society, but the figure appears exaggerated (see M. Ryabchuk, *Od Małorosji do Ukrainy*, Kraków, 2002, p. 139).

²⁴ According to 2004 data collected by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Ukrainians account for 75.8–78% of the country’s inhabitants, while Russians for 17.7–19.9% (B.C. Хмелько, *Лінгво-етнічна структура України: регіональні особливості та тенденції змін за роки незалежності*, Київський міжнародний інститут соціології, 11 November 2004, p. 3—www.kiis.com.ua).

²⁵ Національний склад населення—www.ukrcensus.gov.ua. Kyiv and Sevastopol are two “cities with special status” in Ukraine—that is why they are itemized separately in statistics.

²⁶ Національний склад населення України за даними переписів населення—www.ukrcensus.gov.ua.

reacted ambiguously to the demise of the USSR. In December 1991, 54.19% of Crimean population voted for independence.²⁷ For historical, strategic and ethnic reasons, Russia reacted negatively to the loss of control over the Crimea. It also began to support Crimean separatist, who demanded the acknowledgment of the right of self-determination of the peninsula, supporting its inclusion to Russia or accession to CIS as a sovereign member. Russian MPs were on numerous occasions taking determined stances on the issue of the Crimea. In May 1992, Duma deemed the decision of 1954 on including the Crimea into Ukraine invalid, and demanded bilateral talks on the issue. Russian authorities adopted a milder position, underscoring that Russia did not question Ukraine's borders, and that the Crimean issue was an internal affair of the latter state.

Russia's position on the Crimea was the effect of a number of factors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Crimean separatism appeared as a convenient tool for destabilizing Ukraine. Perhaps Russia counted on the same scenario that had taken place in Abkhazia or Transnistria. The policy, however, failed to generate the expected results. This partially resulted from the policy adopted by Ukraine, which, on the one hand, attempted to meet some of the demands by Crimean authorities half-way, and on the other, opposed Russia's attempts at interfering with the conflict. Not without its significance was also the position adopted by the international community, which offered increasing criticism of Russia's policy regarding the Crimean issue. Under the circumstances, Russian authorities decided to use the Crimean problem for their bargaining position. When the agreement was finally worked out on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the principles governing its stay in the Crimea, Russia withdrew its support for Crimean separatists and got involved in the stabilization of the situation on the peninsula, although still demanded its autonomy. Ukraine accepted this proposal. In 1998, the new constitution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was passed. The document provided that the republic was an inseparable part of Ukraine, and its legislation and actions by authorities must comply with the constitution of Ukraine.

The adoption of the constitution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea solved, in practice, the Crimean problem in relations between Ukraine and Russia. In 2002 parliamentary elections, Russian Bloc, demanding, e.g., the inclusion of the peninsula into Russia, received a mere 4.76% of the votes in the

²⁷ R. Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 1994, no. 1, p. 48.

region.²⁸ Nevertheless, the Crimea continues to play a major role in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet is still stationed there and the Russian minority can still be used to protect Russia's interests in Ukraine.

Russian-speaking population. Ukrainian Russians usually do not speak Ukrainian as their mother tongue (3.9%). Many Ukrainians consider Russian as their mother tongue (14.7%). In total, Russian is used as mother tongue in Ukraine by 29.6% of the population. This is particularly well evidenced in eastern and southern Ukraine. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russian is considered as mother tongue by 72.6% of inhabitants,²⁹ and by 71% in the Donetsk oblast.³⁰ The language also plays an important role in Sevastopol, in the oblasts of Luhansk, Kharkiv, Odessa and, to a lesser extent, in the oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernivtsi and in Kyiv.

The emergence of the independent state of Ukraine and the policy of its authorities has weakened the role of Russian in Ukraine. It is only in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, that the situation has not changed, whereas in some other regions of western Ukraine, the number of fluent Russian speakers dropped in the 1990s more than twice.³¹ In 1991, 45% of pupils and students received schooling in Ukrainian. In 2003-2004, the share rose to 75.1%.³² Partially, these achievements of Ukrainian authorities are only apparent. The Ukrainian language is still perceived by some citizens of Ukraine as the language of lower social strata. Public addresses and drafting official documents in Ukrainian are rituals in their own right. Privately, many politicians and officials are still speaking Russian.

Actions to reinforce the position of the Ukrainian language have repeatedly met with Russia's protests. This reaction appears justified from the political standpoint. By taking a stand in defence of not only Ukrainian Russians, but all Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian authorities appealed to people from a much broader social spectrum, counting on their support.

²⁸ Підсумки голосування по партії (блоку) у регіонах. Виборчий блок політичних партій „Руський блок”. Автономна Республіка Крим—www.cvk.gov.ua.

²⁹ Author's calculations based on Розподіл населення за національністю та рідною мовою. Автономна Республіка Крим—www.ukrcensus.gov.ua.

³⁰ Author's calculation based on Розподіл населення за національністю та рідною мовою. Донецька область—www.ukrcensus.gov.ua.

³¹ Поширення української та російської мов—www.ukrcensus.gov.ua. No data on Sevastopol.

³² В. Малинкович, Степень українізації образования на Украине, 10 March 2005—www.igpi.ru.

The significance of language divides in Ukraine grew in 2004–2006. During his presidential campaign Viktor Yanukovich announced that he would insist on granting official status to the Russian language in Ukraine. The “Orange Revolution” and the election of Viktor Yushchenko as president, widened the gap between the eastern and western parts of the country. Prior to March 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovich reiterated the project. In April-May 2006, at the time of feeble central government in the wake of the self-government reform and post-election chaos, authorities in e.g. Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Sevastopol, as well as in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, granted the status of regional language to Russian. However, these decisions were found illegal by court. The Declaration of National Unity, adopted by the majority of Ukrainian political groups in August 2006 provides that Ukrainian remains the official language of the state, but every citizen has the right to use Russian (or any other mother tongue) in everyday life. Prime Minister Yanukovich announced, however, that he would deliver on his electoral promise if he managed to collect the constitutional majority in the Verkhovna Rada.

The debate on the status of the Russian language in Ukraine is not only about the rights of Ukrainian Russians, or Russian-speaking Ukrainians, but rather has a broader dimension to it. Language is an important element of national identity. The policy of ukrainization of the society appears as a building block for a modern Ukrainian state and, conversely, recognition of the special role of Russian may be interpreted as acknowledgment of the post-colonial status of Ukraine and its ties with Russia. In addition, acknowledging the bilingual status of the country would limit the options for teaching English in Ukrainian schools (it is difficult to teach three languages effectively) which, in turn, would weaken the state’s position in international arena.

Russian dominance in culture and information. Russian and Russian-speaking authors and media play a crucial role in the culture and information realm in Ukraine. In 1990, books in Ukrainian in the publishing market accounted for approx. 20% of the total.³³ In the mid-nineties, the proportions between books in Ukrainian and Russian were 37:63.³⁴ It is mostly works by Ukrainian and foreign classic authors, as well as course books that are published

³³ L. Kuczma, *Ukraina to nie Rosja*, Kraków, 2004, p. 221.

³⁴ Author’s calculation based on J.J. Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin, 2000, p. 336.

in Ukrainian. Popular literature, finding many more avid readers, is available in Russian.³⁵ Books in Russian are often imported from Russia. The publishers there have the edge over their Ukrainian competitors, as they benefit from a large internal market in Russia.

A similar situation exists for electronic media, primarily television. Russian TV channels are available in Ukraine on radio waves—in particular in regions that border Russia, and from cable TV providers. For instance, Volia, a leading cable TV provider in Ukraine, covering 860,000 households,³⁶ has 28 Ukrainian and 22 Russian channels on offer (out of 120 channels). The statistics fail to incorporate thematic channels, where the programmes are often aired in Russian.³⁷ In addition, Ukrainian TV stations often re-air Russian programmes without translation, and guests of domestic shows speak in Russian.

Next to artists and groups that sing in Ukrainian or English (e.g. Ruslana, Okean Elzy), there are many Ukrainian artists who prefer the Russian language (Piatnicca and, to a large extent, Bumboks). Very popular with Ukrainians are also Russian bands. Ukrainian Internet is essentially bilingual (not counting English): this applies also to official sites, e.g. of the president and government.³⁸ Sites run by corporations and organizations that operate in eastern and southern Ukraine, or those that advocate approximation to Russia, are in Russian only.³⁹ Ukrainians are also actively using the resources on the Russian Internet.

The strong position of Russian and Russian-speaking authors, media and publishers is a significant asset for Russia. Firstly, it maintains the popularity of Russian in Ukraine, as well as promotes it in traditionally Ukrainian-speaking regions. Secondly, it testifies to the “fraternal” relations between the two nations. Thirdly, it allows the promotion of content in line with Russia’s interests in Ukraine. The information policy of Russian media is one of the key reasons why Ukrainian citizens reject the accession to NATO. During president Kuchma’s term, the majority of Ukraine-wide TV stations were also supportive

³⁵ T.A. Olszański, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

³⁶ Data from: Our business—www.sigmapleyzer.com.

³⁷ Цифровое телевидение—www.volia.com.

³⁸ See: www.president.gov.ua, www.kmu.gov.ua.

³⁹ Sites of Party of Regions (www.partyofregions.org.ua) and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (www.vitrenko.org) are available in Russian and English, while Rinat Akhmetov’s System Capital Management site has the version in Ukrainian, too (www.scm.com.ua).

of Russia. This stemmed from the fact that some of them were owned by the state, while others remained under control of oligarchs who advocate closer ties with Russia.

Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). Ukraine is not homogenous in terms of religious affiliation. Based on 2000 data, 22% of Ukrainians are believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) (UOC (KP)), 12% of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC (MP)), 1% of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). 26% are Orthodox who do not declare their affiliation with any specific Church. 8% of the population are followers of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).⁴⁰

UOC (MP) is a non-independent Church (non-autocephalous), as it is controlled by the Moscow Patriarchate, but also the only canonical Orthodox Church (recognized by the other ones) in Ukraine. Although UOC (MP) is not the strongest one in Ukraine, its skilful strategies secured a strong standing for the Church. In 2005, the Church had approx. 10,600 parishes and 160 monasteries and nunneries that could operate regularly owing to the support of the clergy from Russia. For comparison, UOC KP has some 3,500 parishes and 36 monasteries and nunneries, while UGCC 3,390 parishes and 93 monasteries and nunneries.⁴¹ The majority of UOC (MP) believers live in southern and eastern Ukraine, although the Church is also gaining ground in the western part of the country. The official name (“Ukrainian Orthodox Church”) also helps it grow, as it conceals its subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate.

UOC (MP) is a significant tool of Russia’s influence on Ukraine. This stems primarily from the fact that the Orthodox Church in Russia has been more of a state institution than a religious one since the times of Peter the Great (beginning of 18th century). In the religious dimension, the Moscow Patriarchate and its subordinate Ukrainian Church oppose the establishment in Ukraine of the autocephalous Orthodox Church, although its formation could strengthen the Ukrainian national awareness and overcome the present divides within the society. The position of the Moscow Patriarchate reveals that Russian church leaders have not come to terms with Ukraine’s independence. This attitude may be rooted both politically (Russian policy) and religiously. The emancipation of

⁴⁰ Church Strength in Ukraine—www.risu.org.ua.

⁴¹ Religious Organizations in Ukraine as of 1 January, 2005—www.risu.org.ua.

the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be for the Moscow Patriarchate tantamount to the loss of Kyiv—a historical capital of East Slavic Christianity.

In the political dimension, UOC (MP) takes a rather unambiguous position both on internal affairs and foreign policy of Ukraine. In the past, the Church supported the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). In 2003, its leader Petro Symonenko received from UOC (MP) the St. Vladimir Order. During 2004 elections, the Church was openly backing Viktor Yanukovich. Leaders of UOC (MP) also oppose Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU as well as advocate referendum on granting the official status to the Russian language.

Ukrainians in Russia. There are some 2.9 million Ukrainians who permanently reside in the Russian Federation.⁴² Russia is also the most popular destination for income-related visits, which results from easy border check procedures and no language barrier. It is estimated that 1 to 2 million Ukrainian citizens work there.⁴³ The presence in Russia of 4–5 million Ukrainians is an important argument for the proponents of proximity between the nations and one that fuels pro-Russian stances in Ukraine's policies. At the beginning of this decade, every one out of two citizens of the country had at least one close relative who resided in Russia.⁴⁴ In addition, Ukrainians who work there, as well as their families back in Ukraine, may represent a convenient tool of pressure on the Ukrainian partner for Russian authorities. If the relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorate, Russia may take actions to limit the employment opportunities for Ukrainians, render settling in Moscow and other big cities difficult for them, or even introduce visa requirements. These types of actions have already been implemented for pro-Western Georgia.

Support for the pro-Russian stance. Multifaceted nature of the relations with Russia is reflected by the results of elections in Ukraine (support for pro-Russian groups) and opinion polls. The majority of the country's citizens support the development of cooperation with Russia (62.5% in 2001, 69.7% in 2005). Among factors that may potentially bring the two states together, in 2005 Ukrainians primarily named family bonds (53.9%), common history (49.1%)

⁴² Author's calculation based on Национальная структура населения—www.gks.ru.

⁴³ W. Konończuk, *Pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Rosją. Problematyka migracji z Białorusi, Ukrainy i Moldawii*, Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, December 2005, pp. 2, 4.

⁴⁴ S. White et al., "A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe," *Europe – Asia Studies*, 2002, no. 2, p. 192.

and common economic interests (32.5%).⁴⁵ Older polls indicate that the majority of respondents wanted the relations between Russia and Ukraine to be those of independent states (78% in 2002) and of friendly nature (64%). At the same time, some respondents opted for re-integration with Russia (20%)⁴⁶ and/or expressed longing for the USSR. Both in the past and now, Ukrainians find out that reality does not meet their expectations: Ukraine-Russia relations are evaluated as unstable (61.9% in 2002, 56.4% in 2005) or bad (10.5% in 2002, 7.7% in 2005). Among problems that contribute to the present situation, the following have been named, among others: restrictions in bilateral trade exchange, development of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, the Black Sea Fleet problem and inconsistency of Ukrainian policy towards Russia.⁴⁷

In 2000, 64% of respondents believed that the relations with Russia had some, or even significant, impact on the internal situation in Ukraine.⁴⁸ This argument appears reasonable. Relations with Russia had a substantial impact on the result of 1994 elections, when Ukrainians voted for Kuchma, who declared his willingness to establish closer ties with that country, rather than for Kravchuk. During the 1999 presidential campaign, 71% of respondents had positive feelings about candidates' declarations on the necessity to establish closer political and economic relations with Russia.⁴⁹

Russian policy during the "Orange Revolution" exerted, as argued by 41.3% of respondents, a negative influence on bilateral relations, while a mere 8.6% claimed that the influence was positive, and 36% failed to notice it at all.⁵⁰ At the same time, however, the "Orange Revolution" appeared to put a question mark over the Ukrainian multidirectional policy. Under the circumstances, many Ukrainians opted for closer ties with Russia. In 2003, 36% of respondents supported the multidirectional option, while 15% went for the eastern option (that is closer ties only with Russia, and potentially other post-Soviet states). In

⁴⁵ "Problems and Prospects of Co-operation between Ukraine and Russia in the Assessments of Ukrainian Citizens," *National Security & Defence*, UCEPS, 2005, no. 4, pp. 48, 51.

⁴⁶ М. Міщенко, В. Хмелько, *Динаміка ставлення громадян України до проблем україно-російських відносин*, Київський міжнародний інститут соціології, no date, p. 3—www.kiis.com.ua, pp. 1–4.

⁴⁷ *Problems and Prospects...*, pp. 46–48.

⁴⁸ S. White et al., *op.cit.*, p. 191.

⁴⁹ Н. Чурилов, *Україна между Востоком и Западом*, no date (electronic source), pp. 9–10.

⁵⁰ "Problems and Prospects..." p. 47.

2005, the shares were at 23% and 31% respectively. The share of respondents who did not have an opinion on the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy fell from 33 to 24%.⁵¹

Regional divisions. Russian influences and the support for the pro-Russian option are significantly stronger in eastern and southern Ukraine, which does not mean, however, that western and central Ukraine is negatively inclined towards Russia. Inner variability of Ukraine is, to a large extent, its characteristic feature, and an important tool used by Russia to influence its neighbour.

The largest populations of Russian minority, Russian-speaking citizens, “Little Russians” with no clear-cut national identity are in eastern and southern oblasts of the country: Kharkiv, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, the city of Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine find relations with Russia very important, do not consider Russian language and culture as alien and are mistrustful about Ukrainian “nationalism,” allegedly characteristic of their fellow countrymen from western and central Ukraine. In 2005, 7% of western Ukraine inhabitants supported the eastern option (with no development in relations with the West), 25% of central Ukraine citizens, and 45% of Ukrainians in eastern and southern parts of the country did so, too.⁵²

Southern and eastern Ukraine is populated by 22.2 million citizens, which represents 47.5% of the total population in the country⁵³ and accounts for \$33,632.3 million in foreign trade exchange (47.6% of the total for the entire country⁵⁴). The region’s primary asset is its industrial sector. In 2004, industrial production of eastern and southern Ukraine represented some 69% of the production total for the country.⁵⁵ Russia remains the primary economic partner for eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.

⁵¹ Research for Stefan Batory Foundation (2003), Robert Schuman foundation and Centre for Eastern Studies (2005), [in:] J. Konieczna, “Wirtualny ‘europejski wybór’ Ukrainy,” presentation at the meeting “Ukraine in the eyes of Ukrainians,” Foundation for Polish-Ukrainian cooperation PAUCI, Warsaw, 11 May 2006, p. 4 (electronic material).

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁵³ Чисельність населення на 1 січня 2006 року та середня за січень – грудень 2005 року—www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

⁵⁴ Обсяги експорту-імпорту товарів за регіонами України за 2005 рік, *ibidem*.

⁵⁵ Author’s calculation based on З.С. Варналій, С.І. Мітряєва, М.С. Токар, *Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети*, Київ: Національний Інститут Стратегічних Досліджень, 2005, chapter I—www.niss.gov.ua.

In terms of political dimensions, peculiarity of southern and eastern Ukraine was clearly visible during 2004 presidential elections. In the repeated second round, Yanukovych won by a landslide, with 76.4% of the votes. Yushchenko won in the remaining parts of the country, receiving 73.8% of the votes,⁵⁶ which largely contributed to the defeat of the pro-Russian candidate. The same split was observed during 2006 parliamentary elections. Party of Regions came first in all oblasts of southern and eastern Ukraine and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and in Sevastopol, although the result fell short of the 2004 result (from 39.1% in the oblast of Kherson to 74.3% in the oblast of Luhansk).⁵⁷

Tools in Multilateral Cooperation

Attempts at institutionalization of Russian dominance. An important objective for foreign policy of the Russian Federation was the strengthening and institutionalization of its ties with other post-Soviet states, Ukraine in particular. Ukraine is one of the founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991) and the Common Economic Space (2003). However, the country rejected the vision of their development put forward by Russia and therefore both CIS and CES have never become effective instruments of influence on Ukraine for Russia.

Ukraine consistently opposed Russian attempts to reinforce the CIS. The country e.g. refused to join the agreement on collective security, adopted in May 1992, and failed to ratify the CIS Statute, signed in January 1993. Despite its reserved attitude towards CIS, Ukraine has never seriously considered leaving the organizations for at least three reasons. Firstly, staying in the Community means it has more, even if negative, influence on the development of CIS. Secondly, by the entry into effect in April 1999 of the treaty between Ukraine and Russia, the declaration of Alma-Ata, adopted by the states of the Community in December 1991, had been the only joint document that recognized inviolability of Ukrainian borders. Thirdly, in line with president Yushchenko's words, CIS "still has value for Ukraine as one of multilateral forums for cooperation."⁵⁸

Ukraine and Russia have different views about the future of the Common Economic Space. In accordance with Russian projects, CES is to evolve into a

⁵⁶ Вибори Президента України. Повторне голосування 26.12.2004. Підсумки голосування по регіонах України—www.cvk.gov.ua.

⁵⁷ Партія регіонів—www.cvk.gov.ua.

⁵⁸ President Seeks CIS Benefits—www.unian.net of 17 November 2006.

customs union, with some elements of the economic union. Ukraine, both before and after the “Orange Revolution,” opposed this solution, as integration beyond demarcated free trade zones would prevent its deeper cooperation with the EU and also require the establishment of common, supranational bodies, where Russia would dominate.

Russia’s protest against Ukraine’s entry into Western structures. Russian authorities are of a negative opinion about the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine, as they are aware that the state’s accession to NATO or the EU would strengthen its position in relation to Russia and effectively prevent reintegration of the Soviet area including Ukraine. Russia has a number of tools at its disposal to interfere with Ukraine’s attempts to cooperate more closely with the West.

In the case of NATO, the most important factor is the opposition of Ukrainian society and a large portion of political elites in the country (vehement opposition of CPU and PSPU, less so with Party of Regions and socialists). Russia deliberately plays on the mistrust of Ukraine’s inhabitants towards NATO and the United States, and upholds these sentiments through Russian media and pro-Russian electronic media in Ukraine. An important argument against Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO that Russia and pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians have used is that the Alliance is allegedly hostile towards the Russian Federation.

The “Orange Revolution” appeared to open up new prospects in terms of Ukraine’s participation in NATO. Optimistic scenarios provided that Ukraine could be covered by the Membership Action Plan in 2006, and be invited to join the Alliance in 2008. At the same time, as attitudes of a portion of Ukrainian society on foreign policy grew more radical—social protests against joining NATO surged: in 2004, 38.5% said no to NATO membership, while as many as 64.4% did so in 2006.⁵⁹

In May 2006, protests broke out in the Crimea against the planned military exercise of Ukraine and the US called “Sea Breeze 2006.” The exercise was not planned to be carried out under the NATO banner. However, Ukrainian authorities failed to get the required consent of the parliament to engage in military exercises with foreign armed forces, which was used by Russia and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine to criticize the cooperation with the Alliance. In June, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea suggested that the peninsula should be

⁵⁹ NATO: які аргументи можуть переконати населення? Додаток 2. Тенденції громадської думки у ставленні до НАТО, Центр „Демократичні ініціативи”, 24 січня 2007 р., р. 1

declared a “NATO-free zone.” At the same time, the Russian Duma adopted a resolution addressed to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, where it called for respect for the will of the majority of Ukrainian society and warned against extremely negative consequences of the state’s accession to NATO for bilateral relations. Konstantin Zatulin, a Russian MP, backed the protesters. These actions brought about tangible results. “Sea Breeze” exercise was held without foreign (American) troops. At the same time, Ukraine’s image suffered in NATO countries, along with prospects for MAP in 2006.

Under the circumstances, during his visit to Brussels in September 2006, Yanukovych announced that Ukraine withdrew from the attempts to participate in the Plan, and thus accession to NATO. It is difficult to assess whether the decision resulted from the Prime Minister’s actual agenda, or was motivated by the need to please voters, or by the necessity to make concessions towards Russia, with new negotiations on gas prices under way. It is true, however, that the latest developments are Russia’s success.

The question of Ukraine’s membership of the European Union is not relevant at present, owing to negative attitudes of member states and Ukraine’s unpreparedness for membership of the organization. In the longer run, an important obstacle on the road to the EU may be the concept “to Europe with Russia,” formulated at the beginning of his second term by president Kuchma. It stipulates that Ukraine may re-establish its ties with Europe only together with its Russian neighbour, which results from the bonds between the two states as well as the lack of interest from European states to cooperate with Ukraine alone. The above argument is detrimental to the country, but in line with Russia’s interests. Firstly, it prevents the drafting and implementation of consistently pro-Western policy. Secondly, it confirms the stereotypes about bonds between Russia and Ukraine. And finally, it puts a question mark over the potential membership of Ukraine of the EU as Russia will not be a member of the organization.

Russia and Ukraine as perceived by Western states. An important tool that enables Russia to take determined policy actions towards Ukraine and postpones the prospects for the country’s accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures is the perception of the country by its Western partners. Ukraine was traditionally considered in Western Europe as part of the Russian empire. Its history and culture did not arouse particular interest for Western experts, who were also sceptical about Ukraine’s ambitions for independence.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia was seeking acknowledgment from Western states of its role as the arbitrator and guarantor in the post-Soviet

area. This objective was partially achieved. By 2004, Ukraine was perceived as a Russia-dependent country in political, cultural, energy, etc. dimensions. It was believed that it was unable to work out its own concept for the relations with the West, and that Western states should not ignore Russia when developing relations with Ukraine. Similarly to Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine was not included as potential candidate to join the EU and NATO. The views on the country and the relation in the triangle Russia-Ukraine-Western states, partially changed following the “Orange Revolution.” Ukraine ceased to be considered as part of the Russian influence zone, although no specific declarations were made on its EU membership prospects.

Russian authorities also attempted to discredit the state in the international arena. They presented Ukraine’s independence as premature and unjustified, and forecast the country’s reintegration with Russia or split. These arguments met with the West’s understanding, which primarily stemmed from the ignorance of Ukraine and the entire post-Soviet area. In 1992–1993, Russian propaganda led to Ukraine’s diplomatic isolation, as the country was regarded as a non-democratic, unstable and unpredictable. Special role here was played by Ukrainian attempts to retain post-Soviet nuclear weapons. In the following years, Russia keenly referred to the ties between Ukraine and the United States, to weaken its position towards the states of Western Europe which are rather reluctant towards the American superpower. One of Russia’s objectives during 2004 elections in Ukraine was to tarnish the country’s image in Western states. As it appears, this was another reason why Russian authorities backed a candidate with a criminal record. Also during the gas crisis of January 2006, Russia tried to put the blame for the situation on its southern neighbour, in particular for suspending “blue fuel” deliveries to European states. The above actions failed to bring the expected results. The “Orange Revolution” improved Ukraine’s image in Western states, and the responsibility for the gas crisis was attributed mainly to Russia.

Conclusions

Primary objectives of Russian policy towards Ukraine are the establishment of close cooperation on terms offered by the Russian Federation and limitation of the latter state’s contacts with Western partners, support to pro-Russian political, business and social groups, protection and promotion of other tools of influence on Ukraine (Russian language, electronic media) and, periodically, destabilization of internal situation in the country, which is to convince Ukrainian authorities that cooperation with Russia is necessary, as well as discrediting

Ukraine in the international arena, intended to eliminate all partners of the country except Russia.

These objectives are pursued with a variety of tools. Here, we could distinguish three groups of different efficiencies, as viewed from Russia's perspective. The first group is composed of formal (juridical) instruments. On numerous occasions, Russia offered to Ukraine the signing of agreements that sanctioned the dominance of the Russian Federation and intended to reintegrate the post-Soviet area, or its part. These actions were largely ineffective, as Ukraine refused to agree to obligations that were disadvantageous for the country, or interpreted them in accordance with its interest. The second group is formed by specific problems that create a divide between Russia and Ukraine, namely the Crimean issue, or division of the Black Sea Fleet. In the past, Russia used the issues as a tool of influence on Ukraine. However, in the majority of cases, the country agreed to solve them, primarily because it won concessions in other areas in exchange, and secondly because this was what Western states demanded. The third group are real areas of dependence connecting the two states. From Russia's perspective, the tools from the last group are the most effective, as Ukraine is not able to liberate itself from a multi-faceted dependence on its Russian neighbour in the shorter term. An important role within this group is played by the energy factor, as it is easy to use by Russia (limited supplies, changed prices). In the longer run, the dependencies in social and cultural areas will be of primary importance, as their removal requires deep transformations within Ukrainian society and the change of its perceptions of Ukraine and Russia.

Although the Russian Federation has numerous tools of influence on Ukraine at its disposal, it is hard to regard its policy towards the state as efficient. This argument is best evidenced by the fact that Ukraine was Russia's greatest opponent within CIS and that it has developed broad cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States. The present situation results both from objective assets that Ukraine has, as well as the weakness of Russian policy towards the country. In comparison with other post-Soviet states, there is a strong sense of national identity in Ukraine (its western and central parts). The state has a substantial economic, military and intellectual potential while Russia, struggling in the nineties with internal problems and marked by general deficiencies of its foreign policy, has never worked out a consistent strategy towards Ukraine.

Losses Inflicted on Poland by Germany during World War II. Assessments and Estimates—an Outline*

Already in the first weeks of World War II, it became obvious that to assess the losses inflicted on Poland by the German aggressor would be an extremely complicated task. This assumption results from way the Third Reich carried out the war. From 1 September 1939, the German armed forces engaged in comprehensive destruction, the scale of which was unprecedented in the history of wars. Barbarian tactics of total war, the ultimate objective of which was not only to break the resistance of the Polish Army, but also to terrorize the civilian population, resulted in extremely extensive losses of lives and property. Of key importance for the assessment of losses suffered by Poland in the course of World War II are not military actions, but over five years of German occupation. The occupation violated standards of the international law of war, or even standards of internal German legal codes. The purpose was, next to the exploitation of the country's resources, to destroy the nation, its culture, monuments of its history, and push Poles into the role of state slaves with no political rights whatsoever. The programme of destroying the Polish statehood and sweeping Germanization was a component of a broader series of actions by the German state, intended to implement the ideological vision of the *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German nation in Central and Eastern Europe. The meaning of Germanization for Hitler was not so much to Germanize Slavic nations, but rather to colonize their areas by Germans.¹

* The starting point for this work is the report: A. Eberhardt, M. Gniazdowski, T. Jaskułowski, M. Krzysztofowicz, "Szkody wyrządzone Polsce podczas II wojny światowej przez agresora niemieckiego. Historia dociekań i szacunków," in: W.M. Góralski (ed.), *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944–2004*, vol. 1: *Studia*, Warszawa, 2004, pp. 11–54. The author would like to thank Włodzimierz Borodziej, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Bogdan Musiał, Wanda Jarząbek and Dariusz Stola for their valuable comments.

¹ B. Musiał, "Niemiecka polityka narodowościowa w okupowanej Polsce w latach 1939–1945," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2004, no. 2, pp. 13–15.

Germany captured 48.4% of the Polish territory in 1939 and, following their attack on the USSR in June 1941, the entire territory of the state, to be subsequently driven out by the Red Army in 1944–1945. Polish soil became the place of extermination for the vast majority of 3.5 million Polish Jews and people of Jewish descent (as well as for some European Jews, the majority of whom were killed in German camps at Auschwitz, Treblinka and Sobibor). The most recent estimates (presented below) indicate that as a result of the German aggression some 1.4 million ethnic Poles died. Czesław Madajczyk lists the following types of persecution of the population: extermination of Polish leaders, annihilation of individuals thought to be open or potential enemies of the Reich, murdering unwanted groups, in particular Jews and Poles of Jewish descent (but also Gypsies, the sick, who were covered by “euthanasia,” some displaced inhabitants of the Zamość district and the so-called *Reichsgau Wartheland*), blind retaliation on the general population of the regions where resistance was put up, drastic restriction of the food supply and suppressing the birth rate by administrative methods.² Displacements were used as a ruthless tool of Germanization in Poland. Some 460,000 Polish citizens (including tens of thousands of Jews) were displaced from the areas illegally annexed to Germany and driven out to the General Government territory.³ Displacements were also carried out in GG. The number of Polish people deported, displaced or “evacuated” totals as many as 1.7 million.⁴ Also, in an act of violation of international laws, 2,857,500 Polish citizens were deported to work in Germany.⁵

The invader’s actions ravaged all realms of national life. The format of this brief description of the losses suffered by Poland as a result of the German aggression does not have the tools to present in an appropriate manner the multifaceted nature of the losses. Germans implemented the strategy for

² Cz. Madajczyk, *Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce*, vol. 2, Warszawa, 1970, p. 369 ff.; *idem*, *Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945*, vol. 1, Poznań, 1983, pp. 242–243.

³ M. Rutowska, “Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z Wielkopolski do Generalnego Gubernatorstwa podczas II wojny światowej,” in: M. Libicki, R. Wryka (eds.), *Zbrodnie niemieckie w Wielkopolsce w latach 1939–1945*, Poznań, 2004, p. 107; Cz. Łuczak, *Pod niemieckim jarzmem (Kraj Warty 1939–1945)*, Poznań, 1996, p. 56 ff.; B. Musiał, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁴ Cz. Łuczak, *Polska i Polacy w drugiej wojnie światowej*, Poznań, 1993, p. 146.

⁵ *Historia Polski w liczbach*, vol. 1: *Państwo. Społeczeństwo*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa, 2003, p. 366; cf. Cz. Łuczak, “Polscy robotnicy przemysłowi w Niemczech w latach drugiej wojny światowej,” in: S. Nawrocki (ed.), *Praca przymusowa Polaków w Trzeciej Rzeszy w latach 1939–1945*, Poznań, 1995, p. 7 ff.

annihilation of the intellectual elite which, according to Adolf Hitler, “could be the carrier of Polish resistance in the future.”⁶ Explicit examples of German crimes on the Polish national elite are e.g. arresting and sending to concentration camps of 183 professors of the Jagiellonian University and the University of Science and Technology in Cracow in November 1939, and the AB action launched in 1940, under which 3,500 representatives of the Polish intelligentsia were executed. The Polish society was being cut off from higher forms of intellectual and cultural life, which was accompanied by the policy for destruction of any Polish traces in architecture, arts and museums. The most valuable artefacts of Polish culture were sent to Germany.⁷

In terms of property losses, Poland comes second, after the USSR, among the states that were entirely or partially occupied by Germany. A particularly acute loss for the human, economic and cultural component of the country was the systematic annihilation of Warsaw. Its proportions were already massive when the liquidation of the Jewish ghetto began, which also involved sending the ghetto’s citizens to concentration camps, suppression of the uprising in 1943 and demolition of the district.⁸ In 1944, during the Warsaw Uprising and after its fall, the largest and most vicious wave of German retaliatory actions in all Europe took place. As a result of the hostilities and systematic destruction, Warsaw lost 80% of its buildings and suffered the highest losses among all European capitals. The total losses in the Warsaw population (600,000–700,000) exceeded several times the civilian population losses in entire France during World War II.⁹

⁶ Quote in Polish after: D.M. Lewandowska, “Plan likwidacji inteligencji polskiej jako część programu polityki okupacyjnej,” in: *Straty wojenne Polski w latach 1939–1945*, Poznań–Warszawa, 1962, p. 68.

⁷ Documentation and assessment of losses in terms of the Polish national heritage was presented by Wojciech W. Kowalski. In his opinion, it is not possible to prepare a full and reliable financial valuation of the losses in the Polish national heritage. A tentative value, determined in 1947, would, after conversion, come to \$20 billion, which does not cover undocumented losses, the value of which is hard to assess. See W. Kowalski “Problem szacunku szkód w zakresie polskiego dziedzictwa kulturowego wyrządzonych Polsce podczas II wojny światowej przez agresora niemieckiego,” in: W.M. Góralski (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 55–80.

⁸ See more in: W. Bartoszewski, *Warszawski pierścień śmierci 1939–1944*, 2nd ed., Warszawa, 1970.

⁹ This was pointed out by B. Musiał, who referred to the latest estimates of civilian population losses in France (100,000, including 78,000 Jews). B. Musiał, “Auf dem Schlachtfeld zweier totalitärer Systeme. Widerstand und Kollaboration in Polen 1939–1945,” in: M. Gilzmer (ed.), *Widerstand und Kollaboration in Europa*, Münster, 2004, p. 32.

“Losses inflicted on the society are huge and cannot be expressed by numbers” as written in the introduction to the provisional report on losses, prepared by the Ministry of Preparatory Work Concerning the Peace Conference of the Polish Government in London in September 1944.¹⁰ This statement has remained largely true. The assessment of the losses in this specific case continues to be extremely difficult. In the history of wars and loss assessment thus far, no sufficient methodologies have been worked out to support such attempts. It should suffice to say that the demographic loss that occurred as a result of the outbreak of war was so huge, that Poland achieved the pre-war population figure (34.8 million) as late as in the mid-seventies. It is even difficult to propose a new division for the multifaceted issue for the purpose of drafting a concise report on the losses. From the very beginning, researchers were struggling against definitions. Depending on the actual definition applied, there might be significant differences in figures for, say, “population losses,” or “biological losses.” German occupation suggests a broad approach, as the boundaries between directly inflicting death and creating conditions that increase the death rate were very blurred. Poland’s human losses are inextricably linked with property and cultural losses, and attempts to find a common denominator that money, as a measure of value, is, must arouse controversies of moral nature, irrespective of the adopted methodologies. Further, it is not possible to separate the martyrdom of individual professional groups from property losses inflicted on the respective areas of social and economic life.

Activity of the Polish Government in Exile and Bodies of the Polish Secret State

From the beginning of the occupation, the Polish Secret State collected information on losses inflicted by the occupying forces. Documentation of losses suffered in the course of the September Campaign started already in November 1939, at the initiative of Antoni Olszewski. A secret Committee for Compensation and Redress was formed, composed of vice-chancellors of Warsaw universities and representatives of various scientific institutions, experts and appraisers, who were preparing reports on the losses. The first one was sent to the Polish Government in France in March 1940. In mid-1941, the Committee was incorporated in the Government Delegate’s Office at Home as the Department of Liquidation of the Effects of the War, and in December 1942

¹⁰ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944–2004*, vol. 2: *Dokumenty*, PISM, Warszawa, 2004, document no. 2.

transformed into the War Repair Department. The department was involved in a broad range of analytic and research efforts on the methodologies for the future compensation for the losses suffered by Poland. Outside Poland, the entity responsible for these duties was the Office for War Objectives, and subsequently the Office for Political, Economic and Legal Affairs, which formed the basis for the establishment of the Ministry of Preparatory Work Concerning the Peace Conference in July 1942.¹¹

Dispatches and reports on Poland's losses and the gradual destruction of the country were reaching, by secret channels, the authorities in exile and were used in official speeches and publications. Special care for accuracy stemmed from the fact that the public opinion of the western states did not believe the reports on terror in Poland. Therefore, a well-established system was used to document German crimes. On 9 October 1942, the Polish Government issued a decree on punishing criminals and collecting information on the occupier's crimes. In December of the same year, the underground magazines of the Government Delegate's Office called on the Civil Fighting Executive to collect evidence of the crimes.¹² A systematic data recording of the policy of German terror was conducted by the Home Army's Information and Propaganda Office and Intelligence Service. Individual stages of the genocide policy were recorded and the records on the extermination of Jews in Poland were sent to the West.

Based on the materials sent from the country, on 3 May 1941, the Polish Government issued a note to the governments of the allied and neutral states on the actions of German occupying forces in Poland. The note, along with a detailed, documented account of the life of the Polish population under German and Soviet occupation, was published by the Polish government in London in 1941.¹³ Following Germany's invasion on the USSR, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published extensive excerpts of the note, this time limited to German occupation of Poland, enclosing 189 documents and excerpts from the reports coming from Poland. The note and its 180 attachments were published

¹¹ T.P. Rutkowski, "Odszkodowania wojenne od Niemiec. Prace Rządu RP na emigracji i podziemiu w kraju 1939-1945," *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-76.

¹² W. Grabowski, *Delegatura Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Kraj*, Warszawa, 1995, p. 128 ff.

¹³ Note adressée en date 3 Mai 1941 aux Gouvernements des Puissances alliées et neutres, au sujet de l'occupation allemande et soviétique en Pologne, Londres, 1941. See H. Batowski, *Polska dyplomacja na obczyźnie 1939-1941*, Kraków, 1991, p. 144 ff.

by MFA in New York as the “Polish White Book.”¹⁴ This did not mean, however, that the Polish government attributed the war losses to one invader only. At the beginning of 1943, it was decided that records of losses inflicted by the USSR should also be secretly collected.¹⁵

Actions by the Secret State, the Polish Government and other Polish centres were aimed at making public opinion in the West aware of the extent of German crimes, their plundering and exploitation of the occupied regions in the East. To that end, in January 1942, the Ministry of Information and Documentation published *The German New Order in Poland*,¹⁶ while the Polish Information Centre in New York published a series of pamphlets entitled *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe*.¹⁷ In December 1942, the Government of Poland approached the United Nations with a note *The Mass Extermination of Jews in German Occupied Poland*, in which they gave an account of the intensification of genocide.¹⁸ The records on the occupying force’s genocide techniques were giving specific figures that illustrated the intensification of extermination and estimated the loss of lives among the 3.13 million population of Polish Jews at one-third.

The compiling of information on Nazi policy served the judiciary as well. In January 1944, the Government Delegate received an order from the minister of internal affairs to organize a cell in Poland that would compile materials for the International War Crimes Commission operating in London. In February 1944, the Central Commission for the Investigation and Documentation of Occupier’s Crimes in Poland was established (operation “Forget-Me-Not”).¹⁹

At the beginning of 1940, a centre for the recovery of cultural losses was established in exile, headed by Karol Estreicher, as part of the Ministry of

¹⁴ German Occupation in Poland. Extracts of Note Addressed to the Governments of the Allied and Neutral Powers on May 3, 1941, London [n.d.]; cf. German Occupation in Poland. Extracts of Note Addressed to the Allied and Neutral Powers. Polish White Book, New York [n.d.]

¹⁵ T.P. Rutkowski *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁶ *The German New Order in Poland*, London 1942 (2nd ed.—April 1942, 3rd ed.—March 1943).

¹⁷ *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe*, New York [1941]: no. 1: German Exploitation of Polish Forests; no. 2: German Destruction of Cultural Life in Poland; no. 4: German Persecution of Religious Life in Poland; no. 8–9: Extermination of the Polish People and Colonization by German Nationals.

¹⁸ See: Z. Zieliński (ed.), “The Mass Extermination of Jews in German Occupied Poland,” *Studia nad Faszysmem i Zbrodniami Hitlerowskimi* 19 (1996), pp. 183–187.

¹⁹ W. Grabowski, *op. cit.*, p. 128 ff.

Information and Documentation. The centre was incorporated in the Ministry of Preparatory Work Concerning the Peace Conference in London in July 1942. In the winter of 1941/1942, detailed documentation of the losses and condition of the Polish culture, submitted to London, was published as a book entitled *The Nazi Kultur in Poland*.²⁰ In 1942, the Polish Information Centre in New York published a booklet *German Destruction of Cultural Life in Poland*. Domestically, scores of experts and consultants were preparing detailed work, as part of the tasks of the War Repair Department of the Polish Government's Delegate at Home, entitled *Straty kultury*. In 1944 in London, based on the documents submitted from Poland, K. Estreicher published a book entitled *Cultural Losses of Poland*.²¹ The following year, J. Hulewicz and T. Terlecki published in Glasgow a monumental work entitled *Straty kultury polskiej 1939–1945*.²² Objective problems in assessing cultural losses were the reasons why the Polish Government in exile did not embark on that task. The prevailing opinion at the Recovery Department was that using any property-related measure to assess the total cultural loss is not appropriate. In addition, it would also be harmful, as it would “seem, under false appearances, that the losses can be compensated with money, or items purchased with the money.”²³

Polish authorities in exile were making only general assessments of the losses, owing to their all-encompassing status and difficulties with data collection under the circumstances of occupation. In February 1944, the Ministry of Preparatory Work Concerning the Peace Conference (MPK), presented its assessment, hedged with a host of reservations, where Poland's losses were estimated at least 60 billion zlotys, and in September 1944, the losses were estimated at 100 billion zlotys.²⁴ The calculations of war losses made by the Secret State structures and authorities in exile could not, for obvious reasons, fully cover the losses in Warsaw, and those related to the frontline cutting through the Polish territory in 1944–1945. Based on MPK report, Poland lost 4.114 million citizens, of which 2.481 million were Jews (this does not cover citizens deported

²⁰ *The Nazi Kultur in Poland*, London, 1944.

²¹ Ch. Estreicher (ed.), *Cultural Losses of Poland. Index of Polish cultural losses during the German occupation 1939–1943*, London, 1944.

²² A. Ordęga (J. Hulewicz) and T. Terlecki (eds.), *Straty kultury polskiej 1939–1945*, vol. 1–2, Glasgow, 1945.

²³ W. Kowalski, *Likwidacja skutków wojny w dziedzinie kultury*, Warszawa, 1990, p. 35.

²⁴ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 1 and 2.

to the USSR and Polish worker victims of bombings in Germany). For lives lost in the economically productive age group (17–59), the total loss was estimated at 43.355 billion zlotys (it was assumed that the average annual income for a male was 1732 zlotys, and 1039 zlotys for a female).²⁵

The above data cannot fully reflect the losses related to the Warsaw Uprising and the subsequent war developments. On 5 October 1944, the Council of Ministers passed Propositions for economic redress from Germany, where it was realistically stated, in relation to the damage inflicted on Poland, that “today the majority of the damage cannot be assessed, or even tentatively forecasted.”²⁶ The massive scale of human loss was referred to, along with hardly quantifiable change of conditions related to the economic stagnation of divided Poland, several years of country’s exploitation and difficult-to-assess losses resulting from migration of the displaced population, necessity to build from the scratch the administrative system and thoroughly reform enfeebled economy.

War Damage Assessment under Communist Rule

The communist authorities had more tools to assess the losses inflicted on Poland by the German invaders. The War Compensation Department, headed by Emil Sommerstein was established within the PKWN (Polish Committee of National Liberation), and, by resolution of the Council of Ministers of 6 January 1945, transformed into the Office for War Compensation (BOW) at the Council of Ministers’ Executive. The Office was mainly involved in determining the value of losses by recording them, also with a view to presenting them internationally, in order to secure the no.1 position on the list of beneficiaries of German war reparations.²⁷ BOW as a central body “brought together the entire volume of work devoted to determining the value of war damage,” initiating and coordinating listings within individual departments and organizations. For obvious reasons, the lists did not cover damage inflicted by the USSR.

The territorial shape of post-war Poland changed dramatically, which significantly affected the attempts at drafting the balance sheet of war. Poland’s borders were moved to the east and north, and the former German territory accounted for one-third of the area of post-war Poland. Recording property and human losses, taking place under the circumstances of reconstruction and mass

²⁵ The estimates fail to cover the cost of treatment and disability benefits. *Ibidem*, document no. 2.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, document no. 3.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, document no. 8.

migration of the population, was based on a combination of territorial and ethnic criteria. Contrary to the calculations made by Polish government officials in London, lists of property damage prepared in Poland covered the territory of pre-war Poland, except for the lost eastern regions. Similarly, the areas annexed to Poland after the war were not covered.²⁸ In terms of human loss assessment, only Polish citizens of Polish and Jewish nationality were considered, including the population “living in areas given up to the Soviet Union,” explaining that “the people have, or would have, were they still alive, the right to choose Poland.”²⁹ Thus, the assessments failed to incorporate all other (except Jewish) national minorities living in Poland in 1939 (some 8 million citizens, mainly Ukrainians and Belarusians). Human losses of Germans and Polish indigenous population in the Eastern and Western Land, annexed to Poland in 1945, were not incorporated as well.

The basis for carrying out the above evaluations was the system of questionnaires prepared by BOW in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Administration.³⁰ The result of the action could not fully reflect the extent of human losses, as extermination often afflicted entire families and local communities. The head of BOW, who was aware of that, addressed the Ministry

²⁸ In post-war calculations, property damage in the former Free City of Gdańsk was essentially incorporated as war damage to Poland (as part of the newly formed Gdańsk province), it was not, however, included in all partial listings. *Ibidem*, document no. 57.

²⁹ There were 5.193 million people (4.222 million Poles and 971,000 Jews) living in eastern areas of Poland in 1939. *Sprawozdanie w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945*, Warszawa, 1947, p. 4, 24; S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 36.

³⁰ Instructions on “damage recording in numerical terms” ordered that human losses be interpreted as: those who died in war activities, murdered on the basis of regulations from German authorities and by German soldiers, those who died in prison, in concentration, penal and all other camps, except POW camps, those who died as forced labourers, those who died as a result of injuries suffered, both in war activities and other German activities, as a result of illnesses that emerged during war activities, in prison, camps, as a result of forced labour, exhaustion, malnutrition or hiding. Human losses also included those individuals who, as a result of war activities, or regulations from German authorities, or acts of violence by German officials or military, suffered “health or bodily harm,” interpreted as: disability, grievous health disorder, grievous bodily harm, rape, lasting mental illness and severe mental disability. Therefore, the instruction concerning “damage recording in numerical terms” indicated that “with this record, it is recommended not to be too formal with the questionnaire, in order not to excessively drag the issue.” Attachment to the circular of the Ministry of Public Administration, 9 June 1945, Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych—AAN), Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej—MAP), 586.

of Public Administration to collect rough data at the level of municipalities and towns, which would supplement the questionnaire action.³¹

The recording of the war damage proceeded at a fast pace, as it was believed that receiving reparations in kind by Poland depended on the result of the campaign, since the reparations were granted through the Reparations Committee in Moscow. The most extensive undertaking of the Office was recording individual losses, carried out through Town and Municipality Executives, under the supervision of the relevant Province Offices.³² There were problems, however, with timely submission of the data. Qualified personnel were scarce at lower levels, and the people were “tired and confused by numerous records and registers.”³³ In December 1946, the draft of the balance sheet of war losses and damage (*Zestawienie strat i szkód wojennych*) was prepared, and later verified, using new materials and figures.³⁴

The synthetic report on losses, entitled *Sprawozdanie w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945*, of January 1947, drafted by BOW in cooperation with the Central Statistical Office and the Central National Office for Measurements, was the primary, general assessment of Polish war damage inflicted by the Third Reich. According to the report, 6.028 million citizens lost their lives between 1939 and 1945, of whom some 3 million were Jews, which corresponds to the loss of 22% of the Polish and Jewish population. The figure covered deaths in direct war activities (644,000) as well as a result of the occupier’s terror (5.384 million), specifically: pacifications, executions, and victims of death camps (3.577 million), epidemic and exhaustion (1.286 million), of injuries and hardships of forced labour (521,000).

Death rates among the intelligentsia were particularly high. During the war, Germans killed 56.9% of barristers and 38.7% of doctors. Among the Catholic clergy, death took 27% of the total headcount from before the war. Losses among teachers also go on to prove that German actions were targeted at social elites: 5.1% of primary school teachers died, 13.1% of secondary school

³¹ Head of BOW to MAP, 24 April 1945, AAN, MAP, 586.

³² Circular of the Minister of Public Administration to provincial governors, 12 April 1945, AAN, MAP, 586.

³³ Inspectorate for War Damage of the Poznań Province Office to MAP, 24 October 1945, AAN, MAP, 586.

³⁴ Head of BOW to the Minister of Public Administration, 30 January 1947, AAN, MAP, 855, p. 18.

teachers and as many as 28.5% of university teachers. Approximately, one out of every three persons with a university degree (a total of 83,000) died.³⁵

BOW's estimates in terms of human loss covered the effects of actions by German occupation authorities that led to the loss of life, but also disability and higher chronic illness incidence rate. 590,000 people were reportedly disabled. Tuberculosis incidence was at 1.14 million over the statistical incidence rate at the time of peace. As argued by BOW, human losses should also include losses in birth rate, that is the number of births during the war below average, estimated at 1.215 million of potential citizens.

As regards property losses, the frame of reference was the status and prices of August 1939. The assessed losses, similarly to the assessments presented below, were expressed in pre-war zlotys. BOW's report tabulates many of the key loss items. The report gave the total value of 258,432 billion zlotys at the price level of August 1939. After conversion, it came to 49.2 billion dollars. In comparison to other states, entirely or partially occupied by Germany, only the losses of the USSR (128 billion dollars) exceeded the Polish property losses, while the latter were higher than the combined wartime damage of the remaining states under occupation (France—21.1, Yugoslavia—9.1, Netherlands—4.4, Czechoslovakia—4.2, Greece—2.5, Belgium—2.3, Norway—1.3). Also, the Polish property losses *per capita* were the highest among all anti-Hitler coalition states, and totalled 840 dollars.³⁶

The loss of national property was estimated at 38% of its 1938 level, while the losses in tangible cultural items came to as much as 43%. The extent of the losses in Poland is well illustrated in the BOW report by percentage date of damage to the individual sectors of the economy. Damage to the Polish railway during World War II came to 84% of total possessions. The textile industry suffered losses at 70%, post and telecommunications lost 62%, the energy sector lost 65%, coal mining—42%, forestry—28%.

One-third of the total losses (88.8 billion zlotys) represented direct losses, that is property losses and income lost during the war. They mostly resulted from the destruction of tangible assets (mainly due to war activities), employment of the economic capital to support Germany's war economy, and plundering by the occupier. The above were estimated at 62.024 billion zlotys, that is

³⁵ Cz. Madajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–30.

³⁶ Cz. Łuczak, *op. cit.*, p. 685.

approximately 70% of all direct losses. The remaining share, that is 26.776 billion zlotys, are losses resulting from production and services lost (e.g. forced labour in Germany).

Indirect losses itemized by BOW, resulting mainly from reduced future income in the post-war period, accounted for two-thirds of the total, and came to 169.632 billion zlotys. The most important item under indirect losses is lost production charged until 1950, and estimated at 74.650 billion zlotys (44% of the total), related to the Polish population being ruined in health terms. Total losses resulting from deaths were estimated at 55.450 billion zlotys, disabilities at 4.700 billion zlotys, tuberculosis treatment at 14.500 billion zlotys. It was further argued that as a result of the biological exhaustion of the most vital resources of the nation, the capitalized loss on the future income was twice as high as the recorded property loss.

Losses related to the lost production in 1943–1950 as a result of destruction of assets were estimated at 52.502 billion zlotys, while lost production as a result of reduced labour efficiency and asset profitability in 1940–1950 totalled 41.635 billion zlotys (24.5%). Special costs, related to the removal of some damage types that were not itemized under property losses came to 845 million zlotys (e.g. removal of military fortifications and mine sweeping).

According to BOW, 34.5% of all property losses were suffered in Warsaw. Calculations of the Office for the Reconstruction of the Capital City indicated that during the war some 80% of the pre-war buildings and facilities in Warsaw were destroyed: 10% during the defence of the city in 1939, 15% during the ghetto liquidation in 1943, 25% during the Warsaw Uprising and as much as 30% after the surrender of Warsaw.³⁷ It should be underlined here that the “overwhelming majority of damage did not happen during actual warfare activities, and was not dictated by the need to deprive the opponent of resistance locations, but rather was a result of consistent organizational work, carried out by civilian authorities in a defenceless and deserted city.”³⁸ The Warsaw Uprising represented for German authorities a pretence that justified the total

³⁷ *Warszawa w liczbach 1947*, *op. cit.* The figures are also quoted by: Sz. Datner, “Zburzenie Warszawy,” in: *Straty wojenne Polski...*, pp. 123–124.

³⁸ R. Piotrowski, B. Lachert, B. Małachowski, “Zniszczenie Warszawy,” in: Cz. Pilichowski (ed.), *Ekspertyzy i orzecznictwa przed Najwyższym Trybunałem Narodowym*, vol. 9, Warszawa, 1982, p. 335.

destruction of the city, executed with special attention paid to the annihilation of artefacts of value from the perspective of national culture.

BOW found that wartime property losses in Poland caused by Germany in the area of culture and arts totalled 43% of the property possessed in 1939. In the area of education and scientific institutions, the losses were even more substantial, totalling 60%. During the war, over a thousand cultural facilities (museums, theatres, cinema halls, common halls) and nearly 6,000 school facilities were destroyed. Property damage in the area of cultural and arts artefacts was estimated at 5.365 billion zlotys. This item was composed of both damage to historical architecture (4.111 billion zlotys), and destruction, seizures and plundering of works of art and art collections (1.208 billion zlotys). Losses of schools and scientific institutions were estimated at 3.022 billion zlotys. These calculations were based on estimated reinstatement costs of the “previous visual state.” These estimates incorporate only the property value of individual historic artefacts, without considering hardly quantifiable historical value of irreversibly lost original objects.

The results of BOW work, presented as a memorandum, were used by the Polish delegation to prepare the position for the conference of deputy ministers for foreign affairs concerning Germany, held in London in January 1947.³⁹ The report was the final outcome of the Office’s work, and the Office was finally closed down on 1 April 1947. This did not mean, however, that research on the extent of damage was over, especially that reliability of BOW data on human losses was being questioned from the very beginning by international expert forums. They were surprised not only by limiting human losses to the Polish and Jewish population only, but also by the fact that the calculations were made to an accuracy of one thousand. Poland was an exception in this respect, as all other German-occupied countries made their calculations within an accuracy of a hundred thousand. This stemmed from the fact that the initial approximations were deemed to be too imprecise by communist authorities and, as a result, the data were made more detailed in a methodologically unjustified manner.⁴⁰ The estimates made simultaneously by demographers (H. Kopeć, G. Frumkin) indicated that the total number of lives lost was at 5.8 million. Based on this

³⁹ *Zbiór Dokumentów* (PISM) 1947, no. 1–2, pp. 3–27; cf. *Memoriał w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945*, January 1947, AAN, BOW, 19.

⁴⁰ Cz. Łuczak, “Szanse i trudności bilansu demograficznego Polski w latach 1939–1945,” *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1994, no. 2, p. 10

figure, the “UN Economic Bulletin for Europe” (no. 1/1949) estimated wartime population loss in Poland at 4.3 million.⁴¹ Within a broader, European balance sheet, the population loss in areas annexed to the USSR (1.5 million) was deducted from the total balance of 5.8 million, and the figure for the former German areas annexed to Poland (0.3 million) was added. This estimation failed to reflect the actual loss in the population of the country that was “moved” 200–300 kilometres to the west.

In November 1948, the Ministry of Public Administration commenced an additional programme for recording individual losses, in order to present the updated BOW documentation to the Ministry of Treasury.⁴² The Commission within the Ministry of Finance, appointed to finally determine the Polish war-related losses, re-examined the materials collected by BOW after two years. Following expert examinations and verification of some partial data contained in the BOW report, the commission prepared, in 1949–1951, a detailed documentation on human, cultural and property losses.⁴³

Based on the verification, the Commission within the Ministry of Finance corrected the figure for the total population loss, arriving at 5.085 million persons, of whom 550,000 died in war activities, 3 million as a result of “murder,” 1.083 million were deaths in prisons and camps, 274,000 were forced labour fatalities, and 168,000 were deaths of exhaustion. The total number of deaths was by almost one million smaller than the figure in BOW report. In the total figure, Jewish population accounts for 3.378 million, while the Polish population for 1,706,700.⁴⁴ This discrepancy was explained by demographers also by the fact

⁴¹ See more in: K. Piesowicz, “Ważniejsze zmiany w zaludnieniu ziem polskich w czasie II wojny światowej,” *Studia Demograficzne*, 1988, no. 3, pp. 77–79; G. Frumkin, *Population Changes in Europe since 1939*, New York, 1951, pp. 119, 122.

⁴² See Department Director of the Ministry of Treasury T. Krycki to MAP, 8 November 1948; MAP circular on recording and documenting war damage, 17 November 1948; Head of MAP Section W. Czapiński to the Ministry of Treasury, 10 March 1949, AAN, MAP, 858.

⁴³ Straty biologiczne, kulturalne i materialne Polski w latach 1939–1945, 1951, Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw (Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej—AIPN), Commission for Examining the Issue of German Compensation (Komisja do Opracowania Problemu Odszkodowań Niemieckich—KOPON), 809/377. Members of the Commission were Jerzy Hoszard (chairman), Bohdan Domoniewski, Andrzej Horoszkiewicz, Jerzy Osiecki, Zdzisław Reklewski, Paweł Sulmicki and Zdzisław Korpany, and later Longin Stankiewicz as the secretary. *Ibidem*, p. 3.

⁴⁴ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 57. Thus, the Commission argued that the number of confirmed disability cases was bigger, and came to 608,000—physical disabilities accounted for 555,000 and mental disabilities for 53,000 cases.

that BOW included the “missing” category in the total population loss figure, based on the statistics of the end of 1945, while many people believed to have been dead either returned to the country, or remained abroad as émigrés.⁴⁵ It was not until 1950 that the war, or war-related, in demographic terms, population migrations in Poland were over.⁴⁶

Authors of the report stressed the fact that Poland’s population loss was 18.1% of the 1939 figure, which was the highest share among all states, twice as high as population losses in states of Central and Eastern Europe, that were on Germany’s road to the “living space” (e.g. USSR—8%, Yugoslavia—10.8%), and fifteen times as high as the losses in occupied states of Western Europe.⁴⁷

The Ministry of Finance came up with a slightly different calculation for Poland’s property losses. They were estimated at 201.1 billion zlotys, that is 57.332 billion zlotys less than in BOW report.⁴⁸ The difference in figures for direct losses was relatively small (the Commission did not have the complete set of BOW’s source documents and largely relied on rough estimates⁴⁹), but a significant correction was made in relation to the so-called indirect losses, estimated at 117.817 billion zlotys.⁵⁰ As such, they accounted for 49% of the total loss. This figure already incorporates future income lost owing to reduced production potential (108.119 billion zlotys) and special costs (9.689 billion zlotys). Production losses owing to deaths or disabilities and damage as a result of treating the chronically ill were estimated at 65.962 billion zlotys. Future income lost was divided into losses by production factors (labour and means of production), estimated at 90.189 billion zlotys, and losses resulting from reduced efficiency of production factors, estimated at 17.930 billion zlotys. Losses in culture and arts were estimated at 4.680 billion zlotys.⁵¹

⁴⁵ More detailed calculations on the “missing” individuals should have been conducted later if they were to be included as war losses. See L. Mochowski, *Konsekwencje gospodarcze strat demograficznych w Polsce w latach 1939–1945*. Annex no. 2, AIPN, KOPON, 809/644, pp. 1–3.

⁴⁶ Cz. Madajczyk, “Czy możliwy jest bilans demograficzno-historyczny Polski lat 1939–1950?,” *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1994, no. 2, p. 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 373.

⁴⁸ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 57.

⁴⁹ L. Sołohub, *Uwagi dot. prac związanych z ostatecznym ustaleniem strat materialnych w wyniku wojny i okupacji w latach 1939–1945*, 30 December 1971, AIPN, KOPON, 809/361, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Significant discrepancy in comparison to BOW report related to the loss in trade, that BOW estimated at 7.096 billion, while the Ministry of Finance at 4.446 billion zlotys.

⁵¹ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 57.

The methodology for the determination of losses adopted by experts from the Ministry of Finance also aroused some controversies. Losses resulting from the income lost, special costs and reduced potential future income (145.947 billion zlotys), representing 72.7% of the total loss, were determined based on rough estimates only. The remaining losses were partially determined on the basis of departmental submissions (34.458 billion zlotys), and partially as rough estimates (20.695 billion zlotys). Direct losses submitted by departments were much higher and totalled 80.831 billion zlotys, although a portion (46.373 billion zlotys) was eliminated from the count as incompliant with the assumptions adopted by the Commission.⁵²

Estimates of the Ministry of Finance were the last comprehensive figures obtained on the basis of analysis of original materials collected by BOW and supplemented by the Ministry of Public Administration at the turn of 1949. The findings of the Commission within the Ministry of Finance were never published. Although some demographers questioned the total human loss figure at 6 million,⁵³ the official line quoted the results presented in BOW report of January 1947. The interest in the war balance sheet returned after 1958, when prospects emerged for the peace conference. At the beginning of 1960, the Interdepartmental Commission for the Peace Treaty with Germany was appointed. The Commission prepared some conclusions on property claims, but since they were not compliant with the official line of the USSR which wanted to “meet some objections of Western partners half-way,” they were not officially presented, and soon thereafter the peace treaty proposal was discarded.⁵⁴ It is very likely that no new estimates of a comprehensive nature were prepared at that time, especially that the representative work *Straty wojenne Polski w latach 1939–1945*, which was to appear in five language versions soon, was based on the old BOW calculations.⁵⁵

In subsequent years, verification of partial data on the martyrdom of Polish citizens was carried out within the Central Commission for the Investigation of

⁵² L. Sołohub, *op. cit.*, AIPN, KOPON, 809/361, p. 1.

⁵³ E.g. A. Maryanski claimed that the total number of lives lost could be 4–4.5 million, although he only considered ethnic Poles when calculating the figure for eastern Poland. A. Maryanski, “Druga wojna światowa a rozwój zaludnienia świata,” *Wiadomości Historyczne*, 1958, no. 2, pp. 107–108.

⁵⁴ W. Jarząbek, “Władze Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej wobec problemu reparacji i odszkodowań od Republiki Federalnej Niemiec 1953–1989,” *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 2005, no. 2, pp. 88–89.

⁵⁵ See e.g. E. Nurowski (ed.) *War losses in Poland 1939–1945*, Poznań, 1960.

Nazi Crimes in Poland. The source documents used for that purpose were, among others, records of investigations conducted mainly in 1945–1960 in cases against key war criminals and cases concerning the various camps and pacification actions.⁵⁶ Following 13 years of restrictions on the Commission's work, it resumed the suspended investigations and documenting work in 1963, although no comprehensive research effort on the war loss balance sheet was conducted. In 1968, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs applied for the appointment of an interdepartmental team that would set the direction for the work on compensation from Germany, but the Political Office of the Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party (KC PZPR) ordered that any attempts at war claims be stopped.⁵⁷

In 1970, the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland (PRL) returned to the research on the damage sustained by Poland during the war. This was related to the preparations to enter into an agreement on the principles for normalizing the relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The Executive of the Central Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland (GKBZHWP) proposed a "multi-faceted, historical and legal, statistical and economic presentation of the problem of human, cultural and property losses of the Polish nation and state, in other words—the balance sheet for Poland during World War II."⁵⁸ The possibility of submitting claims for compensation against FRG in relation to the establishment of diplomatic relations was looked into at that time. By a secret decision of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of 6 May 1970, the Commission for Examining the Issue of German Compensation (KOPON) was appointed. It was headed by the 1st Judge of the Supreme Court, Zbigniew Resich. His deputy was Czesław Pilichowski, director of GKBZHWP, who managed the Executive Office of KOPON, supervised, in organizational terms, by GKBZHWP.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ See e.g. Cz. Pilichowski (ed.), *op. cit.*, vol. 1–9, Warszawa 1979–1982; *Eksterminacja ludności polskiej w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej. Wyniki badań ośrodków terenowych*, Warszawa, 1979.

⁵⁷ Pilna notatka w sprawie odszkodowań niemieckich, 27 April 1968, AAN, KC PZPR, V/85, p. 342; S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 81.

⁵⁸ Cz. Pilichowski, "Stan i potrzeby badań nad problemem zbrodni hitlerowskich w aspekcie zadań Głównej Komisji i Okręgowych Komisji BZHWP," in: *Stan i perspektywy badań w zakresie zbrodni hitlerowskich*, vol. 1, Warszawa, 1973, p. 31.

⁵⁹ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 83.

The tasks of the Commission included verification, preparation and determination of war damage in Poland (human, property and cultural).⁶⁰ With reference to 1947 results of BOW work, and results of work by the Commission within the Ministry of Finance, released in 1951, KOPON decided that both were not prepared in an exhaustive and objective manner, and, as a result “it is necessary to verify the reports so far on the issue of Polish war losses and damage, and to prepare a correct, in computational terms, report.”⁶¹ It was also emphasized that BOW’s listing of human losses “fails to assess fully the extent of losses in Poland,” since, as a result of terror, particularly acute losses were sustained by specific groups (intelligentsia, middle technical and economic staff, qualified workers), and the extent of damage was further aggravated by the lack of Polish university and secondary level education during the occupation. KOPON also indicated that the gap in population in the economically productive age persisted in 1945–1952, while the population decline, spreading across 1956–1962 significantly limited the recovery of the economically productive age group. As a result of war and occupation, there was a labour efficiency decline, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The loss of the production potential turned out to be higher than indicated by the damage expressed in percentage terms. The Commission assessed the decline in the original production capacity all over the country at 50%, and at 60% in Western and Northern Land.

During the work of the KOPON research teams, it turned out that re-calculations of human losses on the basis of the original materials from the nineteen forties is not possible. Since only fragmented and haphazardly arranged data remained in the provincial and county archives, rough estimation methodology was to be applied on a broader scale, supported by detailed regional research data. The calculations on the losses among Polish intelligentsia during World War II were itemized separately and the first stage of cataloguing for this subgroup was finalized. Based on the findings of GKBZHWP, it was reported that in Poland there were 3,690 death camps and centres, subcamps and labour squads, slave labour camps, prisons and other penal institutions, ghettos, etc. Polish citizens were imprisoned and oppressed in 7,862 locations of this type in

⁶⁰ The Commission was also to determine the value of Polish claims for German compensation, investigate the possibility of submitting counterclaims by Germany against Poland and to catalogue other, unsolved matters with FRG. *Ibidem*, document no. 88.

⁶¹ Podstawowe dane o stratach i szkodach wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945 oraz potrzeba ich ostatecznego opracowania (Draft Annex no. 2 to Informacja wstępna... with Professor Klafkowski’s comments). AIPN, KOPON, 809/46.

the Third Reich and 14 countries of Europe. It was further indicated that the death rate among 863,000 Polish citizens who survived Nazi camps of different types was in 1945–1970 higher by 50% than the figure for persons who were not imprisoned there.⁶²

KOPON experts were also ordering the data concerning the recording and documenting of war losses that were kept in the state archives, as well as attempted to recreate documents on which BOW and Commission within the Ministry of Finance's reports were based. A portion of the documentation was already dispersed and destroyed at the time.⁶³ The Commission applied for re-cataloguing of war losses, with the participation of all ministries, and demanded far-reaching powers in that respect, e.g. access to full losses documentation (including secret archives). The intentions of KOPON were extremely ambitious and their tasks broadly defined. The work at the KOPON Executive Office was conducted by subject matter-based teams, and assisted by external experts and researchers. During the initial stage, the Office employed staff from other ministries: Finance, Justice (GKBZHWP), Health and Social Welfare, Education and University Schooling, Central Statistical Office, Social Insurance Institution. In 1971 however, they all returned to their original institutions.

During nearly four years of KOPON's work, the institution collected the basic documentation on Poland's war losses, although it was not free from gaps. Initial examination and verification was carried out on the documents taken over from the Ministry of Finance.⁶⁴ In 1970, departmental documents on the losses were also collected. KOPON meetings were attended by Major-General Jan Śliwiński, as the representative for the Chief of General Staff.⁶⁵ The Ministry of

⁶² *Ibidem*; Analiza i wnioski w sprawie wykorzystania materiałów statystycznych dotyczących strat i szkód wojennych Polski, znajdujących się w archiwach terenowych [1971], AIPN, KOPON, 809/602.

⁶³ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 88. Some documents went to paper recycling. In order to prevent further damage, KOPON applied to the Prime Minister for a circular on securing the existing materials. The requested circular was subsequently issued. Minutes of the conference at the office of Minister of Finance J. Trendota of 29 July 1970, AIPN, KOPON, 809/1, p.1.

⁶⁴ KOPON took over the archives from the Foreign Department of the Ministry of Finance. See Materiały przejęte w depozyt z Ministerstwa Finansów, AIPN, KOPON, 809/36; Materials from the Ministry of Finance, AIPN, II, 244.

⁶⁵ In 1965–1969, General Jan Śliwiński was the representative of PRL armed forces with the Staff of United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and subsequently the head of the Office of the Representative of the Chief of General Staff for Special Affairs. *Sztab Generalny (Główny) Wojska Polskiego 1918–2003*, Warszawa, 2003, pp. 227, 286.

National Defence embarked, at its own initiative, on the task of examining the issue of losses in military equipment and soldiers' lives. General Śliwiński was enthusiastic about the prospects of a comprehensive determination of the extent of war losses, although he admitted that "the lack of a comprehensive decision concerning the launch of the project on a nationwide scale is slowing down the work."⁶⁶

KOPON's Economic Group, treating the data from the 1947 BOW report as "basic and direction-setting," compared them with the findings of the Commission within the Ministry of Finance of 1951. In their report, the figure for direct losses was higher than in BOW's and Commission's reports. In terms of damage to the property, the losses were estimated at 62.405 billion pre-war zlotys (BOW—62.024 billion, Ministry of Finance—55.153 billion zlotys), while the figure for lost production and services during occupation totalled 30.367 billion zlotys (BOW—26.776 billion zlotys, MF Commission—28.130 billion zlotys). Direct losses were itemized in detailed listings, but no new figures were presented in this respect.⁶⁷ It was considered that verification of the previous findings required additional scientific expert opinions (notably in terms of reduced future income) and listings of wartime damage and losses by sectors.

Owing to missing sources that would enable the verification of the data, KOPON experts focused on correcting errors in previous calculations on the basis of arrangements with individual departments. The corrections mainly applied to the figures arrived at with the rough estimate methodology.⁶⁸ Having examined the criteria and methodologies used by both institutions, a comparative analysis was carried out with the obtained materials and departmental verification data submitted to GKBZHwP. On that basis, preliminary suggestions on direct property losses were drafted. The total value of the loss was estimated at 92.772 billion pre-war zlotys, which was an increase by 4.772 billion compared with BOW calculations, and by 4.718 billion zlotys if compared with the calculations of the Commission within the Ministry of Finance. The Economic Group

⁶⁶ S. Dębski, W.M. Góralski (eds.), *op. cit.*, document no. 101.

⁶⁷ Sprawozdanie Zespołu Ekonomicznego w sprawie ostatecznego ustalenia strat wojennych Polski, 1973, AIPN, KOPON, 809/361, dt.

⁶⁸ L. Sołłohub, *op. cit.*, AIPN, KOPON, 809/361, p. 2.

submitted the suggested figures to the Commission, making a reservation that they are of “disputable nature.”⁶⁹

Initially, there was a continuity of contacts between KOPON and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Commission submitted the expert opinions to MFA and Central Committee of PZPR, some of which were ordered prior to visits to Poland of German politicians. From 1972 onwards, KOPON’s activities were gradually being phased out. The executive was aware of the diminishing interest in the Commission’s work from MFA, as well as the lack of political intent to chart specific objectives in terms of Polish claims related to the war damage.⁷⁰ The withering Commission was dissolved by decision of the Prime Minister on 30 June 1974 and the Commission for German Compensation was appointed instead, working with the Minister for Veterans, whose objective was to “collect, record and examine documents that form the basis for determining compensation claims of Polish citizens against FRG in relation to World War II.”⁷¹ The tasks were later transferred to the Office for Veterans.

The return to nationwide research on the original source documents proved unsuccessful, although historians made some progress in their work on general estimates. We cannot leave out here the findings of Czesław Łuczak, published in the seventies. He argued that the human loss of Poland’s population of both Polish and Jewish ethnic background caused by direct extermination reached 4.5 million, and several hundred thousand more lost their lives as a result of indirect extermination.⁷² The necessity to separate the figure for these losses from the general figure for deaths is linked with the necessity to incorporate in the results the conditions imposed by the occupier on the death rate, as well as the absorption of Polish people by German society, mainly as a result of kidnapping and Germanization of children (it was estimated at that time that some 160,000 children fell victim to such actions, while today, based on the latest findings, the

⁶⁹ Sprawozdanie Zespołu Ekonomicznego w sprawie ostatecznego ustalenia strat wojennych Polski, 1973, Balance Sheet I, dt, AIPN, KOPON, 809/361.

⁷⁰ Cz. Pilichowski to the head of Foreign Department of KC PZPR R. Frelek, 18 October 1973, AIPN, KOPON, 809/1; minutes of KOPON meeting on 29 October 1973, AIPN, KOPON, 809/1, pp. 7–8.

⁷¹ Final activity report for the period 6 May 1970–30 June 1974, AIPN, KOPON, 809/23, p. 3.

⁷² Cz. Łuczak, *Polityka ludnościowa i ekonomiczna hitlerowskich Niemiec w okupowanej Polsce*, Poznań, 1979, pp. 216–217; *idem*, “Polish Lives and Material Substance Losses in World War II,” in: *Poland in World War II: 1939–1945*, Warszawa, 1989, pp. 6–7.

figure is estimated at no more than 50,000).⁷³ Together with the victims of direct war activities (450,000), the human losses as a result of German aggression were estimated by Łuczak at 5.5 million, including 2.7 million Jews and people of Jewish descent. Further 13.315 million sustained significant personal losses. Out of this figure, 2.4 million were deported to Germany for forced labour, 400,000 POWs were labour slaves, 863,000 went through concentration camps and prisons, 590,000 suffered disabilities, and 2.478 million were displaced. The balance sheet for displacement and deportation remains a complex task, and individual categories of oppression cannot be simply added up. For instance, it did not include large groups of the population, e.g. 200,000–300,000 Poles, who fled from German-occupied eastern areas in 1943 and 1944, as they feared Ukrainian terror, or 170,000 persons displaced by Germans as part of the plan to establish military training areas in the General Government.⁷⁴

Military historians were also revising the initial findings of BOW and the Commission within the Ministry of Finance, which estimated the total number of deaths in the Polish armed forces at 121,000–123,000. The Military Institute of History estimated the losses of soldiers in Polish underground organizations at 200,000 killed and arrested.⁷⁵ According to Stefan Zwoliński, the total of 239,800 soldiers from regular military units and the resistance movement died.⁷⁶ Official estimates for the losses in military units were marred by the Katyn lie—Soviets' putting the blame on Germans for the execution of 14,587 active duty and reserve officers, as well as police officers, and 7,285 civilian prisoners from camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov.

⁷³ Cz. Łuczak, *Szanse i trudności bilansu...*, p. 12.

⁷⁴ As an example, W. Borodziej argues that a Pole, displaced from Poznań in autumn 1939, could be one of the deported prisoners following the Warsaw Uprising and sent for forced labour to the Reich. POW could be released, later arrested, sent to the camp or killed. In addition, people who were deported from eastern Poland were classified in the German statistics as *Ostarbeiter*, irrespective of their nationality, which makes it difficult to separate ethnic Poles from representatives of minorities. W. Borodziej, "Sprawa polska i przemieszczenia ludności w czasie II wojny światowej," in: W. Borodziej, H. Lemberg (eds.), *Niemcy w Polsce 1945–1950. Wybór dokumentów*, vol. 1, Warszawa, 2000, p. 41.

⁷⁵ The figure includes individuals oppressed in acts of general terror. *Polski Ruch Oporu 1939–1945*, Warszawa, 1988, p. 1089.

⁷⁶ S. Zwoliński, "Polski wysiłek zbrojny w II wojnie światowej," in: W. Piotrowski, M. Stolarski (eds.), *Polska w wojnie światowej 1939–1945*, Warszawa, 1989, book 4. Cf.: W. Kowalski, *Straty biologiczne Polski w okresie II wojny światowej*, AAN, BOW, 50, p. 193; *Polskie straty biologiczne, kulturalne i materialne...*, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych—AMSZ), Dep. IV, z. 11/69, w. 1, p. 375.

Experts were also emphasizing the fact that BOW failed to present full property losses.⁷⁷ Despite the corrections and reservations, BOW data were dominating the domestic scientific literature on the subject and the body of essays on Polish losses in World War II until the turn of the nineties. They were referred to in *Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN* (General Encyclopaedia) of 1975⁷⁸ and in the monumental work by GKBZHWP on Nazi camps in Poland.⁷⁹

Redefinitions and New Estimates after 1989

Since 1989, a public debate has been allowed in Poland on the balance sheet of war-related losses, including those inflicted by the USSR. After years of censorship, the natural focus of attention is the loss suffered as a result of displacement and extermination of the Polish population in the East. In 1990, Jerzy Z. Holzer, chairman of the Committee for Demographic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), submitted a proposal for research on the comprehensive demographic balance sheet for the years 1939–1945. Research centres failed to take on that task at the time, partially owing to the scarcity of funding.⁸⁰ In that period, BOW data were still in use.⁸¹ On their basis, Alfons Klafkowski estimated the total value of damage-related claims of the victims of war and their successors at DM 537 billion (\$284.6 billion).⁸²

There are many indications that the balance sheet of losses inflicted by Germany and the USSR cannot be drafted separately for each state. After the war, the effects of German occupation of eastern Poland which, in 1939–1941, was occupied by the USSR (51.6% of the area of pre-war Poland), were insufficiently examined. Next to mass migrations that proved obstacles for the

⁷⁷ See e.g. S. Jankowski, *Odbudowa i rozwój przemysłu polskiego w latach 1944–1949*, vol. 1, Warszawa, 1988, p. 172 ff.

⁷⁸ *Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN*, vol. 3, Warszawa, 1975, p. 853.

⁷⁹ Cz. Pilichowski, "Hitlerowskie obozy i ośrodki przymusowego odosobnienia oraz ich rola w realizacji programu ludobójstwa i zagłady narodu polskiego," in: *Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945. Informator encyklopedyczny*, Warszawa: PWN, 1979, pp. 11–86.

⁸⁰ J.Z. Holzer, "Bilans demograficzny Polski dla okresu 1939–1945," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1994, no. 2, p. 5.

⁸¹ See e.g. Jan Sałkowski, "Bilans strat i szkód wojennych Polski pod okupacją niemiecką i sowiecką w latach 1939–1945," in: *Elity władzy w Polsce a struktura społeczna w latach 1944–1956*, Warszawa: ISNS UW, 1992, p. 39.

⁸² *Ekspertyza podstaw prawnych roszczeń indywidualnych o odszkodowania wojenne wykonana przez Alfonsa Klafkowskiego w styczniu 1990 r. celem dochodzenia roszczeń odszkodowawczych*, Warszawa, 2000.

loss recording and estimates, historians list other problems as well. Doubts are being expressed as to which party is responsible for specific crimes (notably at the Eastern Frontier). There are no comprehensive calculations for the loss of civilian population connected with the frontline sweeping through Poland in 1944–1945. Also in relation to property losses, the results of the research carried out in the first years following the war stir up controversies. As argued by experts, the research at that time failed to capture the losses fully.⁸³ The present state of research does not allow the separation of economic losses that Germany inflicted from those sustained from Soviets, who were driving them out of the country. Cases of disassembling industrial machinery and shipping it back to the USSR were taking place not only in the formerly German areas annexed to Poland, but also in the pre-war territory of Poland.

Refreshing the topic of human losses was related to the following dilemma: should we cover the losses suffered by the Polish and Jewish populations only or, under the new circumstances, free from political restrictions, should the starting point be the pre-war territory of the state and the entire population residing there? Czesław Łuczak, in the debate on the pages of *Dzieje Najnowsze* pointed out that we should not give up the research on the demographic balance sheet for all Polish citizens in 1939, also because we could compare it with the corresponding data from other states. To move on to estimating total population losses of the 2nd Republic of Poland as a result of the war would have to entail the rejection of artificial criteria that researchers in Poland had to adopt, such as the combination of the ethnic criterion (often unclear), the perpetrator (often difficult to determine) and the territory with no universal definition of the term. In many cases, the holistic approach facilitates calculations. However, in particular in relation to victims belonging to other ethnic minorities, it entails new challenges, such as the cooperation with foreign centres and detailed confrontation of the data against the historical findings of the neighbouring countries. Given the limited access to reliable sources, which prevents accurate calculations of the losses suffered by residents of the Eastern Frontier belonging to other nationalities, the process of verifying the balance sheet of human loss still proceeded within the scope of research narrowed down to the Polish and Jewish population.⁸⁴ The overall loss of the indigenously Polish population in the

⁸³ A. Jeziernski, C. Leszczyńska, *Historia gospodarcza Polski*, Warszawa, 1997, pp. 418–419; see also e.g.: L. Bończa-Bystrzycki, *Grabież mienia związków wyznaniowych na ziemiach polskich „wcielonych do Rzeszy” w okresie hitlerowskiej okupacji (1939–1945)*, Koszalin, 1999, p. 7.

⁸⁴ Cz. Łuczak, *Szanse i trudności bilansu...*, p. 9.

territory of Poland under German occupations was, until recently, estimated at 1.5 million. The figure includes 1.3 million victims of direct and indirect extermination as well as those killed as a result of direct war activities in the General Government, and some 250,000 victims in the territory annexed to Germany.⁸⁵

There are bigger discrepancies in terms of the number of lives lost by the Jewish population. As emphasized by Czesław Łuczak, in the face of the Holocaust tragedy, research on the exact number of people killed might be viewed as inappropriate, however, without objective findings concerning the issue, it will be very difficult to determine in a reliable manner what the demographic loss for Poland was. Already when BOW was working, different assessments were presented, as the number of killed was initially estimated at as much as 3.4 million. A challenge for the damage research teams was the lack of reliable data on Polish Jews, who survived the war in the USSR. Historians estimate that there were 300,000–800,000 of them. Currently, the historians who deal with the Holocaust tend to argue that from 2.35 million to 3 million Polish Jews were killed, which represents 54–58% of the total population of Jews killed in Europe.⁸⁶

Partial verifications were made possible as the work on the determination of the number of people killed in German death camps was progressing. Rough estimate methodologies proved misleading, and the crucial source for contemporary researchers are list of convoys heading for the camps and synchronic tables based on them. Here, we should refer to the research by Franciszek Piper, who found that at least 1.1 million people died in Auschwitz, out of at least 1.3 million prisoners (initially, the number of victims was estimated at 4 million). An overwhelming majority of 300,000 Polish Jews, and 70,000–75,000 Poles imprisoned there, were killed.⁸⁷ Based on more recent research, the original estimates concerning the number of people who died in other camps are also being re-examined. In 2005, Tomasz Kranz verified the number of victims of the

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

⁸⁶ J. Marszałek, “Stan badań nad stratami osobowymi ludności żydowskiej Polski oraz nad liczbą ofiar obozów zagłady w okupowanej Polsce,” *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1994, no. 2, p. 36. Central Statistical Office, gives, after Cz. Madajczyk, 2.7 million as the number of Jews killed. *Historia Polski w liczbach*, vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

⁸⁷ F. Piper, *Ilu ludzi zginęło w KL Auschwitz. Liczba ofiar w świetle źródeł i badań 1945–1990*, Oświęcim, 1992; *idem*, *Auschwitz. How many perished Jews, Poles, Gypsies....*, Oświęcim, 1996.

concentration camp at Majdanek, proving that 78,000 people died there (thus far, the accepted estimate was over 230,000, while in the initial years following the end of World War II, the estimate was 1.5 million), which should be reflected by overall loss estimates for Poland.⁸⁸ Similarly, we should consider new findings on the number of victims of the Warsaw Uprising. The methodologically unjustified estimate of 200,000–250,000 victims, dominant in the literature on the subject until 1989, has also been discarded.⁸⁹ Czesław Łuczak estimated the total loss at 180,000 (including 15,000 soldiers), while Władysław Bartoszewski estimated losses among Warsaw civilians at 150,000.⁹⁰ Krzysztof Komorowski refers to 100,000–150,000,⁹¹ while Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, also on the basis of the Polish Red Cross data, estimates the number of victims at 120,000–130,000 civilians and 16,000–17,000 soldiers.⁹²

Considering these two corrections, the tentative number of victims of German occupation, quoted after Czesław Łuczak, should also be reduced from 5.5 million down to 5.2–5.3 million, while the balance sheet of deaths of indigenously Polish people should be brought down to 1.4 million. Undeniably, even with these corrections, the loss is of massive proportions (some 15% of the population) and remains the highest among the states occupied by the Third Reich, in particular that the findings of foreign researchers also bring corrections to earlier estimates (for comparison: Soviet Union—12.4%, Greece—10.8%, Luxembourg—1.6%, France and Belgium—1.2% each, the Netherlands—2.4%, Czechoslovakia—2.1%).⁹³

Gradually, new findings are also introduced to the research communities on individual items under property damage. International negotiations on compensation for forced labourers employed by Germany during World War II encouraged Czesław Łuczak to resume the research on forced labour of Poles for

⁸⁸ T. Kranz, “Ewidencja zgonów i śmiertelność więźniów KL Lublin,” *Zeszyty Majdanek* 23 (2005), pp. 7–54.

⁸⁹ 250,000 was, however, given as estimate also later. See e.g. S.B. Lenard, I. Wywiół, *Historia Polski w datach*, Warszawa, 2000, p. 484.

⁹⁰ W. Bartoszewski, “Przedmowa,” in: A.K. Kunert, *Rzeczpospolita Walcząca. Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Kalendarium*, Warszawa, 1994, p. VIII.

⁹¹ K. Komorowski, “Powstanie Warszawskie,” in: *Armia Krajowa. Szkice z dziejów Sił Zbrojnych Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego*, Warszawa, 1999, p. 317.

⁹² During the uprising, 120,000–130,000 civilians died (including children, women, elderly), and 16,000–17,000 soldiers. See e.g. “60 lat później,” *Nowe Państwo*, 2004, no. 8, pp. 21–24.

⁹³ M. Mallmann, B. Musiał (eds.), *Genesis des Genozids. Polen 1939–1941*, Darmstadt, 2004, p. 7.

war needs of the Third Reich, with the new, insufficiently emphasized in previous research, aspects of using their labour in Poland and in other occupied areas. He estimated that Polish citizens were forced to work 100 billion hours, of which 19.2 billion were worked by Polish civilian forced labourers deported to Germany. As a result of using Polish labour force, Third Reich and German corporations earned over 10 billion German marks.⁹⁴ After 1989, some corrections have been also made to the balance sheet of losses suffered by armed forces. Tadeusz Panecki estimates the total number of soldiers and officers killed at over 147,000 (including 17,000–19,000 killed by Soviets), over 197,000 wounded and 8,500 missing.⁹⁵ However, the figures fail to incorporate guerrilla and underground resistance units (except the Warsaw Uprising). The memorial book of the buried Polish soldiers who lost their lives during World War II contains 119,720 entries, but it does not cover all Polish soldiers' lives lost.⁹⁶

Finally, it turned out that the losses suffered by the capital of Poland were also incorrectly calculated. The most spectacular undertaking after 1989 in terms of assessing war-related losses was the research on property loss initiated by Warsaw's local government. In November 2003, the City Council for the Capital City of Warsaw made an appeal intended to trigger off research on estimated losses that the city suffered during World War II. This initiative came as a response to claims from German communities which demanded the return of the property they left behind in areas annexed to Poland after the war, as well as to the initiative of building the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin, interpreted in Poland as an attempt to bring unfounded relativism into the history of World War II. Pursuant to the decision by the Council of Warsaw of 22 April 2004, the then Mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczyński, appointed a team of experts headed by Wojciech Fałkowski, to determine the extent of losses to the city property, state treasury property and private property of Warsaw residents, lost during German occupation.

⁹⁴ Cz. Łuczak, *Praca przymusowa Polaków w Trzeciej Rzeszy i na okupowanych przez nią terytoriach innych państw (1939–1945)*, Poznań, 2001, pp. 142–144.

⁹⁵ T. Panecki, "Wysilek zbrojny Polski w II wojnie światowej," *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny*, 1995, no. 1–2, pp. 13–18; *idem*, "Militaryny udział Polski w II wojnie światowej," in: T. Panecki (eds.), *Polski wysilek zbrojny w drugiej wojnie światowej. Bilans, wnioski, doświadczenia*, Warszawa, 1999, pp. 28–38.

⁹⁶ E. Pawłowski (ed.), *Księga pochowanych żołnierzy polskich poległych w II wojnie światowej. Suplement*, Pruszków, 1998, p. 5.

The bulk of the work was completed in autumn 2004. In October 2004, the City Hall published preliminary results. The presented value of Warsaw's losses during World War II totalled 18.2 billion zlotys (based on the value of zloty in August 1939) which, converted to the present value, comes to 45.3 billion dollars. It was pointed out, however, that it was not the total amount, as the balance sheet did not include the property which belonged to the State Treasury prior to the war, and some private property. The Mayor of Warsaw submitted the report to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that "there would be no report, if it wasn't for actions by some German communities."⁹⁷ In October 2005, Warsaw authorities published the updated war loss estimates, this time at 21.9 billion zlotys (of 1939), that is the present 54.6 billion dollars. The amount rose by 20% in comparison to the 2004 report, which resulted from additional assessments and adding the cost of equipment of state and city institutions, as well as correcting computational and factual errors.

For ethical reasons and owing to the "lack of a clear and convincing methodology," the team did not estimate the value of lives and health lost by residents of Warsaw. Rather, they focused on losses to property items, and the point of departure was the analysis of 62,000 questionnaires, found in Grodzisk Mazowiecki, containing loss listings submitted in 1945–1946 by Warsaw residents. Experts proceeded to the verification of individual data sets. The value of losses in the selected 40 city quarters was carefully investigated, and each piece of real property examined separately. The value of standard furnishings in a typical flat was determined, following a division of residents into five, annual salary-based categories. This enabled the value of the destroyed real property in the remaining 480 quarters of the city to be estimated, based on the volume of the buildings in each quarters, and also on the basis of cartometric maps and air photos. Values of means of transportation (private and public) were also assessed, and losses to the municipal infrastructure examined. 133 destroyed historical buildings, 111 industrial facilities, 20 bridges and overpasses were assessed for value, and, on that basis, summary listings for the entire city were drafted.⁹⁸

Warsaw is not the only city in Poland that embarked on the project of calculating the losses suffered as a result of World War II. In May 2005, the local government in Poznań appointed the Team for Assessing the Value of Losses

⁹⁷ www.um.warszawa.pl.

⁹⁸ W. Fałkowski (ed.) *Straty Warszawy 1939–1945. Raport*, Warszawa, 2005, p. 7

Related to the War and German Occupation 1939–1945. Poznań considers itself fourth city in Poland in terms of war-related property damage (after Warsaw, Gdańsk and Wrocław). In February 2006, the work of the Team accelerated, following the discovery of KOPON's report of 1971, along with 42 thousand questionnaires filled out by Poznań residents at the turn of 1947.⁹⁹ The head of the Team is Professor Andrzej Sakson, director of the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni). In his opinion, the present assessment of war-related losses by local authorities will not thwart the reconciliation process between Poles and Germans, since the estimates submitted by Warsaw “made Germans acutely aware, that attempts to ‘outbid’ each other, who’s lost more, don’t make much sense.”¹⁰⁰ As other cities (Lublin, Jasło) follow the footsteps of the first two, it could be said that the research that can contribute to the work on the balance sheet for war-related losses in Poland is developing.

Preliminary Assumptions for the Government Programme of Research on Human Losses

For several years, a concept for conducting comprehensive research on the balance sheet of human losses suffered by Poland during World War II has been maturing in the minds of historians of World War II. In some states, such undertakings have been in place and successful for a long time now (Israel, Great Britain). There are factors that may help overcome problems resulting from the passing of time and the generation changes. In the nineties, access to Soviet source documents was granted. Historians have new possibilities of collecting and verifying data, and may use computational capabilities that were not available in the past. The work on the Index of the Oppressed, covering Polish people oppressed in the USSR, coordinated by KARTA Centre, has generated some relevant experience in the field. The cooperation of the stakeholders—institutions and communities, enabled the determination of the scale of oppression and collection of personal data for one out of three oppressees. The project of the nationwide database on victims of World War II, however, much exceeds the organizational potential of a single research institution and requires support from the government in the form of coordinating actions of the many institutions involved in documenting war losses.

⁹⁹ *Gazeta Poznańska* of 13 February 2006.

¹⁰⁰ PAP News, 11 May 2005.

A growing interest from state institutions in the research on war losses was also accompanied by the conviction that the state policy in the area of the so-called “historical diplomacy”¹⁰¹ should be revitalized. In connection with insufficient knowledge on the balance sheet of Polish participation in World War II, the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) has prepared a concept for calculating all human losses of the 2nd Republic of Poland. Janusz Kurtyka, IPN’s president, has appointed a commission of experts to carry out the preparatory work. The commission is headed by Tomasz Szarota, and its members are Andrzej K. Kunert, Andrzej Chmielarz and Waldemar Grabowski. The first stage of the project deals with the victims of the German invasion on Poland, as this research field has been neglected since 1989, in comparison with assessing losses suffered by Poland from the USSR. On the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, that is on 1 September 2006, the official inauguration of the scientific and research programme “Personal losses and victims of oppression under German occupier” was held at the Royal Castle in Warsaw. Minister Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski announced that “the objective of the programme is to compile a detailed list of the sacrifices of life made by Polish citizens during the defence war of 1939, and during German occupation in 1939–1945.” The objective of compiling a list with the names of victims, or at least modifying their present anonymous status, stems from the “obligation of the Polish state that has not been met yet” and is to become “tribute to that sacrifice.”¹⁰² The minister underscored that the programme is not a “response to problems between Poland and Germany. The work this project embraces should be carried out irrespective of whether there are any problematic issues in our debate with Germany or not.” He also explained that “what we are doing today will be of significance for the Europe-wide discussion with our western neighbour.”¹⁰³

The Programme Council, chaired by director of IPN’s Public Education Office Jan Żaryn, is composed of the invited directors of Poland’s most important institutions dealing with the collection documents on the victims of

¹⁰¹ See more in: M. Gniazdowski, “Kwestie historyczne w polskiej polityce zagranicznej,” *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* 2006, pp. 234–257.

¹⁰² www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/index.jsp?artId=1306.

¹⁰³ PAP News, 1 September 2006.

World War II.¹⁰⁴ The combination of their efforts is to result in establishment of the Centre of Information on Oppressees, where data will be collected on German and Soviet occupation, as well as post-war acts of oppression.¹⁰⁵ The first statements of the promoters of the programme indicate that the ethnic criterion, dominant in the investigations on the population losses thus far, has been definitely discarded to the benefit of the citizenship criterion, the application of which, in particular in relation to population loss at the Eastern Frontier in the final episodes of World War II, poses new methodological challenges. The first stage of the work, planned to continue for approximately two years, will cover actions intended to consolidate databases on population loss and victims of oppression. Simultaneously, the process of collecting information directly from the victims and their families has been launched. To that end, a detailed questionnaire, drafted by a team of experts and available from 1 September 2006, on websites of IPN, the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and the House of Encounters with History in Warsaw, will be used. The latter institution has been temporarily tasked with collecting personal data and receiving applications for personal inquiries.

Final Remarks

The history of assessing damage inflicted on Poland by Germany during World War II reveals that all comprehensive findings are of an indicative nature only. Authorities of the RP in exile, and subsequently communist governments domestically, were taking actions to determine the value of the damage suffered from the Third Reich. Although, for objective reasons, full redress of the

¹⁰⁴ The Programme Council is composed of the representatives of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, Institute of National Remembrance, Central Archives of Modern Records, Head Office of State Archives, Central Military Archives, Central Military Library, Military Office for Historical Research, National Library, State Museum at Majdanek, Gross-Rosen Museum in Rogoźnica, National Stutthof Museum in Sztutowo, Central Prisoner-of-War Museum in Łambinowice, Office for Information and Tracing Service of the Polish Red Cross, Board of the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation, Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in Oświęcim, Office for Veterans and Oppressees, Museum of the Polish History., World Union of Home Army Soldiers, The Institute of Western Affairs in Poznań, Warsaw Uprising Museum, Section for Totalitarian Systems and World War II of the Department of History at PAN, Jagiellonian Library, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London, Ossolinski National Institute, Council for the Remembrance of Struggle and Martyrdom, Hoover Institution, Standing Conference on Polish Museums, Archives and Libraries in the West, Pawiak Prison Museum and Jewish Historical Institute.

¹⁰⁵ Z. Gluza, "Pamięć imienna," *Karta*, no. 49 (2006), p. 3.

damage could not be expected, the determination of the value of the damage was to serve the purpose of receiving as much in reparations from Germany as possible.

In post-war Poland, the most often quoted calculations were those announced in January 1947 by the Office for War Compensation at the Council of Ministers' Executive. It made the most extensive use of original sources, collected during a broad-scale campaign of recording damage. BOW findings, however, similarly to subsequent attempts at the assessment, carried out in the following years, almost exclusively covered the damage inflicted in one area of the territory of pre-war Poland, and in relation to individuals of Polish and Jewish nationality only. Post-war actions to limit the war damage in Poland to that inflicted by Germany was a risky plan, which had to produce biased results and methodological chaos. Those estimates failed to incorporate in a proper manner the losses inflicted in 51.6% of the territory of the Polish state, namely the areas annexed by the USSR which, in summer 1941, were seized by Germany and in 1944 (except for parts of Białystok and Lviv provinces) came back to the USSR. The lack of data on losses suffered in this vast area of the pre-war state prevented, in practical terms, reliable calculations of the losses suffered by Poland as a result of World War II. The separation of the damage inflicted by one occupier from the total balance sheet of Poland's war-related losses poses significant problems.

The government programme for the consolidation of data on human losses, that institutions documenting victims of World War II and private individuals have at their disposal, and subsequent creation of the list with names of the victims, appears an extremely complex task. However, the launch of the programme inspires hope that the results of the research to date will be properly arranged and systematically presented. Clearly, this is a big opportunity to expand our body of knowledge on some specific issues, also owing to the collection of questionnaires filled out on the basis of witnesses' accounts. The very implementation of the programme plays a positive role for the educational dimension, and, thanks to the proper information policy, may prove a factor that enhances the prestige of Poland in the international arena.

It was Poland where Hitler started to embody his ideology of the "living space," gathering criminal experience before the planned settlement action throughout Eastern Europe. Several years of terror, genocide and mass-scale "movements" of the population render the balance sheet of war-related losses extremely painful. After almost 60 years from the end of the war that brought

about changes of borders and subsequent migrations, the possibility of conducting a reliable verification and correction of previous estimates may be questioned. However, the attempts thus far at evaluating damage inflicted by German invaders are a sufficient proof that the loss and damage Poland suffered during the war was the most acute among the members of the anti-Nazi coalition.

Diplomatic File

KRZYSZTOF STRZAŁKA

Polish-Italian Contacts in Lisbon in 1941–1943

The document presented below reveals a little-known aspect of the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kowalewski, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Continental Action in the capital of Portugal in 1940–1944. A memo drafted towards the end of 1943, that is already after Italy had formally joined the anti-Hitler coalition, supplements the resources on Kowalewski's activities in Lisbon and the Polish-Italian relations during World War II,¹ compiled notably by Jan Ciechanowski and the author of this article.

Owing to the importance of the problems tackled in the document and the people it describes, it seems reasonable to introduce the readers to the historical background of Kowalewski's contacts with Italians, and take a critical look at the information contained in this source.

Firstly, talks held with the Italian representatives in Portugal's capital were part of the action "Tripod," dating back to the turn of 1943. It primarily intended to separate Hitler's European allies, that is to say Italy, Romania and Hungary, from Germany, to bring forward the demise of the Third Reich and the end of World War II, which was vitally important for the Polish citizens suffering under

¹ J. Ciechanowski, "Misja ppłk. dypl. Jana Kowalewskiego w Portugalii," in: T. Dubicki, D. Nałęcz, T. Sterling (eds.), *Polsko-brytyjska współpraca wywiadowcza podczas II wojny światowej. Ustalenia Polsko-Brytyjskiej Komisji Historycznej*, vol. 1, Warszawa, 2004, pp. 517–530; K. Strzałka, *Między przyjaźnią a wrogością. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-włoskich w latach 1939–1945*, Kraków, 2001, pp. 232–246.

German occupation.² The concept was born in Lisbon, and Jan Szembek, the former minister of foreign affairs, who settled in the Portuguese capital during the war, is rightly regarded as its author.³

Secondly, it is worth noting that “Tripod” was not a regular political action plan. It was inextricably linked with a broader strategic and military concept, providing for the option of the Allied and Polish forces’ transfer from North Africa and the Middle East to the Balkans, thus opening the shortest route for the country’s liberation before the coming of the Red Army. The success of this political plan (separation of the Third Reich’s European allies), perceived as a peculiar act of sabotage, was a precondition for the success of the entire strategic and military concept. The withdrawal of the three states from the “Axis” and their accession to the anti-Hitler coalition meant for Italy a possibility that the Allies would build bridgeheads in the north-eastern part of the country (Kowalewski primarily underscored the importance of capturing the ports of Trieste and Fiume) and launch a broad offensive using the Polish units (Polish Army in the East) heading for Krakow and Lviv, through Zagreb, Budapest and the Hungarian lowlands. This plan was to conclude with the liberation of a major part of southern Poland.⁴

Italy, the strongest ally of the Third Reich, occupied a special place within this concept, both for their industrial and military potential, geographical location and, first and foremost, the political meaning related to Mussolini himself and fascism’s position in the country. According to the Polish scenario, the withdrawal of the state from the “Axis” to join the side of the Allies would not only enable the second front to be opened in the south, much closer to Polish borders, but also trigger off a massive-scale sabotage campaign in the ranks of the remaining satellite states in the Balkans, in particular Hungary and Romania.⁵ Therefore, the representative for the so-called Continental Action in Lisbon and the chief, next to Szembek, actor of operation “Tripod” spared no effort to link up the Italian representatives with the Allies. Undoubtedly, the

² T. Piszczkowski, *Między Lizboną a Londynem. Z sekretów dyplomacji polskiej w czasie drugiej wojny światowej*, London, 1979, pp. 11–15.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁴ Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London (IPMS), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/5, Kowalewski’s report from Lisbon no. L. 161 of 12 October 1942.

⁵ J. Librach, “Nota o ‘Akcji Kontynentalnej’,” *Zeszyty Historyczne*, 1973, no. 23, pp. 166–167.

ultimate purpose of the Polish agenda was to convince Italians to leave the alliance with Germany and sign a compromise peace treaty with Great Britain and the United States.⁶

The starting point for the Polish efforts with the Italians were reports, received since mid-1942, on the change of social sentiments and increasing anti-German attitudes among fascist elites, associated with repeated defeats of German troops on various fronts. Analyses of the internal situation in the country were submitted by the Polish institutions and representatives in Italy,⁷ arguing that there was a growing conviction in government circles that defeat in the war was imminent, as was the bankruptcy of fascism and the necessity to seek compromise with the Allies.⁸ The Polish sources were also pointing out that an informal team of politicians and military, who opposed close cooperation with Hitler's Germany, was beginning to emerge, headed by Dino Grandi, the former minister of foreign affairs and ambassador in London, and the former commander-in-chief of the Italian army, marshal Pietro Badoglio. In 1942, the group, representing the internal opposition within the fascist regime, was regarded by Polish government circles as the only power capable of staging an anti-German coup in Italy.⁹

As a consequence, Polish diplomatic and intelligence efforts towards Italy focused primarily on that group and connected individuals, initially seeking appropriate partners to negotiate a compromise treaty among anti-German fascists. This also stemmed from other calculations serving the Polish *raison d'état*. The memo presented also touches upon the issue of the influence of the Polish suggestions from Lisbon on the actions of political groups in Italy around Grandi that were dissatisfied with Mussolini. An interesting fact is the linking of the Polish "support" for Italy (offering to take on an intermediary function and provide good service for the Italian-British contacts, intended to result in a separate treaty between Italy and the Allies) with Italian interventions for the improvement of living conditions for the Polish population under German occupation.¹⁰

⁶ K. Strzałka, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

⁷ Notably by Poland's ambassador to the Holy See, Kazimierz Papee, secret representative of MFA in Italy, Zygmunt Skórzewski and—to a lesser extent—by the Polish Red Cross in Rome. See K. Strzałka, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–216.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 219–220.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ All known Polish attempts to act as intermediary between Italy and the Allies during World War II testify to that. See more in: K. Strzałka, *op. cit.*, pp. 223–231.

Guided by the factors above and playing on the moods prevailing in Italy at that time, Lt Col Kowalewski and Szembek initiated contacts, initially indirect and later direct, with the Italian representatives in Lisbon. The individuals they were interested in meeting were chiefly the employees of the Italian mission (envoy Francesco Frasoni and the mission's secretary, Renato Giardini), the Cultural Institute (Lefebvre D'Ovidio), journalists and people on various missions in the capital of Portugal, known to be linked with Grandi's camp.¹¹ During the talks, initially held in relay mode with the help of a Romanian diplomat, Jean Pangal, the Poles tried to convince the Italians that they could count on the Polish acting as intermediaries in their negotiations with the Allies.¹² They made the effectiveness of their role dependent on removing Mussolini, and the fascists faithful to him, which was an absolute must for the Allies, notably the British, to proceed to any contacts with the Italians. The Italian diplomats pinned many of their hopes on the Polish mediation, but could not understand, until the end of 1942, that the British did not want to make any, even the slightest, concessions regarding the Italians keeping their colonies. Therefore, at the beginning of 1943, they sought contact through the Polish with the Americans as well, suggesting to them a possibility of entering into a separate peace treaty.¹³

The document published below does not reveal it unequivocally, but detailed accounts of the talks with the Italians in 1941–1943, addressed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, left quite a mark at the headquarters of Continental Action in London and MFA. In mid-November 1942, when justifying the case of continuing talks with the Italian representatives, Kowalewski reported that “the case of Italy leaving the war is as important as Romania's or Hungary's quitting, since if Italy does so, landing locations will appear for the Polish units from the

¹¹ IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/5, Kowalewski's report from Lisbon no. L. 155 of 22 September 1942.

¹² IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/5, Kowalewski's report from Lisbon no. L. 161 of 12 October 1942. Kowalewski wrote in plain terms that the Italians were happy with the Polish “care” extended over Pangal.

¹³ The Countess of Listowell, *Crusader in the secret war*, London, 1952, pp. 116–118. This work, discovered by the author several years ago in London, contains a detailed political biography of LTC Kowalewski, based on authentic documents, notably the description of his activities in Lisbon in 1940–1944. The late Judith Marffy-Mantuano Hare—the Countess of Listowell (died in 2004 in London), of Hungarian descent, was Kowalewski's close associate in the postwar era. In 1944–1954, they were publishing together an excellent political bi-weekly called *East Europe & Soviet Russia*.

east in Trieste and Fiume, and quick arrival in Krakow, through Zagreb and Budapest, will be become possible.”¹⁴ Based on the reports, a conviction emerged in the “Polish London” that the “Italian card” may prove an ace for the government in exile in their interactions with the Allies. It turned out soon thereafter that these were just misleading appearances. Information on establishing contacts with representatives from Italy in Lisbon was questioned by the British.¹⁵ Anthony Eden, the secretary of state at the Foreign Office, and his deputy Sargent decided that the Polish brokering was troublesome for London for at least several reasons. Firstly, they argued that the “peace feelers” between Poles and Italians on the separate peace treaty would solidify fascism and Mussolini, rather than weaken them. Secondly, the execution of “Tripod” in its Italian aspect would fundamentally contradict the principles of the overall strategy and the British attitude to fascist Italy, both clearly defined at the turn of 1943. The strategy primarily stipulated total annihilation of fascism and exemplary punishment to Italy for the losses they inflicted on Britain in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa. Also, the influence of the USSR on British activities cannot be underestimated here. Churchill did not want to carry out his own projects against the Soviet Union, and ultimately abandoned (influenced by Americans) the previously promoted concept of the assault in Europe through the Balkans, which would meet the Polish political and strategic agenda.¹⁶

The factors referred to above also contributed to the failure of the “Tripod” concept towards Italy, which was vehemently manifested by the announcement by Churchill and Roosevelt in Casablanca in January 1943 of the principle of “unconditional surrender” of the “Axis” states. Kowalewski, similarly to most Polish politicians, thought that this demand would lead to a protracted war in Europe and discourage German satellites from seeking settlement with the Allies.¹⁷

¹⁴ IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/5, Kowalewski’s report from Lisbon no. L. 176 of 16 November 1942

¹⁵ T. Piszczkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–42.

¹⁶ L. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. 2, London, 1971, pp. 272–280; A. Varsori, “Italy, Britain and the problem of a separate peace during the second world war: 1940–1943,” *The Journal of Italian History* 1, no. 3 (1978), p. 470; on 3 December the War Office finally approved the memorandum by the Foreign Office concerning this case, which was tentatively agreed on 20 November 1942.

¹⁷ The Countess of Listowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–105.

Despite vibrant activity and efforts by Kowalewski himself, combined with the efforts of Polish diplomacy, the British remained set in their dogmatic views on Italy and, in the face of Mussolini's removal from power towards the end of July 1943, did not allow themselves to be convinced about embarking on speedy and determined actions which, as it appears from the examination of the archived materials and today's perspective, could have brought the outcome presented by the Polish, that is the capturing by the Allies of ports in central and northeastern Italy and a much earlier end to World War II. The British and the Americans, who subscribed to the argumentation in this respect, were held hostage by their own strategic concepts, notably the "unconditional surrender," and a misunderstood sense of loyalty to the obligations made to the USSR.

The memo reveals a whole array of direct and indirect contacts made by Kowalewski with Italian representatives in Lisbon, notably with individuals from diplomatic circles, as well as the strategy he adopted. Contacts with the Italians were excellent, as evidenced by the events of July and August 1943, when Kowalewski directly negotiated details of the Italian surrender with the Italian diplomats: the new envoy Renato Prunas, and his personal friend, secretary Lefebvre D'Ovidio.¹⁸ The document does not offer an analysis of those facts, but the archived documentation indicates that Kowalewski shared the concerns of the Italians who, following the toppling of fascism and Mussolini, waited in vain for clear political decisions from the Allies. Uninterrupted silence from the British, awaiting unconditional surrender of Italy, caused him to call on London. On 5 August 1943 he received from London semi-official conditions that he was supposed to pass on to the Italians. They were so tough that Kowalewski doubted from the very beginning that they could be accepted by the representatives of Italy. He still submitted them to Prunas, who showed deep concern. On the next day, the Italian envoy presented to Kowalewski the new Allied policy towards Italy, underscoring that the only chance for Italy for the future would be to manoeuvre skilfully among the three big allies.¹⁹

The document also fails to consider the actions of Szembek, parallel and complementary to Kowalewski's efforts. The latter's reports to the subsequent leaders of the Polish diplomacy in London: Edward Raczyński (until July 1943)

¹⁸ IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/7, Top secret telegram from the Polish Mission to Lisbon to MFA of 30 July 1943 (no number).

¹⁹ The Countess of Listowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–129.

and Tadeusz Romer, cast a new light on details on Kowalewski's tactics.²⁰ The memo also leaves out a sensitive period between June 1940 and second half of 1941, when Kowalewski maintained direct political contacts with the Italian envoy to Portugal, Renato Bova Scoppa (until his departure from Lisbon on the eve of the Third Reich's invasion on the USSR).²¹ It also fails to give account of the period following December 1943, when both Kowalewski and Szembek were involved in intense, direct talks with the official representatives of Italy in Lisbon, mainly a renowned Italian politician Grandi, who, after fleeing from Italy, stopped for some time in the capital of Portugal.²²

The document was drafted towards the end of 1943, probably by Jan Librach, head of Continental Action in London, based on reports and messages sent from Lisbon by Jan Kowalewski and partly also by the Polish mission.²³ It picks up the key issues of the complex contacts between Kowalewski and the Italians in 1940–1943. It focuses almost entirely on the Polish efforts to separate Italy from Germany. Perhaps this limitation in scope was motivated by a specific assignment, e.g. from MFA, and the report itself was to become a trump card in the efforts by the Polish government to join the Allied Control Commission for Italy. In the documents of the Polish MFA, especially those drafted by Minister Tadeusz Romer, who—owing to his position and interest in Italy—promoted the issue among the British, we can find arguments to support this thesis. Documents from MIA (Continental Action), MFA (the Sikorski Institute in London), the executive committee of the Council of Ministers (ECM) as well as the Public Record Office (documents from the Foreign Office, Cabinet, War Office, Lord Avon-Eden) indicate that the document was not submitted to the British as support for the Polish efforts.

What also needs clarification is the conjectures mentioned in the memo, concerning the actual talks between Italy and the Allies, that were later to be concluded with the signing of the truce (so-called short truce) on 3 September 1943 in Sicily and the act on unconditional surrender of the state. The author of the memo is wrong in writing that the location for the secret negotiations was Turkey. In reality, negotiations with marshal Badoglio's envoy, general

²⁰ Szembek's reports to heads of MFA, Edward Raczyński and Tadeusz Romer, are kept in the Sikorski Institute in London, in collection no. 85 (Jan Szembek).

²¹ The Countess of Listowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–96.

²² K. Strzałka, *op. cit.*, pp. 376–378.

²³ J. Librach, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–174.

Giuseppe Castellano, were held in Lisbon through the British envoy mission and with delegates from the American (Gen. Walter Bedell Smith) and British armies (Gen. Kenneth Strong).²⁴ The Polish were not informed about it. However, they enabled, be it indirectly, direct contacts between the Italians and the Allied representatives in Lisbon.

The document re-published below is in the archives of the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London (Ministry of Internal Affairs team, Continental Action), and its version here follows the original copy. Corrections have been limited to the necessary minimum. The guiding principle was as little interference with the text and the way of relaying the information as possible, although at times readers might find the text convoluted and the message blurred. Lexical and stylistic peculiarities have been retained; underlined parts in the original text have been replaced by bold font. Only the obvious errors, such as misspelt names (mainly Italian) have been corrected, with the appropriate versions in square brackets. Editing has been limited to adding punctuation marks, bringing the text closer to contemporary Polish orthography, and correcting grammatical errors. Missing sections in the text have been marked with [...]. Wherever necessary, the year was indicated in brackets, in order to render the document clearer. Similarly, missing days in dates have been added.

²⁴ More on the issue in: P. Pastorelli, *Dalla Prima alla Seconda guerra mondiale. Momenti e problemi della politica estera italiana 1914–1953*, Milano, 1997, pp. 178–186.

Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kowalewski and Polish-Italian Contacts in Lisbon in 1941–1943

London, 13 December 1943
IPMS/A.9.VI.24/1

Contact with the various Italian personalities, temporarily or permanently residing in Lisbon, has been maintained by our correspondent there for a long time. Since the beginning of this year [1943], the talks have intensified as the events related to Italy have gained importance.

Relations were maintained both with the official representatives of Italy, that is members of the Envoy mission, as well as with individuals who were coming for various purposes and under various pretexts for a short stay in Portugal. Initially, the contacts were mostly indirect.²⁵ Gradually, however, as the interlocutors built up more trust towards each other, or in line with the new instructions they were receiving, or new political developments, they finally arrived at the conclusion that it was more beneficial for them to be involved personally in future dealings with the Allies.

During the first half of the period, the Italian envoy to Lisbon was Minister Franzoni [Frasoni].²⁶ The talks with him were almost entirely held in the indirect mode. Only when he was notified that he would move to the headquarters in Rome, did he agree to a face-to-face meeting, inviting our representative over several times. In mid-May [1943], he left Lisbon to assume the duties of the Overseas Department Director at the Italian MFA. Undoubtedly, working in this capacity, he had genuine influence on the Italian policy and was

²⁵ Through Jean Pangal, former envoy for Romania in Lisbon. He was Kowalewski's close friend since the time the latter worked as a military attaché in Bucharest in 1932–1937. Pangal had extensive contacts with diplomats of the Axis in Lisbon, as well as access to President Salazar; IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/5, Kowalewski's report from Lisbon, no. L. 155 of 22 September 1942.

²⁶ Francesco Frasoni, professional diplomat, in the 30s the Italian envoy in Kaunas and Prague, then from June 1941 to May 1943 in Lisbon. Since end of May 1943, general director of the overseas department at MFA. In the postwar period, also the secretary general at the Italian MFA in 1946–1948.

in direct contact with deputy minister Bastianini.²⁷ However, when Ciano²⁸ was still in office, his meetings with us in Lisbon boiled down to relaying instructions. Regarding our correspondent, it was so formulated that he claimed he received authorization from Rome to “maintain mutually informative contact.” This authorization remained valid after the Cabinet changed and count Ciano stepped down. In summer this year [1943], Franzoni [Fransoni] was coming to Lisbon again, to phase out construction works at the Mission he had started, as the Italians wanted to withdraw from that referring to their foreign currency shortage. In reality, however, he brought secret instructions for his successor in case of Mussolini’s fall. Regardless, our correspondent kept continuous mail contact with him, or through individuals travelling to Italy.

Counsellor Guardini [Giardini].²⁹ Contacts with him started earlier than with Franzoni [Fransoni], he was open and less formal. He was involved in the talks more than his boss, although he acted, as it turned out when direct contact with Franzoni [Fransoni] was initiated, on his instructions and with his knowledge. Guardini [Giardini] left Lisbon simultaneously with the envoy, heading for Italy to take the position of the governor of Corfu. G[iardini] is a distant relative of marshal Messe.³⁰

²⁷ Giuseppe Bastianini, a fascist politician and participant in the “March on Rome,” professional diplomat. Since 1928 at MFA. In 1928–1932, the Italian envoy in Lisbon and Athens, later ambassador in Warsaw (1932–1936). In 1936–1939, deputy minister of foreign affairs, then from May 1940 ambassador in London. From 1940 to 1943, civilian governor of the Italy-occupied Dalmatia. From February to the end of July 1943, again deputy minister of foreign affairs. It was him who actually managed the ministry in Mussolini’s absence. Very favourably inclined towards Poland and Polish people.

²⁸ Gian Galeazzo Ciano, a fascist politician, Mussolini’s son-in-law, participant in the “March on Rome” in 1922. Professional diplomat. From 1925 to 1933 working at diplomatic posts in Brazil, Argentina and China, also as consul general in Shanghai, and then as envoy in Beijing (1932–1933). In 1934–1936, minister for the press and propaganda, and from 1936 to February 1943, minister of foreign affairs of fascist Italy. Later ambassador to the Holy See. Opponent of the German-Italian alliance. He voted against Mussolini at the Grand Council of Fascism on 25 July 1943.

²⁹ Renato Giardini, professional diplomat. In 1938–1940 the Italian consul in Tenerife, first secretary of the Italian mission in Teheran (1940–1942), then, by 1943, counsellor for the Italian mission in Lisbon.

³⁰ Giovanni Messe, general, and later marshal of Italy. During World War II he commanded the Italian Expeditionary Corps in the USSR (1941–1942), and later the 1st Army in North Africa. From the end of February to mid-May 1943, commander-in-chief of the Axis troops in North Africa (1st mixed German-Italian army). He signed Italy’s surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. He was regarded as an opponent of fascism. After Italy joined the anti-Hitler coalition, he was freed from a POW camp and nominated as the chief of general staff of the revived Italian army.

Mission secretary Manzini³¹ remained in Lisbon as Franzoni's [Fransoni's] representative after his departure. Contacts with the latter during his sojourn in Rome were maintained through Manzini. His concepts and position were identical with those of his boss.

Marquis Della Terza [La Terza]³² was *chargé d'affaires* after Franzoni's [Fransoni's] departure and before his successor arrived. He obviously wanted to continue with the talks initiated by Franzoni [Fransoni] and Guardini [Giardini], however, due to his poor familiarity with the issue and insufficient skills, we did not respond to that readiness. After Mussolini's fall, he was moved to Madrid, to clear the office for Marquis de Ajeta [Blasco D'Ajeta],³³ until then the head of count Ciano's office. He received the post in Lisbon so that he could be safe from potential persecutions in Italy.

In mid-May [1943], Prunas,³⁴ the new minister, came to Lisbon. In Rome, his post was the one that Franzoni [Fransoni] took afterwards. So this was merely an office swap. The contacts with him were a straight continuation of the talks initiated with Franzoni [Fransoni], since he was kept informed of them from the very beginning. Since the events of the time rendered the talks more topical, it was not before long that they became entirely open, to finally adopt the mode of almost specific, final negotiations.

The director of the Italian Cultural Institute in Lisbon was Ovidio Lefevre³⁵ [Lefebvre D'Ovidio], a young, learned sociologist, linked with the University of

³¹ Raimondo Manzini, professional diplomat. Since 1940 at the Italian MFA. Initially, deputy consul in San Francisco and later, after Italy declared war on the United States, 2nd secretary of the Italian mission in Lisbon, where he remained until the end of September 1943. One of the closest associates of ambassador Renato Prunas. See more in E. Serra, *Professione: Ambasciatore d'Italia*, vol. 2, presentazione di Giulio Andreotti, Milano, 2001, pp. 91–93.

³² Pier Luigi La Terza, professional diplomat. In 1939–1942, head of Office II at the General Directorate for Trade Affairs at MFA. From 1943, adviser to the Italian mission in Lisbon and, from August 1943, in Madrid.

³³ Blasco Lanza D'Ajeta, professional diplomat. From 1936 to 1943, head of office of minister of foreign affairs Ciano, and from September 1943 to September 1944 *chargé d'affaires ad interim* in Lisbon. He sought contact with the British before Italy's surrender was signed.

³⁴ Renato Prunas, professional diplomat. In 1940–1943, director general of the overseas department at MFA. From end of May to end of September 1943, the Italian envoy in Lisbon. From October 1943 to November 1946, royal government's secretary general of MFA. In 1943–1944, actual head of MFA, later ambassador to Turkey.

³⁵ Lefebvre D'Ovidio, a poet and literary historian. During the interwar period, employee with the Italian Cultural Institute in London, from 1939, head of the Italian Cultural Institute in Lisbon.

Naples. He was our first point of contact among the Italians; he was most involved in the talks and grew personally committed to our joint endeavours. Therefore, for the future, he can be regarded as our trusted man, more than others, and used when the right time comes.

In the second half of March and at the beginning of April [1943], professor Pellizzi³⁶ came to Lisbon as the director of Italian foreign institutes, which was why he was constantly travelling abroad. At the same time, he was a member of the fascist party's directorate and, as a result, had strong influences within the party and access to the highest government officials in Rome. During his presence in Lisbon, he had numerous conversations with our correspondent, implying that this was because of the mission he was tasked with, namely seeking unofficial contact with the Allies. He was also trying to establish direct contacts with the British, who dodged this. After his departure, Lefevre [Lefebvre], who was very close to him, regretted a lot that he failed, claiming that Pellizzi had meaningful information to tell to the British and had those talks been held, the case of a separate peace with Italy would have been much more advanced. Later, on numerous occasions, we were receiving feedback from our correspondent's talks with Pellizzi,³⁷ namely that Pellizzi took them very seriously and was working in Rome with the issues in a way corresponding to our objectives.

The representative for the Milan daily "Stampa" ["La Stampa"] in Lisbon at that time was Zingarelli.³⁸ "Stampa" ["La Stampa"] belongs to the Fiat group, thus representing big industry interests. In our talks, Zingarelli was expressing views of the fascist right. He was also inclined to seeking contact with the Allies and, during the talks, primarily tackled the issues related to the viewpoint of the economic world. He was keenly interested in procurement prospects for the war industry on the Allies' seizure of Italy, offering the industry for the war needs of

³⁶ Camillo Pellizzi, professor of sociology and one of the greatest minds among fascists. Before the war, he was, among other duties, director of the Italian Cultural Institute in London and, during World War II, president of the National Institute of Fascist Culture. Author of a dozen or so scientific publications on sociology. After the war, professor at universities in Florence, Trident and Urbino.

³⁷ The background of Kowalewski's meeting with professor Pellizzi presented here matches Pellizzi's report to Mussolini: Fondazione Ugo Spirito in Rome, Archivio Camillo Pellizzi, fasc. 10, Conclusioni di una visita in Portogallo e in Spagna, 4 April 1940.

³⁸ Italo Zingarelli, Italian journalist and press correspondent. Author of several books on history. In 1917–1930, a foreign correspondent in Switzerland and Austria. From 1940, Lisbon correspondent for the daily *La Stampa*. Head of section in the daily. Never an editor-in-chief.

the Allies. His primary argumentation was prevention of unemployment, unrest and the masses in northern Italy from getting radical. After Mussolini's fall, he was recalled to Milan to take the post of the newspaper's editor-in-chief. Soon, however, he returned to Lisbon and again tried to be very active.

Closely connected with Zingarelli was Colonel Eurico Baldi [Enrico Baldi],³⁹ Fiat's representative in Lisbon. He was constantly shuttling between Italy and Portugal, mainly playing the role of a liaison. In talks, he was openly against Mussolini. It seems that he had close ties with the Court.

Our contacts with Italy as such were maintained through couriers and individuals travelling there. We hired a Portuguese⁴⁰ specifically for that purpose, a former travel agency officer, who had already been a long-term loyal collaborator of the various Polish elements in Lisbon. At our request, he received Italian return visa from the envoy, which enabled him to get transit visas and travel tickets. Despite that, his trip, also to Italy, was not without its problems, although he finally managed to complete the assignments and returned to Lisbon in July [1943].

The Italians mentioned above represented the officer circles, closely linked with the party.⁴¹ They belonged to the pro-Allied wing within the party, criticizing official government politicians and the party's pro-German group. They initiated and maintained contacts on their own account, to a certain extent, but as the talks got more specific, they reported to Rome and received instructions from there. Over time, this channel became a non-official, yet recognized link with the Allies, even more so if we consider that they knew that our correspondent was acting on the basis of the relevant authorization. Finally, those talks were at moments adopting the mode of non-official and straightforward negotiations. Notably with some issues, e.g. the request right before the signing of the truce for an 8-day break in bombings, announcing tentative terms of the "unconditional surrender," etc.

The content of the conversations was reaching the most powerful groups in Rome. Through the envoy mission, count Ciano, and later Bastianini, were kept informed, and Mussolini must have known too. Professor Pellizzi reported to the top fascist leaders. Also the members of the historic meeting of the Grand

³⁹ Enrico Baldi, professional intelligence officer. During World War II, he worked for the General Staff, and later for foreign posts, e.g. in Spain and Portugal.

⁴⁰ This person could not be identified based on the available documentation.

⁴¹ The National Fascist Party.

Council of Fascism,⁴² when the vote of censure against Mussolini was passed, received a memo before the meeting, based on our suggestions, and must have acted under its influence.

It appears clear that Mussolini himself must have known about our conversations, too, and tolerated them at least. It is also a fact that a number of documents we had submitted reached his desk. His reaction to the suggestions thus communicated could be read from his actions. There were also suggestions from their side, definitely inspired by Rome rather than coming directly from our interlocutors.

The channels we had could also be used to get to the king, or Badoglio.⁴³

One of our main suggestions was for Italy to establish a group of important individuals, which, when the time for the separate peace would be nearer, would be solid enough to stand up and become the centre for the entire process. Professor Pellizzi managed to form such a group, and at a certain moment, they were the *spiritus movens* of the crisis within the party that toppled Mussolini.

The point of departure for our talks with the Italians was their attitude to the current Polish affairs. Their positive stance was our first and absolutely required condition for further contacts. This primarily applied to the treatment of Polish people in Italy. In this respect, they were giving us far-reaching reassurances and this undoubtedly led to the improvement of conditions for our citizens. Despite the fact that they vehemently tried to persuade us that Gestapo didn't have a say in Italy, the fact that there were cases of blatant deficiencies concerning our citizens should not be attributed to ill will, but rather having their hands tied as a result of the German intervention.

The same applies to the occupied parts of France, where we demanded that the Polish citizens there be left alone. In general, the Italian behaviour there towards them was appropriate, but in some cases they yielded to the German pressure. This was primarily the case with professor Zaleski [Zaleski].⁴⁴ After

⁴² On the night of 25 July 1943 the Grand Council of Fascism passed a vote of censure against Mussolini. For king Victor Emmanuel III this became the basis for dismissing Mussolini and appointing a new government headed by marshal Pietro Badoglio.

⁴³ Pietro Badoglio, marshal of Italy. Chief of general staff of the Italian army until December 1940. He resigned after Italy's attack on Greece. Opponent of fascism and Mussolini. After Mussolini was ousted on 25 July 1943, appointed prime minister by king Victor Emanuel III. He worked in this capacity until the liberation of Rome by the Allied forces (4 June 1944).

⁴⁴ Zygmunt Zaleski-Lubicz, writer, reader in Polish Romanticism at Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes and the University of Paris. After France's defeat, he lived in the

his arrest, our correspondent stepped in strongly, but he met with regretful helplessness.

The most important for us, however, were the attempts to make the Italians aware of the real situation in Poland and the German persecutions. They claimed they were totally unaware of what the Germans were doing to the Polish people in Poland. Allegedly, they imagined that it was regular occupation, with certain restrictions resulting from wartime requirements. They seemed much moved after our detailed presentation of the actual state of affairs. They understood that it was in Italy's interest to distance themselves from the German policy towards Poland. Especially Prof. Pellizzi, who undertook to make the decision-making circles in Italy aware of that. He took a number of our publications and documents on the issue, among them the *German New Order in Poland*. The documents were also submitted to Mussolini. The effect of these actions was his referring, in a conversation with Hitler in Brenner, to how the states of the "Axis" treat the conquered nations, notably the Polish. Although Mussolini's arguments met with a negative reply from Hitler, the issue was referred to in the announcement released after the meeting, in the passage on "equite por tous les peuples europeens."⁴⁵

Our reports on the issue must also have had some impact on the behaviour of the Italian occupation authorities in Yugoslavia before, and in particular after the coup in Italy. In any case, the attitude of the Italian authorities to the Polish people in Yugoslavia was appropriate. In particular, this applies to general

non-occupied parts of France. He was president of the Polish Red Cross, and later the Society for the Assistance to Poles in France and member of the Social Committee. In December 1942, he was arrested together with other Polish activists in southern France by Petain's police and Gestapo. Imprisoned in a concentration camp in Buchenwald. After the war he decided to stay in France as emigrant.

⁴⁵ This is probably the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Berchtesgaden towards the end of April 1943. The draft of the so-called Continental Charter, to counterbalance the Atlantic Charter, was prepared by the Italian diplomacy in spring 1943 in order to replace the German formula for the "new order" in Europe. The main proponent of the document was the then undersecretary of state at MFA, Bastianini. The Charter provided that, e.g. the future order in Europe must be based on respecting the right of nations to self-governance, full sovereignty and free choice as to the internal order. There are indications that the document emerged under the influence of events related to Poland. See more in K. Strzałka, "Włochy wobec zbrodni katyńskiej i spraw polskich w 1943 r.," *Acana*, 1999, no. 4 (28), pp. 63–79; R. De Felice, *Mussolinie alleato*, vol. 1: *L'Italia in guerra 1940–1943*, part 1: *Dalla guerra „breve” alla guerra „lunga”*, Torino, 1990, pp. 446–447.

Roatta,⁴⁶ who, within his scope of duties, tried to make life easier for the Polish, and at his order, the Italian army was giving food to some Polish centres. Owing to Gen. Roatta's close ties with the Court, it is likely that some facts from our conversations were reaching him.

The former proper relations between Poland and Italy, still evidenced by the fact that Poland was not formally at war with Italy, provided good background for the talks with the Polish as unofficial representatives of the Allies. This fact also contributed to some help from them, prior to their joining the war on the "Axis" side, with getting many people out of the country. Referring to this, our correspondent could create a friendly aura which, over time, grew into some kind of trust.

Our plan was to develop and strengthen in the Italians the sense of the war being lost and to undermine their faith in Germany by pointing out strategic and political errors. A strong argument was our explanation why they should distance themselves from Germany and their attitude towards the conquered states. We explained that it would be much more beneficial for them to act as a "satellite," acting under compulsion and a victim to Germany, rather than as accomplice guilty of war and all crimes and persecutions done by Germany. The departure of Italy would be the first and key puncture in the "European front," and act as precedent for other vassals of Germany.

The achievement of the above by means of a pre-planned campaign, rather than following a collapse under the direct military defeat, was intended to prevent the evolution of the situation in Italy in the Soviet direction of masses getting revolutionary. The scenario was justified, as there were potential signs for such scenarios to be realistic, even within the party itself. Its left wing, at the same time the most pro-German party group (Storace⁴⁷), was leaning towards social radicalism, with the simultaneous strengthening of ties with Germany, in

⁴⁶ Mario Roatta, general of the Italian army. In the interwar period, a military attaché in Warsaw (1926–1930), and later Finland. In 1934–1936, chief of military intelligence, and from 1939 to 1941 a military attaché in Berlin. For a year (1941–1942), chief of staff for the land forces. In 1942–1943, commander of the 2nd Italian army in occupied Croatia, and later commander of the 6th Italian Army in Sicily, and finally (until November 1943), chief of general staff for the land forces. His very favourable attitude towards the Polish refugees in Croatia and Dalmatia in 1941–1943 is referred to in the Italian archived documentation (MFA), the documents held by the Polish MFA and memories of the refugees.

⁴⁷ Achille Storace, a fascist politician, proponent of the alliance with Germany and one of the closest associates of Mussolini. Author and organizer of the Voluntary Militia for National Security, and in 1931–1939, secretary general of the National Fascist Party.

order to prepare the ground for future settlement with the Soviets. This was to take place in conjunction with similar developments in Germany, under the patronage of Himmler.⁴⁸

The proposal to play the Soviet card appeared in our conversations already in summer this year [1943]. Very openly after Mussolini's fall. This was clearly due to the instructions received, but also not without German influence, as it overlapped with similar statements from Germans and other Germany-related elements in Lisbon. We even had a chance to read a classified instruction to that effect, sent by the Reich's mission there to all their satellites. Guariglia's⁴⁹ contact with Soviet elements in Ankara had its meaning too.

Then, they replied that the Soviet attitude towards Italy was much more lenient than that of Anglo-Americans, and the Stalin did not offer such far-reaching terms, and demanded the removal of Mussolini and fascism only. Russia's position presented in this light was confronted with the artificial position of the Allies, who kept repeating that unconditional surrender was a must. The attempt to win individual Allies and conflict them with one another went even further at some point. It was expressed by the intent to find out whether the position of the United States was more favourable in this respect, and the intent to initiate talks on this issue. Lefevre [Lefebvre] wanted to use us to link up with the former US envoy in Lisbon, Pell,⁵⁰ who was returning from Cairo via Lisbon.

As a result, it was essentially about introducing Italy, as quickly and smoothly as possible, to the Allied camp, so that it could become an encouraging precedent for others, allow Italy to be liberated from Germans at the lowest cost and keep their resources and military capabilities to strengthen the potential of the Allies. As a result, benefits would double, as it would not only be unavailable to Germany, but also saved for the Allies.

⁴⁸ Heinrich Himmler, one of the main leaders in Nazi Germany and main war criminals of World War II. Co-author and chief of SS, Gestapo and the German police. From 1943, minister of internal affairs of the Third Reich.

⁴⁹ Raffaello Guariglia, professional diplomat. In the interwar period, among others, ambassador in Paris (1938–1941), ambassador to the Holy See (1942–1943), and from March to July 1943 in Ankara. From 25 July to 8 September 1943, Italy's minister of foreign affairs.

⁵⁰ Herbert Pell Claiborne, politician with the Democratic Party and diplomat. From 1921 in the House of Representatives. In 1937–1941, the American envoy in Lisbon, and later (by the end of 1941), in Hungary.

With this attitude, however, the concept of the “punishment” would have to be eliminated or reduced to some individuals only. A significant problem here was Mussolini himself. It soon became clear that he had positive feelings about leaving the “Axis,” and that he would do it himself, was he not afraid, not so much about his office, but his life. The Allies’ statements, where they demanded that he be given over to them and referred to the judgment and vaguely specified punishment, and the fear of revenge from the population if the Allies offered too harsh terms to Italy, prevented Mussolini from getting involved in this matter, or even made him demand military help from Germany. Mussolini’s escape, leading to some complications, saved the Allies from a troublesome situation where they would have to decide what to do with him after the Italians turned him in.

The moment of breakthrough in the Italian position was when they realized that the “Axis” was actually no longer in existence. The new position solidified when they lost hope that Japan would declare war on Russia, as they understood that one of the reasons behind it was a pessimistic assessment of the German situation by the Japanese. This took place towards the end of March [1943]. From that moment on, the Italians became more active in their relations with us, yet they kept coming back with the question: what to do?

Our response, gradually unveiled, amounted initially to the following recommendations:

Do everything to convince the world that Italy is not occupied, i.e. that it is physically, especially externally, independent and can take its own decisions.

Dissociate yourselves from the German anti-humanitarian actions towards conquered and oppressed nations, notably Poles and Jews [lowercase as in the original].

Withdraw your troops entirely from the eastern front and workers from Germany.

Change the policy in the Balkans and, if impossible, withdraw from there as well.

Create a new image of Italy in line with modern (Anglo-Saxon) views, offer new people and sacrifice Mussolini.

It must be admitted that the Italians deliberately acted on the majority of these recommendations, or at least tried to. Already in spring this year [1943], it was clear that they were taking some serious actions in this respect. The main problem was the last item. However willing all our interlocutors were to get rid of Mussolini, and it seems this applies to the majority of the regime’s

proponents, the fear of the collapsing state order that it could bring about, and that they could not control, was overwhelming.

In terms of their proposals, they insisted on keeping the dynasty as the only constant factor and saving the “positive aspects of fascism’s heritage.”

Already in early spring [1943], the Italians expressed their willingness to join the Allies. However, the changed position would have to reflect the objective position of Italy and their offering to us. Their position, until Sicily was captured, was not evaluated by them as desperate. And, when the campaign on the peninsula itself began, their position became even stiffer, undeniably due to the instruction they received not to show their weakness. They also highly valued their offering, namely surrendering the entire territory to the Allies and the prospect of deploying their own troops to guard Brenner [Brenner], thus leading to spontaneous disarmament of Germans. The war industry factor was also considered as giving them a stronger bargaining position.

They believed that the best way to do it would be for the Allies to attack the neighbouring areas (France, the Balkans), and, as a result, in the face of their massive advantage, the Italians would have the “moral right” to leave the war and then immediately join the other side. They even showed us a draft of “Ordre du Jour,” to be published as announcement to justify the change of sides.

The need to adopt this milder and more careful tactic towards them was argued by them to come from the concerns about a tough response from the “des desperados du fascisme,” who, headed by Farrinacci,⁵¹ afraid to lose their lives and loot, could easily, under the pretext of “honour and loyalty to the former ally,” break out and form an extremely pro-“Axis,” anti-monarchist and extremely radical government in northern Italy, under the patronage of the German army. They also pointed to the power to be counted with, namely the Fascist Militia (500,000 people),⁵² which was the only Italian military force still

⁵¹ Roberto Farinacci, a fascist politician. He was one of the founders of the fascist militia groups in 1919–1920 (Fasci di combattimento) and their chief for the province of Cremona. From 1921, deputy to the Italian parliament. In 1925–1926, secretary of the National Fascist Party. Proponent of close cooperation with Nazi Germany. Following the fall of Mussolini in mid-1943, he supported duce in his effort to build the Italian Social Republic (the so-called Republic of Salò).

⁵² This was the Voluntary National Security Militia (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale, MVSN). Formed in 1923 on the basis of the fascist party militias, it was an integral component of the Italian armed forces, but had its own status. It was in fact an independent army, whose immediate supervisor was Mussolini. MVSN units in the form of the so-called Black Shirt Divisions fought in North Africa and in the Apennine Peninsula during World War II.

of some value and ready to fight—as they had everything to lose. To confront them with the labour movements in northern Italy, which could be formed only by non-affiliated workers, mostly old and unfit for the military, was unrealistic in their opinion. Therefore they warned against any actions that could lead to it. The fact that our interlocutors referred to and warned against this scenario already in spring this year [1943], should be emphasized here.

So, the whole action would have to be arranged so that Italy could leave the war without any external pressure, retaining their honour, and without excessive humiliation. The argument of honourable exit was definitely brought up sincerely, for the most part. Yet it went hand in hand with a clear intent of avoiding fighting on their own, before the Allies manage to arrive.

Arguments concerning the retention of colonies beyond the old Italy were brought up timidly, and without any pressure from the Italians. Rather, there were concerns about Sabaudia and Trieste.

It should be admitted that their position was a satisfying basis for the talks, especially that it was revealed already in early spring this year [1943]. A clear-cut response to it could lead to far-reaching arrangements. However, the only thing we could do was to reinforce that position among the Italians by constantly influencing them and countering their discouragement resulting from no actual feedback.

On Gen. Messe's nomination as the commander-in-chief of the Italian troops in Tunis, Giardini, and later the envoy himself, stated to our correspondent that this had happened at the specific request of the king. Messe was raising his objections and later demanded that the fact that he was the commanding officer in Tunis be kept secret. He didn't want to "go down in history as the defeated general." Reportedly, the king replied that he would have a big role to play in the future, but this was the right post for him at the time. When Messe was captured, we were reminded, and this was said with emphasis, that he turned himself in voluntarily, because he had the option and authorization not to turn himself in and that, in connection with his promotion to the rank of marshal, he should have been presented to the Allies as the future of Italy and a partner to negotiate with. Giardini even put forward a proposal that an appropriately recognized Allied personality should address marshal Messe, in accordance with all the necessary formalities of the military code of honour, for the latter to offer his support to the Allies and command the liberation army of the Italian POWs against Germany. Giardini, who is Messe's relative and very close to him, expressed his intent to deliver to him in person a letter drafted in a way that

Messe could interpret it as the will of the nation, corresponding to the present moods. Disappointingly enough, despite the Italian insistence, the concept has been used only recently, when he was nominated as the chief of staff with marshal Badoglio, replacing Gen. Roatta.

Based on the Italian position presented above, we could argue that even before the war actually reached the territory of Italy proper, that is in spring this year [1943], the minister and officials from the Italian mission in Lisbon as well as high party officials and representatives of other important centres of power were on numerous occasions expressing their intent to engage in open talks about Italy's withdrawal from the "Axis" in unofficial, but authorized talks, and the most important aspects of their position were presented in a way that formed the basis for future negotiations.

Towards the end of April [1943], the Italians suggested their sending to Lisbon of a higher staff officer to discuss the military aspect connected with their joining the Allies' side.

After the liberation of Tunis, they were clearly pointing at marshal Messe as the representative of the new Italy, nominated to carry out direct negotiations with the Allies. Messe was promoted to the rank of marshal specifically for that purpose, and he turned himself in voluntarily, to be able to interact directly with the Allies.

In exchange, they wanted the throne and the positive part of fascism's heritage to avoid revolutionary movements and save Italy, in best interest of both parties, from being the battlefield for the war on Germany.

Until the "unconditional surrender" requirement was announced, the Italians had not received any specific answers from the Allies, except our suggestions. When that happened, our talks, already almost entirely open, were only clarification of the terms of the unconditional surrender, and later of the honourable surrender. Still being aware of the value of their contribution, the Italians continued to express their willingness to negotiate through us, failing to listen to our arguments that they had to accept unconditional surrender.

On [26 July 1943] minister Prunas addressed our correspondent with an official request to submit to them the terms. "Tentative terms" were submitted to him based on the telephone instruction of our government. [hand-written text added: Mr. Zingarelli took them with him when he was leaving for Rome, to pass them to the Government and the King.]

On [30 July 1943] the Italian envoy addressed us with the request to act as intermediary and relay to the Allies the Italian request for an 8-day break in war activities and bombings, to let them regroup their troops in Italy, to man Brenner [Brenner] and withdraw from the Balkans. The break was silently granted.

Starting on [27 July 1943] they addressed us on numerous occasions, insisting that the Allies send their troops as soon as possible to Fiume, Trieste, and potentially to Genoa, in order to capture locations on key German communication routes and to allow them to seize northern Italy [as in the original text, it should rather be “not to allow them.”] This would also allow [Italians] to pull out of the Balkans.⁵³

The Allies in Lisbon were kept informed of the outcome of the talks. Obviously, the Lisbon path was not the only one they had. In Lisbon however, their direct contacts with the Italians were practically non-existent, to the extent that already after the truce was signed, the first meeting of the American military attaché and the Italian envoy took place with our correspondent as the intermediary. (Key talks between the Allies and the Italians must have been held in Turkey, as evidenced e.g. by the nomination of Guariglio, the Italian envoy in Ankara, as the minister of foreign affairs in Badoglio’s government).

Our path in Lisbon undoubtedly played an important role in preparing the Italians for surrender. It was more comfortable for them than any other, as they felt our deeper understanding of the problems that were common to all states in the continent, and thus a potential community of interests. The talks finally corroborate the fact that even in the situation Poland is in now, active political action on foreign ground is possible, and able to produce not only short term benefits, but build stable foundations for the future.

⁵³ The above statements are based entirely on Kowalewski’s reports. IPMS, MIA, Continental Action, A.9.VI.17/7 Top secret wire telegram of the Polish mission in Lisbon to MFA of 27 July 1943 (no ref.).

Reviews • Notes

JAN ROWIŃSKI (ed.): *Polski Październik 1956 w polityce światowej* (The Polish October of 1956 in World Politics). Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2006, 351 pp.

Enlargement of our knowledge about the international echoes of the events of October 1956 in Poland and the reactions and attitudes of other countries to the unfolding situation was the main purpose of an international academic conference organized under the aegis of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. The participants were fifteen scholars from Poland and abroad and the fruits of their research are presented in this publication. The contributions dealing with bilateral relations offer a rich variety of viewpoints as they address responses to the changes in Poland in the Soviet Union (Aleksandr Orekhov), China (Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui), Hungary (János Tischler), Czechoslovakia (Igor Lukes, Karel Sieber), Bulgaria (Yordan Bayev), the two Germanies (Bernd Schäfer) and the main (other than the aforementioned West Germany) Western nations: USA (Douglas E. Selvage), Britain (Anne Deighton), France (Maria Pasztor). The NATO position is presented by Robert Kupiecki. By contrast, there is no account of the Romanian and Yugoslav reactions, which is unquestionable a serious shortcoming, though not, it appears from the book's introduction, the fault of the project's authors. There are, however, three articles presenting a more internal, Polish perspective (Andrzej Werblan, Andrzej Friszke, Włodzimierz Borodziej).

It is impossible to do justice, even in summary, to the whole publication. So the following selective discussion of its contents is not to be taken as implying that the overlooked articles are unworthy of consideration. Indeed, credit it due to all the authors for the effort put into marshalling obscure or even quite unknown source materials and their perceptive analysis.

The book opens with an examination by Andrzej Werblan of certain opinions, some with only a tenuous basis in fact, about the course of the “Polish October.” This piece is an interesting exception in the book since its author’s life story and first-hand experience allow him to appear in a dual role: as both a historian and an eye-witness who can draw on personal conversations with the central figure in these events, Władysław Gomułka. Werblan has focused on accentuating less clear-cut and often controversial matters. Among these he mentions the contemporaneous shift in the USSR’s geopolitical position, internal changes in that country and power struggles in the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). Among the problems which he thinks merit inquiry and searching discussion predominate ones connected with the “internal” history of “the October:” a split and infighting within the Polish Party and their influence on the weakening of Stalinism and manifestation of popular discontent, the presence of a pro-Soviet faction in the PZPR, potential resistance by the population in the event of a Soviet intervention, and the question of whether Gomułka betrayed the ideals of “the October,” which of course begs the related question: where, exactly, did he himself stand in all this? Werblan’s own view is that his actions bespoke a desire for liberalization in the non-political sphere but rejection of any kind of democratization of the system. But that in itself was enough to differentiate Poland among the eastern bloc countries.

The significance of “the October” for Poland’s internal history is examined by Andrzej Friszke. After a perforce cursory recapitulation of developments he turns to the causes of the clampdown on radicalism in the behaviour and demands of this period. Among the enduring changes in Polish politics he singles out discontinuance of repression on a mass scale, abandonment of endeavours to vassalize the Catholic Church (which did not rule out combating it), reduction of government interference in the world of culture and learning, and rollback of collectivization. But he makes the point that the regime never officially confirmed that these specific Polish differences amounted to lasting concessions on its part. That they survived to the end of communist Poland was due, therefore, not so much to the good will of its rulers as their incapacity to effect change. The final part of the essay is devoted to what might be called the intellectual tradition and memory of “the October.” For Friszke its legacy comprises the experience of freedom of discussion and civic activism which some years later bore fruit in the rise of a pro-democracy opposition and, more immediately, the re-emergence of a revisionist current. The place of this current in the annals of the Communist party and the history of political thought has still to be satisfactorily defined. However, Friszke notes that this became a

controversial issue from the moment that the pro-democracy opposition came into being, as evidenced by a decoupling of the tradition of “the June” (the brutally suppressed strikes and protests in Poznań in June 1956) from that of “the October” in the second half of the 1970s. Poznań grew into an important component of the Solidarity movement’s historical vision of the post-war period. The October legend was eventually overshadowed by the negative associations with Communist revisionism which inevitably lost out to the tradition of revolts in the cause of independence.

The October upheavals are popularly associated with the winning of a certain measure of not only internal but also external freedom manifest in a revival of Polish foreign policy. This judgment is corroborated by Włodzimierz Borodziej who sees 1956 as the most important watershed in Poland’s international activity between Stalinist ossification (reflected in the effective absence of any foreign policy at all) and the fall of the system. He points to three qualitative changes: new relations with Moscow, new foreign policy modalities, and a new geography of international relations. With regard to the first of these he highlights undermining of Kremlin infallibility in dealings with its satellites, surmounting of a barrier of fear in conversations with the Soviet leadership, and formulation of a new framework for the further development of Polish-Soviet relations. On the second point he stresses the impact on the standing and role of the foreign ministry which grew out of all recognition compared with the preceding period and the startlingly small scale of the personnel changes which did not, however, have an adverse effect on the making of foreign policy. Analyzing the third problem he particularly accentuates a change in perceptions of Poland in the outside world (puncturing of the stock image of a Soviet satellite), active cultivation of relations with the West and the Third World and a relatively long spell of coolness in dealings with the other Kremlin vassals. Establishment of new areas of Polish diplomatic engagement was not, however, solely a consequence of the October changes but an outcome of a broader shift in internal relations of this period.

In terms of external factors the biggest influence on the events in Poland was exerted by the behaviour of Moscow and Beijing. Never before have we been offered such detailed accounts of the reactions of the two “big brothers.” Aleksandr Orekhov focuses on three problems: what did the Soviet leadership know of what was happening in Poland, what was its assessment, and what action did it take. It saw the internal situation in Poland as a result of mounting socio-economic problems, the fallout from Khrushchev’s “secret speech,” the

evolution of the press, deepening popular discontent, and strains within the PZPR itself. It also began consider possible candidates for a new Party leader. Orekhov points out that awareness of the tide of disaffection in Poland did not affect assessments of events since these were dominated by a stereotypical attribution of all the blame to “imperialist machinations.” A major influence on the Soviet view of things was any reports or rumour of a growth of anti-Soviet moods which were interpreted as signalling imminent abandonment of socialism. Orekhov charts in some detail Soviet actions from 17 October on, that is from the Polish leadership’s rejection of Khrushchev’s proposal to pay an immediate visit to Warsaw. By the final week of October the Soviet leadership had calmed down and in any case found itself with a new crisis in the bloc on its hands, this time in Hungary. In conclusion Orekhov flatly asserts that all barriers to development of good-neighbourly bilateral relations were removed. But that leaves unanswered the question why such relations (meaning something deeper than high-level contacts between leaders of the two countries) did not in fact take shape and whether this was only a matter of resolving a few still festering problems. Among the positively settled issues he naturally includes regularization of the status of Soviet forces stationed in Poland, the withdrawal of Soviet advisers and the broaching of the problem of compensation for Poland’s losses on coal exports to the USSR. To these should be something not mentioned by the Russian historian: an agreement regarding the mass repatriation of Poles from the Soviet Union, a demand which had great social resonance.

The contribution by the Chinese historians also makes interesting reading. They demolish the received belief that Moscow was dissuaded by China from intervening in Poland during the critical days of 19–20 October. But it does not follow that Mao took a critical view of the changes in Poland. In fact his attitude is better described as sympathetic as the authors demonstrate in various ways. Worth emphasizing is how knowledgeable the Chinese were about the situation in Poland (thanks to reports from diplomats and journalists) and anxious to understand the real causes of the Poznań crisis. As for Moscow having second thoughts about military intervention the Chinese authors produce compelling evidence that Mao only learned of such plans on 21 October and could not therefore have influenced the Soviet decision-making. Nevertheless it is true that, in the days that followed the Chinese, denouncing Soviet “great-power chauvinism,” urged compromise and normalization of Polish-Soviet relations. But this did not mean complete agreement with Poland: differences emerged over assessments of the events in Hungary. In this case, faced with its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, Beijing fully endorsed deployment of the

Soviet Army. According to the authors Mao perceived Gomulka as a “right-wing intra-party revisionist” of a nationalist bent, but with whom it was possible to work together within the eastern bloc.

János Tischler, who for years has been studying the events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, writes not about the actual course of those fateful days at the turn of October and November but Polish-Hungarian relation from the suppression of the rising to the execution of its leaders. The Polish leader’s distancing of itself from condemnation of Imre Nagy is well known. Less familiar is the seesawing of Polish policy towards Hungary’s new government and János Kadar’s sustained efforts to get Gomulka to come to Budapest. His view of the situation in Poland and Hungary and the methods employed by their parties to tackle the internal crisis are worth noting. According to Kadar the only difference was a matter of tactics: the Hungarian solution was one of initial brutality followed by liberalization of policy, whereas in Poland moderation was pursued at first but before long gave way to coercive rule. It needs, however, to be pointed out that whatever excesses may have been committed by Gomulka’s Poland in the late 1950s they were nothing in comparison with the atrocities of the Soviet intervention in Poland.

Of the articles dealing with responses in the West I shall single out only one as it addresses a hitherto wholly unexplored topic: Robert Kupiecki’s study of the stance adopted by NATO vis-à-vis the events in Poland. As the author notes, Poland was of marginal interest to the Alliance, appearing on its radar only when something happened there which might have an impact on Soviet military capacities and the cohesion of the eastern bloc. It took the outbreak of some explosive internal crisis to attract more intense scrutiny though Kupiecki awards high marks to the extent of NATO’s knowledge and the quality of its analyzes. The events in Poland and Hungary were judged an unintended consequence of liberalization of public life in the eastern bloc. Attention was drawn to the differences between Polish and Soviet communism though any enlargement of Polish autonomy was thought doubtful. The scale of economic aid (political support of any kind was not even contemplated) was affected by reluctance to strengthen a member of the communist alliance. Consideration was given to the possibility of aggravation of the crisis in Poland and non-ideological reasons for the Soviets’ determination to keep its allies in line. Attention was also devoted to Gomulka who was seen as the only person capable of bringing the situation in Poland under control since he was deemed by public opinion to be strongly anti-Soviet. Finally, while pointing out the episodic nature of NATO’s interest in

Poland, Kupiecki stresses that in 1956 Poland extricated itself from “the shapeless mass of satellite states.” From this it follows that after Poland was absorbed into the Soviet sphere of dominance it disappeared from the West’s field of vision regardless of its history and earlier close relations with Western nations.

The book will undoubtedly prove an inspiration to further research. It will also provide a basis for verification and refinement of much conventional wisdom in Polish historical studies, which shows how rewarding it is in the pursuit of history to have recourse to a variety of materials and draw on a broader frame of reference than the strictly national.

Krzysztof Ruchniewicz

Rocznik Strategiczny 2005/2006 (Strategic Yearbook 2005/2006).
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar,” 2006, 466 pp.

The eleventh issue of the Yearbook is, like all the volumes in this series, a very solid publication. Following in the footprints of preceding ones, the 2005/2006 Yearbook is composed of three parts: first, the “Forum”, which consists of three essays complete with names of authors, second, the body of the work, which contains thirteen chapters presumably penned by the seventeen members of the Yearbook’s team of editors (what is the point of such anonymity seeing that each of the chapters is an authorial effort, not a product of teamwork?) and, third, a section entitled “Panorama,” based on scholarly notes and fragmentary analyzes, some of them with names of authors attached. The character, style and scholarship of all three parts do not differ from one another in any essential way, so that the chosen subdivision is not particularly clear and of little or no significance for reception of the work. The Yearbook has been furnished with a very extensive and detailed international chronology and a set of tables providing basic information on all the world’s states (population, area, GDP, life expectancy, defence spending). An index facilitates selective reference to accounts of particular issues. The topical chapters are based on a wealth of source materials thereby enabling researchers and students to become acquainted with a broad range of the literature and official documents in a given area of study.

The thematic arrangement of the Yearbook remains basically unaltered. The eleventh issue covers the following topics, first, evaluations of the global

strategic situation, trends in the world economy, phenomena such as terrorism and proliferation which pose the most serious global threats, and the policies of the European Union and NATO; second, assessments of “geographic” areas or, to be more specific, the policies of the United States, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Germany, and Middle East, Asian (especially China) and African countries; third (the final chapter), an evaluation of the Polish foreign policy in 2005 and early 2006. A “novelty” is an article devoted to India whose title, “Emerging Power,” neatly captures the significance of this dynamically expanding Asian nation. The only continent (region) which is missing from the Yearbook is South America: no doubt it will find a place in future Yearbooks since the political and economic impact of this part of the world on the international situation is growing very markedly.

The tone of the Yearbook is set by an essay by its editor, Roman Kuźniar, which performs the function of an introduction and in which he carries out a critical survey of the past year on the international stage. Writing with great vigour and (compared to what we are used to and contrasting with the rest of the contributions) trenchancy, he provokes the reader into taking a fresh and bolder look at this stage. This is particularly true of such assertions as: “Instead of leading the world in solving its problems the United States has unexpectedly itself become a world problem” (p. 11). Even more calculated to stir up argument is his judgment of the Leszek Miller government that it extended the United States “unthinking and unconditional support” for the invasion of Iraq which, he claims, had “no connection” with Poland’s interests (p. 12). By the same logic one could say that military engagement by Poland in Afghanistan or Sudan and Congo was of no direct relevance to our country’s security interests. There is no question, however, that the author of these statements is opting for insular non-involvement. His criticisms seem, rather, to centre on the dubious legality of the Iraq operation and a complete lack, especially in the last few years, of transparency in official policymaking on matters of supreme consequence for national security. Likewise, the statement that the failure of the government to take a clear stand in response to allegations about the existence of CIA covert prisons in Poland “can only be explained by the long years of practice at coming to terms with lack of sovereignty” (p. 15) seems too emotional though he is surely right when he argues that the absence of serious debate on the subject of Polish-American relations is irritating and harmful. Given the non-stop political campaign over internal historical reckonings as well as the doubtful quality of the approach of today’s chief political forces’ to such concepts as “liberalism, Europe, sovereignty” the argument that in this situation

the public, preoccupied as it is with internal disputes, is incapable of “defining fundamentals where external challenges are concerned” (pp. 18–19) has a particularly compelling ring.

The severity of these disturbing judgments has been somewhat tempered in a chapter devoted to Polish foreign policy in 2005. It was Poland’s first full year of European Union membership and a period in which the doomsday scenarios broadcast by political quarters, now junior partners in the current coalition government, was, in the positive sense, demonstrably put to the proof. It was also a time in which the nature of our membership took shape, a time of undisputed successes (financial perspectives) and a time to pursue a policy leading to deferment by the government of a decision on the Constitutional Treaty. Subsequent developments in this area have borne out the Yearbook authors’ suggestions concerning a lack of maturity in the new authorities’ handling of Polish foreign policy. Other faults pointed out in the article are less than effective “organization of the decision-making process [and] coordination of the execution of Polish foreign policy by the foreign minister” (p. 392) and conduct of a “reactive” policy in relations with Germany and Russia.

The three-part “Forum” comprises three very important chapters on, respectively, US policy (Zbigniew Brzezinski), the world socio-economic situation (Paweł H. Dembiński), and UN reform (Janusz Symonides). Professor Brzezinski’s arguments, familiar from other writings, include a cogent critique of the international policy pursued by the present US administration under the all-embracing but also too broadly defined banners of fighting a global “war on terror” which, relying on patriotic cheerleading and a dubious legitimacy, “could be perceived as extra-legal or even wholly illegal” (p. 23). The result if this policy has been a hitherto unprecedented “hostility towards America and immense loss of credibility.” According to the author, regional coalitions of states are emerging which are characterized by a barely concealed anti-Americanism, which might well lead to jeopardization of this power’s interests and its isolation worldwide. The answer to this predicament is promotion by the United States of supranational cooperation in order to validate its international status and demonstrate the will to work together towards achievement of common goals. Brzezinski believes that the nation-state structure, even of so great a power as the United States, “has become too narrow for political solutions, economic remedies or checking social pressures in an era of globalization” (p. 29). A comment that immediately springs to mind is that this is a point that ought to be dedicated to all governments in countries with far smaller political and economic capabilities—such as Poland.

Some extremely interesting observations are presented by Paweł H. Dembiński in a chapter devoted to the social and economic problems of the contemporary world subjected, on the one hand, to runaway globalization processes, on the other, preserving the divisions and inequalities so typical of the last century. Poverty and disparities of income between rich and poor nations is not diminishing, a good idea for propelling less developed countries towards faster growth is still lacking, the selfishness of the rich continues to force through policies serving their interests, and the role of big international corporations is growing stronger. Of the author's thoughts it is worth stressing his conclusions: the influence of states over global processes is in eclipse; the clear-cut and multifunctional physical boundaries of states with which we are familiar are melting away, and new "orders" legitimising, on a different basis than "democratic legitimacy", the behaviour of actors in the international arena are emerging (p. 42).

The UN chapter by Janusz Symonides lays out persuasive arguments in support of the thesis that the state has lost its monopoly of the use of force but that at the same time the international decision-making machinery for authorizing coercive action, personified by the UN, is malfunctioning, especially when faced with intra-state violence, which has now become more frequent than traditional inter-state conflicts. These difficulties have given rise to the emergence of a completely new international norm of "responsibility for protection" in the sense of protection of ethnic and other minorities whose safety is threatened.

The bulk of the article is devoted to the ongoing debate about UN reform (mainly the issue of Security Council enlargement). It is a pity that the editors have permitted an almost *in extenso* repetition of Professor Symonides' arguments by another author in the next part of the Yearbook (pp. 63–70). The same fault crops up a couple of times elsewhere in the volume in articles dealing with other issues. No doubt this is due to the complexity and nature of the material which causes the same problems to be discussed by other authors in different aspects. This is the case, for example, with US strategy, non-proliferation or references to Chinese policy.

Given that by definition the Yearbook is supposed to deal with "strategic" matters and that the contributors include well-know military authors, one is left unsatisfied by its discussion of the sphere of military developments in the world where a number of major armed conflicts are currently raging and the revolution in military technology and the related field of operational thinking continues in full swing. Similarly skimpy is the treatment of the plans for deployment in

Central Europe of elements of a missile defence system which is called, wrongly, an offensive system (p. 16). However, if the idea of expanding the Yearbook by a more searching survey of military were to be put into practice the result would no doubt be too massive a volume and at the moment a publication running to 466 pages arouses respect.

Looking back at the 2005/2006 from a certain distance in time we are in a position to test the contributors' assessments and predictions against the actual course of events. The Yearbook's authors have come out of this reality check victorious, which is the best tribute to their professionalism. Unfortunately, the pessimistic forecast have also proved true. Particularly worrying is the fact that the hopes expressed concerning Polish foreign policy have not been fulfilled or the fears not dispelled.

Andrzej Karkoszka

JERZY MENKES (ed.): Prawo międzynarodowe – wyzwania i problemy. Księga pamiątkowa Profesor Renaty Sonnenfeld-Tomporek (International Law—Challenges and Problems: Essays in Honour of Professor Renata Sonnenfeld-Tomporek). Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa im. Ryszarda Łazarskiego, 2006, 555 pp.

Reviewing a festschrift is an extremely difficult undertaking since every publication of this kind serves at least two purposes. The first is to pay tribute to the so-honoured academic and his or her scholarly and teaching achievement and thus has a very personal dimension. In the book under review this purpose has been accomplished in full, though there is no way of evaluating this. There can, however, be no doubt that it has affected (if only through the choice of contributors) fulfilment of the academic purpose of a festschrift, which is something that *can* be reviewed.

The academic purpose of "Essays in Honour of Professor Renata Sonnenfeld-Tomporek" has been defined in the very title of the volume. It is exceptionally well chosen and broad enough to allow contributions by specialists in different branches of international law. The subject matter of discussed "challenges and problems" is very diverse but linked by two common features. The first is that the issues addressed are of topical interest, the second that each of them represents a grand challenge for the international or European communities or for national governments.

The festschrift comprises, not counting an introduction, recollections of Professor Sonnenfeld and a biographical note, no less than 26 parts (articles) whose authors are both recognized authorities and academics only at the beginning of their careers. However, it would be impossible to discuss all of these contributions. Here, therefore, I shall present only three works selected from among ones which might be found something of a surprise by readers led by the title to imagine that the contents of the collection concern issues that have been repeatedly discussed or are passé and not expecting a new approach to the subject. Nothing could be more mistaken.

The article by Lech Antonowicz, “The Concept and Classification of Succession of States in International Law,” belongs to a strand of contribution to the festschrift which might be called the classical current of international law. The subject addressed by the author remains ever topical, as evidenced by the creation of a new state, Montenegro, and its admission to the United Nations in June 2006. Indeed, he successfully demonstrates that this field of international law is still a busy one and that, despite the demise of the colonial system, the international community continues to have problems with questions of sovereignty, succession and acquisition and loss of territory.

The author analyzes three fundamental documents of international law relating to succession of states: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (1978), the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (1978) which has not yet come into force, and the Declaration of the UN General Assembly on Citizenship of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States (2000). Despite these acts’ varying degrees of binding force they are all of basic significance since they define the concept of succession of states and perform a consequences-based classification of the latter. Antonowicz discusses the different categories of succession and cites specific examples of dissolution of a state and the simultaneous transfer of its rights and obligations in the international arena to the successor state. Such an approach is exceptionally rewarding for the reader as the issues involved cease to be of a purely theoretical nature. Specific examples are used by the author to illuminate the diverse problems posed by the phenomenon under analysis which include even such basic questions as establishing the dates of the dissolution and creation of a state.

The article by Anna Przyborowska-Klimczak, “Evolution of the Situation in International Law of Europe’s Micro-States,” concerns what only appears to be a static and, in the 21st century, outworn issues of international law which, it might

be thought, do not present any new challenges. Yet it may be startling to learn what significant changes have occurred in this area at the turn of the 21st century especially as regards mini-states' membership of international organizations, right of legation and relations with former protectors. As little as a dozen-odd years ago the international law status of micro-states was open to question: Andorra, San Marino, Monaco and Lichtenstein were described as “non-viable geopolitical entities.” At present the status of these states is clearly defined, as the author excellently demonstrates. Another merit of this contribution is that Przyborowska-Klimczak makes her subject matter less esoteric for the Polish reader by showing, for example, micro-states ties to the European Union (often called “a side door to the EU”) or direct links with Poland by discussing diplomatic and consular relations.

An article by Anna Wyrozumska, “Objective or Subjective Approach to International Agreements,” which examines the views of authorities on international law (Renata Sonnenfeld, Jan Klabbers, Lord McNair, James J. Fawcett, Fritz Münch, Michel Virally, Anthony Aust, M.A. Fitzmaurice), concerning approaches to international agreements can also be included under the “classical” heading. The question of subjective or objective approaches to international agreements has also been analyzed by the author in the light of the International Court of Justice Judgement in a dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. Her essay seems to be unique of its kind as surveys of the doctrine in a particular field are becoming increasingly rare. Most importantly, however, she conclusively shows that discourse on the subject of the sources of international law continues and this area of study has by no means sunk into stagnation.

Within this same current of studies we can undoubtedly include Jerzy Menkes' contribution on the controversy over the 1953 Declaration by the Polish government renouncing reparations claims against Germany and articles by Dorota Pyć on international effectiveness, Paweł Czubik on access to consular services, Leonard Łukaszuk on the relationship between national and international norms, and Roman Kwiecień which asks about values in international law. A distinct subgroup within this current are articles which discuss UN reform and all aspects of use of force in international law (Janusz Symonides, Jerzy Kranz, Andrzej Wasilkowski and Michał Płachta).

In the current under discussion also belong articles devoted to UN activities aimed at promoting respect for democratic governance (Dobrochna Bach-Golecka), questions relating to codification of international law (Maria Frankowska), and

state responsibility in international law (Maria Magdalena Kenig-Witkowska and Anna Jasińska).

Three contributions (Janina Ciechanowicz-McLean, Joanna Gomuła, Marcin Górski) are devoted to the subject of protection of the natural environment and action in this area undertaken by the World Trade Organization.

A second current comprises articles dealing with the most important issues of European international law and Community law; it might also be described as a current of international law with a Community element. Among the topics discussed here are recognition of the EU as a legal entity in international law and the future of the Constitutional Treaty (Ewelina Cała-Wacinkiewicz, Jan Barcz), and human rights in the EU forum (Filip Jasiński, Agnieszka Dziegiel). Integration issues are addressed in relation to creation of a European Civil Code (Andrzej Całus) and free movement of persons in Community primary legislation (Wojciech Szczepan Staszewski).

In conclusion it should be stressed that the festschrift has accomplished its stated academic purpose as it has unquestionably succeeded in pointing out major “challenges and problems” of contemporary international law. It cannot be said that any of the topics discussed is inconsequential or no real challenges for the international community. Even an article of seemingly fringe interest like Maria Grzymkowska’s on promotion of scientific cooperation and academic freedom is classifiable under “challenges and problems” of international law since science has now also become a field of inter-state competition..

It might, however, also be asked whether an even fuller picture of these “challenges and problems” could not be created. Such an undertaking does not, however, seem very likely as the relentless development of international law makes a picture of it impossible to capture in its entirety. What is worth considering is whether the festschrift’s systematics has been aptly constructed. It is arguable that a subject rather than alphabetical arranged (by names of authors) might be a slightly better solution, though one wonders whether the present arrangement is not a better reflection of the diversity of the challenges and problems of international law postulated in the title.

Barbara Mikołajczyk

JAN SANDORSKI: Opieka dyplomatyczna a międzynarodowa ochrona praw człowieka. Zagadnienia wybrane (Diplomatic Protection and International Law: Selected Issues). Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 2006, 431 pp.

This book is a source of valuable information about recourse by individuals to one of the instruments of action on behalf of their rights, diplomatic protection, which excellently fills a gap on the Polish publishing market and enhances it with a monograph on a subject hitherto unexplored. The author concentrates on illuminating the relationship between two matters of consequence for both the theory of international law and international practice: diplomatic protection and protection of human rights. In an introductory chapter he expounds the concepts of international protection of human rights, international human rights and diplomatic protection and discusses the stages in the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on codification of international rules regarding diplomatic protection. He concludes with a caveat that “the publication does not aspire to the designation of a monograph examining all the issues addressed or passed over by the [ILC] in the course of its work to date on issues relating to diplomatic protection. Nor is it a commentary on the Commission’s draft articles as it does not follow its systematics and does not address, and occasionally only mentions, the questions dealt with therein, but not of a controversial nature” (p. 31).

Part One is a presentation of the institution of diplomatic and consular protection. It discusses the origins of both and protection of human rights. The author notes that the institution of diplomatic protection has always been connected with human rights protection but that the legal theory on which diplomatic protection is based is of a broader nature and differs from that which engendered international human rights protection.

After analyzing the system of human rights enforcement (inter-state complaints) shaped by the 1950 Convention the author formulates critical remarks concerning the effectiveness of this form of human rights protection. His view is that in the immediate future remedies of this type will not eliminate diplomatic protection from the arsenal of human rights protection measures. He argues, rightly, that this observation also applies to the notification mechanism created under Article 41 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which no state has ever had recourse.

The concluding reflections in this part of the monograph concern the relationship between treaty protection and diplomatic protection and the principle of equality of nationals and aliens and diplomatic protection. On the first question the author perceives an underlying difference between the two institutions. The basic requirement in diplomatic protection is nationality but in cases of injuries to human rights laid down in international treaties action can be taken not only by the victim's home country but any state which is a party to them. Next, the author analyzes the Calvo Doctrine which states, in essence, that aliens resident in a state have the same right to protection as its nationals and cannot resort to other than local remedies. Only if they are treated worse by the host country than its own nationals would there be grounds for exercise of diplomatic protection. The contemporary shape of this principle is presented in a summing-up.

In Part Two the author discusses the preconditions of diplomatic protection: international torts, nationality, and the "clean hands" principle (also called the "clean hands" doctrine). In terms of the rules of international law regarding diplomatic protection the crucial point is whether a state has committed an international tort (a wrong under international law done wilfully or negligently) against an alien as this constitutes grounds for exercise of diplomatic protection. According to the author such grounds are also constituted by the risk of commission of an international tort which entitles a state to take preventive action. Diplomatic protection of a preventive nature can be called diplomatic protection *sensu largo*.

The relationship between international torts and diplomatic protection is analyzed by reference to a 1992 case called the "rifle affair" in which the claimants were Polish nationals. It was the highest-profile instance in Polish diplomatic practice of intervention by the foreign ministry exercising the right of diplomatic protection to redress an international tort committed by the United States.

Another requirement for exercise of diplomatic protection is nationality. The author seeks to show the influence of nationality on diplomatic protection and presents the legal problems involved: continuous nationality, the international validity of an injured party's nationality, and effective nationality. The latter two points are illustrated by three popular cases in this context, *Nottebohm*, *Flegenheimer* and *Mergè*.

After analyzing the judgments in these cases the author sides with the decision of the Conciliation Commission in *Flegenheimer* which ruled against separating nationality from diplomatic protection and dismissed the idea of

“effective nationality” in a situation in which an individual holds only a single nationality. In the author’s opinion this idea should be regarded as undemocratic and an impediment in international human rights protection. It is only applicable in cases of dual nationality.

Examining the question of individuals’ entitlement to diplomatic protection the author rights criticizes the accepted view in international doctrine that states have a right, but not an obligation, to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals (the concept of diplomatic protection as a right of the state). He believes that from the point of view of international human rights protection this is an unfortunate provision since it places injured nationals at the mercy of their home country which can easily decide, for political reasons, for example, not to espouse their interests. In this connection he perceives the positive development of a growing tendency to incorporate into national legislation rules imposing on states an obligation to exercise diplomatic protection. In this part we will also find some interesting reflections on the subject of nationality of juristic persons and diplomatic protection and the “clean hands” principle as a rationale for diplomatic protection.

Part III of the monograph deals with the principle of exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition for exercise of diplomatic protection. After clarifying the concept of “local remedies” and presenting a definition of this principle the author analyzes its substance, applicability, relationship of equity with the principle of equity, and exception to this rule and presents it in the context of international human rights protection and the ILC codification work.

Summing up, he states, based on the decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, that “there is no difference is no difference been the substance of the exhaustion principle deriving from the diplomatic protection context and the substance deriving from the treaty context of human rights protection. In both cases there are restrictions on the exhaustion principle in the forms the principles of equity and exceptions (special circumstances)” (p. 250). He also considers the question whether the principle of exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition of diplomatic protection should no be modified with a view to further empowerment of individuals entitled to diplomatic protection. He suggests, therefore, that a future convention codifying diplomatic protection should include a clause shifting the burden of proof of the necessity of exhaustion of local remedies to the state which has allegedly infringed upon international human rights. One has to agree that “such a solution would strengthen the position of both a wronged individual and the state acting on his or her behalf” (p. 253).

Part IV is devoted in its entirety to diplomatic protection within the European Union. It begins with an analysis of the relationship between national and Union citizenship held by virtue of a country's EU membership and between Union citizenship and Union diplomatic protection. The frame of reference for the author's reflections is national citizenship, in this case Polish. He criticizes Article 36 of the 1997 Constitution refers only to the right of Polish nationals to protection by the state without specifying whether by "protection" is understood both consular and diplomatic protection. He rightly perceives an urgent need to spell out the right of individuals to protection outside Poland's borders through adoption of the appropriate legislation. "In the event of the state deciding not to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of a national whose rights have been injured in another state he or she should be entitled to file a claim against their own state in a national court for compensation for the injuries suffered. Otherwise the constitutional provision will be no more than a hollow declaration" (p. 270).

The author is equally critical of European Council Decision 95/553/EC of 19 December 1995 which was intended to firm up Article 20 of the EC Treaty regarding the exercise of diplomatic and consular protection by any member state. This Decision, which provides only for consular protection, is inconsistent with ECT Article 20 compared with which it truncates the rights of EU citizens. The author also points out another shortcoming: Article 5.1 basically restricts the scope of consular protection provided by a member state. In his opinion, to the list of problems arising from ECT Article 20 should be added claims by EU citizens related to Community diplomatic and consular policy.

In Part V Sandorski discusses the right to communication as a fundamental condition of effectiveness of diplomatic and consular protection and wonders whether it is solely a right of the state or also the right of a national who has been arrested or detained by a host state. After carrying out an interpretation of Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations he has no doubts that an alien so deprived of his or liberty abroad has the right to be informed of the possibilities of communication with consular officers of their home state and that the latter have the right to visit them and provide legal services as part of the exercise of consular protection. How dangerous to the international rule of law violation of the right to communication can be was shown by two cases discussed by the author—*Breard*, *Avery* and *LaGrand*, both of which were heard by the International Court of Justice.

Particularly interesting in this part of the monograph is an analysis of the controversial case of the Afghan "illegal combatants." The author shows how

the United States by denying Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters the status of prisoners of war and thereby their rights to protection committed a serious violation of the rules of international law relating to armed conflicts both of a treaty-based and customary nature. Depriving persons taken prisoner in the course of military operations in Afghanistan of the services the “protecting power” or its appointed delegated and/or the right to diplomatic and consular protection has, according to the author, no support in international law and can only be treated as unlawful retaliation for the injuries caused by terrorist attacks. Such reprisals are based on collective responsibility which is universally recognized as contrary to the principles of rule of law, both internal and international.

Elżbieta Dynia

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ŁUKASZ FIJAŁKOWSKI, ANDRZEJ POLUS: *Azja Południowo-Wschodnia i Australazja w stosunkach międzynarodowych* (South-East Asia and Australasia in International Relations). Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, 2006, 221 pp.

The book presents the specific characteristics and differentiation of the South-East Asia region and provides information on the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the development of regional cooperation in Asia. Chapter by chapter it describes both the historical and the contemporary problems of particular countries: Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Australia and New Zealand. The authors have also perceived the dilemmas of the insular micro-states of the South Pacific and regional threats. Crucially, these are not solely threats of a direct and military nature. Of particular interest are the chapters devoted to pandemics (SARS, avian flu, HIV/AIDS) and to safety on sea routes and piracy. In addition, the book contains information about the causes, course and consequences of the financial crisis which swept South-East Asia in 1997–1998. All the issues addressed in the book are of great importance for the international community, primarily because specialists have designated the twenty-first century as “the Asian Century” on the grounds that in this region any local problem or conflict threatens escalation into a regional or even global conflict. Another reason is

that since we have already experienced what kind of fears can be spread by a pandemic like avian flu it is worth getting into our heads how great and plausible such threats are. Thus the authors make an important point when they write that Asia is not only a dazzling growth story but also a source of potentially uncontrollable dangers as evidenced by the plague of piracy and concern for the safety of shipping routes, subjects that regularly crop up during talks between governments of Asian states and the USA or the EU. (a.b.)

JERZY BAYER, WALDEMAR J. DZIAK: Korea & Chiny (Korea and China). Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006, vol. 1: 323 pp, vol. 2: 272 pp.

In Volume 1 (“Strategy and Politics”) the authors concentrate primarily on Chinese strategy towards the Korean Peninsula, directing special attention to China’s attitude to the North Korean programme for development of weapons of mass destruction and China’s involvement in North Korea’s diplomacy of blackmail. They also provide a broad picture of the six-party talks (America, North and South Korea, China, Japan and Russia) aimed at persuading North Korea to halt its uranium-enrichment programme. Without a doubt many readers will be interested, given events of fairly recent memory, in China-North Korea relations in the context of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The authors demonstrate that China backed the development by North Korea of a nuclear capability—indeed actively supported it with transfers of space technologies and supplies of fibre optic gyroscopes and miniature warheads production processes. This has been confirmed by reports released by the National Security Agency in 1999 and the CIA in 2000. Volume 2 (“Economy and Borders”) provides more information about Chinese-South Korean commercial relations but is still for the most part devoted to relations with the North. It shows the latter’s economy to be a model of ideology-driven descent into stagnation and presents the specific interdependence between the Chinese and North Korean economies. Chapter II of this volume, which deals with borders, highlights all the basic elements of Chinese and Korean culture and Confucian tradition, including controversial interpretations of history and a related dispute over a section of the frontier between the two countries, Baekdu Mountain, and the problem of North Korean immigrants in China. (a.b.)

JOLANTA BRYŁA: *Rozwój i znaczenie reżimów międzynarodowych na przykładzie reżimu nieproliferaacji broni jądrowej* (The Development and Significance of International Regimes as Exemplified by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2006, 243 pp.

The author explains the phenomenon of the rise of the “conglomerates of institutions, treaties, national legislation and regulations and informal arrangements between states based on shared values and principles” known as international regimes, using the nuclear non-proliferation regime to illustrate this process. She illuminates for the reader the concept of international regimes, presents the most important of the security regimes, brings out the motives behind proliferation of nuclear weapons, and pinpoints the basic components of the regime itself and the nuclear-supplier regimes. She assesses the significance, scope and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and presents its post-Cold War status. Finally, she stresses the danger of proliferation of fissile materials. Predicting the future of the non-proliferation regime she postulates two scenarios: a) the regime will remain in place but the process of elimination of nuclear weapons will slow or come to a halt or b) the speed and uncontrolled scope of proliferation of nuclear weapons will bring about the total collapse of the regime. For the moment the non-proliferation system is undergoing steady evolution and is at the growth stage. What is more, the present hegemon has an interest in preserving the status quo in this area since that leaves it free to exercise control over the regime and the whole world. (a.b.)

ANDRZEJ CHOJNOWSKI, JAN J. BRUSKI: *Ukraina* (Ukraine). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2006, 412 pp.

The authors present the history of Ukraine from the national revival at the turn of the twentieth century to the formation of the Viktor Yanukovich government in summer 2006. Three attempts have been made by the Ukrainians, in 1917, 1991 and 2004, to create a fully independent, modern state but on each occasion (with the possible exception of the last) they came to nothing. This was due to both the divisions within Ukrainian society and the international situation. Ukraine was and is a country with deep-seated ties to Russia, but has proved unable to attract support in the West. Given this, of considerable importance is Poland's stance which is moving towards increasingly firm support for Ukraine's

aspirations. The authors have adopted a broad perspective on his subject analysing such issues as the twists and turns of Soviet policy in Ukraine, the ideology and activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the situation of ethnic Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia and Romania or the Ukrainian diaspora. Another of the book's merits is an extensive chronology and index of persons with short biographical notes on all the dramatis personae. Worth noting, too, is the commendable effort of the authors to be objective, especially in their account of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, though there are occasional stumbles (e.g. the virtual omission of the pacification of Eastern Galicia in 1930). A weakness of the book is that the treatment of some issues is too general, which is attributable to the extent of the ground covered. The authors have also allowed a few errors and oversimplifications to creep in (e.g. the International Covenants on Human Rights were not adopted in 1967). (a.s).

AGNIESZKA FLORCZAK, BARTOSZ BOLECHÓW (eds.): Prawa człowieka a stosunki międzynarodowe (Human Rights and International Law). Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2006, 374 pp.

The publication is devoted to human rights protection in both the legal perspective and international practice. It also addresses questions relating to how the processes shaping the international environment impact on human rights protection. In succeeding chapters it discusses the following topics: human rights as an international regime, the UN system of human rights protection, the European system of human rights protection, protection of fundamental rights in the European Union, the human dimension of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, freedom of the individual and human rights in the Middle East, humanitarian intervention—new law or new paradigm of inquiry, application of the laws of war to UN peacekeeping missions, terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights, human rights in the foreign policy of states, the problem of refugees in the contemporary world, international standards of protection of children's rights, and the role of non-governmental organizations in the international system of human rights protection. These topics, carefully and logically chosen, lucidly delineate the problem-area of human rights protection. Of particular interest is the chapter "Humanitarian Intervention: New Law or New Paradigm of Inquiry?" The main point stressed by its author, Teresa Łoś-Nowak, is that humanitarian intervention can only be undertaken if the domestic policy of a particular state presents a threat to international peace and

security, and the international community is in the process of drafting a catalogue of such potential situations. But she also argues that any violations of human rights, whether in inter- or intra-state conflicts or by non-democratic regimes, should be examined on a case-by-case basis before a decision to intervene on humanitarian grounds is taken. (a.b.)

EDWARD HALIŻAK, WIESŁAW LIZAK, LEONARD ŁUKASZUK, EUGENIUSZ ŚLIWKA SVD: *Morze w cywilizacji, kulturze i stosunkach międzynarodowych* (The Sea in Civilization, Culture and International Relations). Warszawa–Pieniężno: Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych i Fundacja Misyjno-Charytatywna Księży Werbistów, 2006, 413 pp.

Navigare necesse est ... Pompey's dictum handed down to us by Plutarch has stood the test of time, capturing as it does human nature's innate curiosity about new lands and hunger for the riches awaiting explorers. The above publication is a collection of articles containing reflections devoted to the sea viewed in various perspectives: theology, history, international studies and administrative matters (the organization and operation of the Polish Coast Guard). A dozen or so authors, all specialists in their respective fields (among whom we should be gratified to find colleagues from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Jan Bury, Marek Madej and Andrzej Szeptycki), present articles on the sea and shipping to which they apply the insights of their particular disciplines. Readers whose interests are bound up with international affairs will find between the covers of the volume examinations of issues relating to the foreign and security policy of selected sea powers (America, Russia, France, China, India) and to cooperation and competition between contemporary states (for example, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, protection of the marine environment in the Mediterranean, sustainable transport in the European Union). Readers whose interests extend to broader theological-humanist aspects of sea-related topics will be drawn to such issues, among others, as the sea in Indian philosophy or marine symbolism in the language of the Fathers of the Church and the evolution of approaches to maritime matters bearing on the proper perception and cultivation of national and regional interests in an integrating Europe. (r.t.)

HANNA MACHIŃSKA (ed.): Polska i Rada Europy 1990–2005 (Poland and the Council of Europe 1990–2005). Warszawa: Biuro Informacji Rady Europy, 2005, 295 pp.

Poland acceded to the group of member states of the Council of Europe, established in 1949, in November 1991. It has to be stressed that this organization was of immense importance in smoothing the path of transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The above publication appeared on the eve of the third Council of Europe summit which was held in Warsaw in May 2005. It offered a special opportunity for presenting the successes of the Council in promoting reform in former Soviet-bloc nations as well as laying down new goals for the twenty-first century and highlighting the role of Poland as a regional leader. The volume includes contributions by, among others, Denis Huber (“The Council of Europe after Enlargement: Reinforcing the Unity of Europe in the Present Realities”), Roman Kuźniar (“The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: towards Inevitable Merger”), Hubert Izdebski (“The Role of Council of Europe Standards in the Organization and Functioning of the Public Administration”), Zdzisław Galicki (“The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism: New Standards”) and Hanna Machińska (“Council of Europe Standards in Combating Racism, Intolerance and Xenophobia as Exemplified by the European Convention on Human Rights”). Almost all the articles (one exception) have been translated into English which is an additional asset of the book. (a.b.)

Serie wydawnicze dokumentów dyplomatycznych w zbiorach bibliotek polskich. Informator (Diplomatic Documents Series in the Collections of Polish Libraries: Directory). Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2006, 267 pp.

Recourse to source materials is of fundamental importance for pursuing historical research. This also holds true for work in the field of the history of diplomacy and international relations. Access to records stored in archives cannot be valued too highly though it must also be remembered that some documents are published in specialized publications issued in regular succession. In the twentieth century many countries embarked on serial publication of diplomatic documents, and their number is steadily widening. In 2001 they were joined by Poland with the launch by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) of

a publishing project entitled “Polish Diplomatic Documents.” PISM also hosts a project aimed at propagating information on this type of publications. The result is the appearance of this guide to the diplomatic documents series to be found in Polish libraries. Aside from a general description of these publications it contains concise notes about eighteen series and their history and distinctive features. They include bibliographical data relating to the thousand-odd volumes that make up these series. The resources of the PISM library, which has accumulated Poland’s biggest collection—currently totalling over 900 volumes—of diplomatic documents series, are presented in detail. It should be stressed that it is unique of its kind since many of the volumes and in some cases whole series are available only in this library. The information on the collections of the 17 remaining libraries will enable researchers to establish what other libraries in Poland they can consult and what kind of diplomatic documents they will find there. The publishers have not forgotten to include the addresses and like data of these libraries. Attached to this publication is a CD containing data on both the series (including illustrative material) and the availability of particular volumes in Polish libraries. The Directory will undoubtedly enhance our knowledge about serial publications of diplomatic documents. (t.m.)

JERZY TOMASZEWSKI: *Czechy i Słowacja* (Czech Lands and Slovakia). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, Instytut Historyczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2006, 416 pp.

The author presents a history of the Czech lands and Slovakia from the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the two nations’ accession to the European Union in 2004. The Czechs and Slovaks have affinities of language and culture but the history of the two peoples has followed differing paths—even as fellow-subjects of the Habsburg monarchy or sharing an independent state of their own, Czechoslovakia. The Czech lands were more advanced economically, secular and with stronger ties to the West, Slovakia more backward, Catholic and culturally and politically suspended between East and West. These differences account in part for the demise of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs always tended to look down a little on the Slovaks and the latter felt they were second-class citizens. Tomaszewski paints an interesting picture of the history of the two peoples spiced with personal reflections and anecdotes. He often refers to Polish stereotypes of their southern neighbours (“Schweik versus Hitler”) and devotes considerable space to the chequered course of Polish-Czechoslovak relations

both before the war (attempts by foreign minister Józef Beck to block the election of Eduard Beneš as president of Czechoslovakia) and during the communist era (in 1981 the Czech leadership poised themselves for intervention in Poland). Another of the book's assets, as of others in this series ("History of the World's States in the 20th Century"), is an extensive chronology and index of persons with short biographical notes on all the dramatis personae. A weakness is the omission of certain consequential issues which is doubtless attributable to the extent of the ground covered. There are also a number of errors. For example, Romania recovered Bessarabia, not Moldavia after the First World War; Czechoslovakia was not admitted to the European Council in 1990 but to the Council of Europe and in 1991. (a.sz.)

JERZY J. WIATR: Europa postkomunistyczna. Przemiany państw i społeczeństw po 1989 roku (Post-Communist Europe: the Transformation of States and Societies after 1989). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2006, 419 pp.

The book contains an overview of the transformations in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc written by an academic but one who is also a politician and eye-witness aware of the historical significance of the events which he has been in a position to observe. He begins with the idea of a "burden of history"—the mix of factors which shaped the communist system in its local versions—as a specific starting point for further change and a factor determining the later changes. The breakup of multinational communist states is treated as a separate problem. He briefly outlines the history of the ideology of communism and its expansion by means of revolution and then the imperial policies of Soviet Russia. After discussing the national versions of the communist system in Europe he analyses their breakdown and collapse with the focus on a number of what he considers pivotal aspects: emphasis of the strategic importance of the constitutional choice made after the overthrow of the old system, the significance of the emergent multi-party system and the related electoral system—gradual assimilation of the principles of democracy by both voters and their elected representatives. He rounds off his reflections with a chapter on strategy in foreign policy pointing out the differences between the Central and Eastern European countries and Russia and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (r.t.)

International Chronology

OCTOBER 2006

3 Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Rangin Dadfar Spanta paid a working visit to Poland to meet Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga. The discussion included political and economic relations between the states as well as Poland's actions for stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

5 Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov completed his two-day visit to Poland, where he held talks with his Polish counterpart Anna Fotyga and was received by President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. The burning issues in relations between Poland and Russia, namely the ban on the imports of Polish meat products to Russia and the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline, remained unsolved. The status of the regional and cultural co-operation was assessed as positive; among the decisions taken was the restoration of the Polish and Russian Song Festivals.

The problems related to the delays regarding the enlargement of the Schengen area were tackled during the talks held between Prime Ministers of Poland and Slovakia, Jarosław Kaczyński and Robert Fico. The presence of Slovak troops in Iraq and Afghanistan was also discussed. Prime Minister Fico also met with President Lech Kaczyński.

Presidents of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine—Lech Kaczyński, Valdas Adamkus and Viktor Yuschenko, issued a joint statement on the situation in Georgia, in which they called on Russia and Georgia to show moderation, refrain from mutual accusations as well as commence dialogue and negotiations.

At the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the European Union states held in Luxembourg Poland agreed to a one-year delay in abolishing checks on the Polish border with the EU. The Ministers (among them Deputy Prime Minister Ludwik Dorn, who represented Poland) agreed that residents of border regions would receive, free of charge, a special document entitling them to multiple crossings of the border with the Union.

The Command of the Atlantic Alliance took command over 10,000 American soldiers in the eastern part of Afghanistan.

6 Czech Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra held a meeting in Warsaw with his Polish counterpart Anna Fotyga. The ministers discussed bilateral cooperation and

current events on the European agenda, as well as the present situation in the states east of the European Union. The legacy of the Visegrad Group received positive comments and a declaration was made noting the will to preserve this form of regional cooperation. Moreover, the interest in strengthening stable transatlantic relations was underscored. Minister Vondra was also received by Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. The topics tackled at the meeting included energy security, potential location of the anti-missile shield as well as internal situation in both states.

Poland's Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski met in Warsaw with Mongolian Defence Minister Mishing Sonompil.

Following talks held in Ankara with Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Germany would not change its position, upholding the promises that the European Union made to Turkey regarding the latter's prospects for EU membership. In addition, she called on the Turkish authorities to open their ports to vessels from the Greek Republic of Cyprus.

9 North Korean press agency KCNA published a communication on the positive completion of a nuclear test employing domestic technologies only. In relation to the nuclear test, in its statement Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed deepest concern and disappointment with the decision of the North Korean authorities. "The test poses an unprecedented threat to peace and stability in the region as well as to the international system of non-proliferation and arms control."

During his visit to China Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apologized for the brutality of the Japanese Army during World War Two. "Japan inflicted massive damage and suffering," he said. His visit was an attempt to relieve the tension in mutual relations.

10 At the meeting in Visegrad, Prime Ministers of V4 states Jarosław Kaczyński (Poland), Mirek Topolánek (Czech Republic), Robert Fico (Slovakia) and Ferenc Gyurcsányi (Hungary) emphasized the need to agree on common positions regarding energy, foreign and defence policies of the European Union and stated that all the states should accede to the Schengen Treaty in 2007 at the latest. They also reviewed 15 years of cooperation among the four states.

11 Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Dresden with Chancellor Angela Merkel and presented the energy partnership project for Russia and Germany. Russia is ready to guarantee stable gas deliveries to Germany over the next few dozen years. In return, Russia expects accelerated works to combine the states' energy systems. German companies would gain a privileged position on the Russian market, with opportunities to invest in the fuel and gas sector.

12 Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński visited Italy, where he met with the head of the Italian government Romano Prodi. The talks were dominated by energy security issues. Both Prime Ministers offered joint actions in this respect. Prime Minister Prodi assessed the relations between Poland and Italy as excellent and announced their further deepening and increased investment in Poland. Problems related to the enlargement of the European Union and the EU constitution

were also discussed. Prime Minister Kaczyński was also received in a private audience by Pope Benedict XVI. The key topic of their discussion was international affairs and the situation of the Catholic Church in Poland.

13 The 7th Summit European Union–India was held in New Delhi. Discussions revolved around the joint action plan adopted at the summit in September 2005, effective multilateralism, climate change, energy issues, combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons as well as regional issues, such as Iran, Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka. European and Indian leaders also supported the recommendations of the EU-India working groups on measures to develop trade exchange and mutual investments.

UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Georgia to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia and extended the mandate of the UN mission to the republic by another six months.

UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution appointing Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General of the Organization.

14 The President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, who met in Warsaw with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and President Lech Kaczyński, called on Poland to participate in the reinstatement of the constitutional project for the Union. He emphasized that only when acting as one will the European Union have a say in the global arena. President Kaczyński promised that Poland would get involved in work on the Constitutional Treaty but made it clear that the last version of the document was unacceptable to Poland.

In a unanimously adopted resolution, UN Security Council condemned North Korea for the nuclear test and demanded that Pyongyang should renounce any weapons of mass destruction and return to the international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. China's objection led to lenient sanctions being imposed on North Korea.

17 Enlargement of the European Union as well as the EU strategy for Africa were among the items on the agenda of the meeting of the Council for General and Foreign Affairs of the European Union (Poland was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga).

19 The European Union energy policy problems dominated the meeting of Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński with the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The Danish Prime Minister presented his proposals for the enhancement of the energy policy of the Union. The politicians agreed that an important goal of the policy should be to reduce dependency on imported energy carriers. Prime Minister Kaczyński emphasized that the situation where the so-called energy weapons would be used against the states of Europe should be prevented. Prime Minister Rasmussen was also received by President Lech Kaczyński. Emphasis was put on the very good status of the relations between Poland and Denmark.

A meeting was held in Moscow between Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The talks were predominantly focused on the

Iranian nuclear programme, raising concerns for Israel, notably in the context of the statement by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he called for “wiping Israel off the map.” Olmert expressed his hope that Russia would use its position to stabilize the tension.

20 An informal summit of the heads of state and government of the European Union finished in Lahti, where energy relations between the European Union and Russia, the situation in Georgia as well as the problem of border protection were discussed. An informal summit of the heads of 25 EU states, attended by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, was also held, where reassurances regarding Russia’s stability and predictability in terms of energy cooperation with the Union were presented by Russia’s head of state. He also rejected the idea of energy market liberalization in the form proposed by the Union (Energy Charter). President Lech Kaczyński, who participated in the meeting, held talks with Finland’s Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and head of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso.

22 Poland’s President Lech Kaczyński took part in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising. Together with other participants, he signed the “Declaration of Freedom.” In addition, he met with the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Horst Köhler to discuss the relations between the European Union and Russia, as well as the role of the US and Russia in the world.

23 Poland’s Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski said in Berlin that Poland would like to contribute to NATO’s success in Afghanistan. He announced that a contingent of over one thousand soldiers would be sent to Afghanistan at the beginning of 2007.

24 Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga met in Warsaw with her Canadian counterpart Peter G. MacKay. Bilateral relations and international security issues were discussed. Particular attention was paid to Poland and Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan as well as the situation in the Middle East. Common actions in the area of development aid were assessed as positive.

26 The European Parliament called on Russia to lift the economic embargo on Georgia and immediately stop the persecution of Georgians in the Russian territory. Russia was also condemned for supporting separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

27 Poland’s President Lech Kaczyński took part in the International Conference “One Way—Four States” held in Łańcut. During the conference Transport Ministers from Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary signed the “Łańcut Declaration.”

Prince Albert II of Monaco paid a visit to Poland. During a meeting with President Lech Kaczyński he discussed his experiences with charity work.

At the end of an EU-Ukraine summit in Helsinki, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso stated that both parties were not ready for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. The Union called on Kyiv to reform the judiciary, combat corruption and improve the climate for investors. In turn, the Ukrainian President said that he expected greater involvement of the Union in the construction of Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline. An agreement was signed between

Ukraine and the EU on readmission and simplified Community visa system for Ukrainians.

30 The 8th Polish-German Intergovernmental Consultations, headed by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel and Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, were held in Berlin. Items on the agenda were the energy policy of both states and the entire European Union, claims of German citizens against Poland and youth exchange. A future agreement was announced that would ensure energy security for Poland. Germany rejected the proposal for the assumption of responsibility (in the form of an international agreement) for property claims of the displaced German citizens. Angela Merkel reiterated the commitment of her government that they would not support individual claims of the displaced filed with international courts.

NOVEMBER 2006

1 Following behind-the-scenes talks held in Beijing between the envoys of Kim Jong-il's regime and George W. Bush's administration, North Korea decided to return to six-party talks on its nuclear programme, suspended a year earlier.

2 Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presiding over the EU, admitted that they failed to convince Turkey and Cyprus to participate in a meeting devoted to the access of Cypriot vessels and aircraft to Turkish air and sea ports.

3 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy visited Warsaw, where he held talks with his Polish counterpart Anna Fotyga as well as with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Bilateral relations, cooperation of both states in the European Union as well as crucial international problems were discussed, such as energy security and EU issues. French Foreign Minister assured Poland that it could count on France's support in the energy sector, notably regarding the application of nuclear energy.

4 The largest China-Africa summit so far was held in Beijing, attended by approximately 1,500 representatives from over 40 African states. The purpose of the summit was to strengthen economic cooperation between China and Africa as well to secure new sources of energy for China. A joint action plan for 2007–2009 was agreed on along with the Beijing Declaration, calling on new strategic partnership between China and Africa, based on political equality, trust, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. In addition, 14 trade agreements were signed (totalling USD 1.9 bn), notably on infrastructure, raw materials, construction, telecommunication and finance.

6 Poland's President Lech Kaczyński took part in the meeting of the presidents of Baltic states, held in Vilnius. Among the issues tackled was the cooperation of the Baltic Sea states on the international forum as well as the plan for transportation routes—Via Baltica and Rail Baltica. A joint declaration was signed. President Lech Kaczyński met with Presidents of Lithuania—Valdas Adamkus, and Latvia—Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga.

7 Poland's President Lech Kaczyński paid an official visit to the United Kingdom, where he was received by Queen Elizabeth II in a private audience. He held talks with Prime Minister Tony Blair on energy security and the future of the European Union as well as further developments concerning the Constitutional Treaty, joint initiatives on the European agenda and the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both politicians share similar concepts of the Alliance as the guarantor of peace in the world, and the EU as a community of sovereign and proud nations.

10 Prospects for cooperation between Poland and Romania within the European Union, cooperation within NATO and on energy security were discussed at a meeting of Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga and the head of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mihai Razvan Ungureanu. Minister Ungureanu was received by President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov visited China with reference to the completion of the "Russian Year in China." Investment agreements were signed, totalling nearly USD 1.5 bn.

12 In a referendum 90% of South Ossetia residents supported separation of the republic from Georgia.

13 Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński met in Warsaw with the President of the Republic of Montenegro Filip Vujanovic. Both politicians named three important areas of cooperation: agriculture, tourism and railway transportation, as well as agreed that the development of broadly understood cooperation requires greater intensity of mutual exchange of information on both states. Among international problems discussed were the issues of the Balkans, Kosovo, NATO and the European Union.

At the Meeting of the Council for General and Foreign Affairs, held in Brussels, Poland opposed the adoption of the mandate for negotiations concerning the new agreement on partnership and cooperation between the European Union and Russia. Poland demanded that Russia should offer concessions regarding two issues: lifting the embargo on Polish food and opening of the Russian energy market for international competitors. No state accepted the Polish position in unequivocal terms. Pressure from the EU did not change this decision. At the joint meeting with Ministers of Defence, Foreign Ministers listened to the report on the development of civilian capabilities for crisis management in the EU within the European Security and Defence Policy. At the meeting, Poland's Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski signed a Memorandum of Understanding together with heads of defence ministries of Germany, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia on the establishment of a joint Polish-German-Lithuanian-Latvian-Slovak Task Force.

14 On his way to the APEC summit in Vietnam, US President George W. Bush visited Moscow, where he met with President Vladimir Putin. Several burning issues were discussed, including Iran and energy cooperation.

15 Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński held a meeting in Kyiv with Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. Among items on the agenda were security issues and the development of cooperation in the area of energy, as well as economic relations and prospects for joint investment projects in the defence and aerospace

industries, and concerning the development of transportation routes. Both Prime Ministers considered the development of crude oil transfer system, namely an extension of the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Płock, as one of the most important projects.

President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas called on Israel to use the chance for peace and emphasized that he was ready to “begin final talks intended to resolve the conflict in the Middle East.”

16 Mutual cooperation and joint actions of both states within the European Union were discussed in Warsaw by Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia Aigars Kalvītis.

Albania’s President Alfred Moisiu visited Poland, where he met with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Items on the meeting’s agenda included bilateral relations, the situation in the Balkans, problems related to Albania’s accession to NATO and its EU aspirations.

Consultations were held in Gerona among Spain’s Prime Minister José Zapatero, French President Jacques Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. A joint French-Spanish-Italian peace initiative for the Middle East was announced, providing for the “immediate stop to violence,” establishment of the national unity government in the Palestinian Authority and exchange of prisoners, talks between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian President, establishment of an international mission to the Gaza Strip in order to monitor the truce and potential organization of an international peace conference.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Islamabad with the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. Predominant topics on the agenda were issues related to bilateral relations as well as threats to international security.

17 Cooperation between Poland and Finland within the European Union and the relations between the EU and Russia were key items on the agenda of the Warsaw meeting between Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland Matti Vanhanen.

The American Senate unanimously adopted a draft resolution supporting the enlargement of NATO to include Albania, Croatia, Georgia and Macedonia.

18 Poland’s Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński met in Warsaw with Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas. The talks focused, among other things, on the Polish position on the agreement between the European Union and Russia. Prime Minister Kaczyński noted that Poland’s consent regarding EU-Russia agreement primarily depended on lifting the embargo on Polish exports of vegetable and animal products to Russia. The head of the Lithuanian government expressed his understanding for the Polish veto in this respect. The issue of the construction of an energy bridge to connect energy systems of Lithuania, Poland, Western Europe and Baltic states was tackled.

The fight against terrorism was the main item on the agenda of the meeting between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf. Both politicians agreed that the priority remained to control the situation on the

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, were Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants were operating.

19 The Korean nuclear crisis dominated the summit of 21 APEC states which was held in Hanoi. Non-convergent positions on the issue resulted in the topic not being included in the final declaration of the summit. A joint statement was issued in relation to the problem, expressing concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear test and earlier missile tests. Another issue tackled in the statement was liberalization of international trade. APEC leaders called on the quickest-possible re-convening the Doha round negotiations of the World Trade Organization. They also declared their readiness to reduce agricultural subsidies. Following 10 years of negotiations, in Hanoi Russia and the United States signed a protocol opening up the path to membership of the World Trade Organization for Russia. Another meeting was also held between the leaders of Russia and the US, Vladimir Putin and George Bush.

21 A joint session was held in Warsaw of Polish-Lithuanian and Lithuanian-Polish Consultation Committees with the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania. Issues of the future legal framework for the European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy and international security problems were discussed.

During the first day of his visit to India, China's president Hu Jintao signed 13 agreements on political and economic cooperation and the 10-item strategy, intended to enhance the relations between the two states. In addition, he held talks with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Both politicians announced that the trade exchange would double within the next four years and that the border conflict would be solved as soon as possible. Also, M. Singh assured China that 120,000 Tibetans who found their refuge in India, including the government in exile and the spiritual leader Dalai Lama would not be allowed to engage in anti-China activities.

22 The commander of the Russian air force, general Vladimir Mikhailov announced that Russia would like to offer European states the establishment of a missile defence system.

23 Poland's Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga visited Norway, where she met with her Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Stør to discuss bilateral relations and international issues, including energy security, NATO and EU matters.

24 The German Parliament was the last to ratify the accession treaty with Romania and Bulgaria.

The 18th European Union-Russia summit was held in Helsinki, where issues of energy, economic integration and external affairs were tackled. Since Poland upheld its veto, negotiations to enter into a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement did not commence.

27 Finland, presiding over the European Union, announced the fiasco of its negotiations with Turkey concerning the opening of Turkish ports to Cypriot vessels.

28 The objective of the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, held in Minsk, was to reform the Commonwealth. Owing to the differences in opinions, reforms to the Commonwealth were put off until next year.

The 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of ministers of foreign affairs was held in Tampere, Finland, where the situation in the Middle East was discussed, and the Barcelona process was reviewed one year after the first summit. The Polish delegation was headed by Deputy Minister Witold Sobków.

29 A meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council at the level of heads of state and government ended in Riga. Items on the agenda included the Alliance's accommodation to operations in contemporary security conditions, military transformation of NATO, political transformation of the Alliance, including cooperation with non-members and other security and defence matters, the status and prospects for allied operations, including ISAF in Afghanistan. A final declaration was adopted. Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Serbia and Montenegro were invited to the "Partnership for Peace" programme. In addition, it was stated that Albania, Croatia and Macedonia could receive invitations to accede to the Alliance in 2008. The Polish delegation was headed by President Lech Kaczyński, who met with the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Romania's President Traian Basescu.

Oli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for enlargement announced a partial suspension of the accession talks with Turkey, as the latter failed to initiate trade relations with the EU member Cyprus.

30 Ukraine's Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich met in Moscow with President Vladimir Putin. The items on the agenda of the meeting between the leaders included the supply of Russian gas to Ukraine in 2007.

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1 The last unit of 70 soldiers of the Italian contingent in Iraq left the base in Nasiriya which was handed over to the Iraqi security forces.

2 In response to Raul Castro's declaration that Cuba was ready to negotiate with Washington, the Department of State noted that the United States did not intend to change its strict policies towards Cuba.

4 A meeting was held in Mettlach, Germany, attended by heads of state of the Weimar Triangle—with Lech Kaczyński representing Poland, Angela Merkel—Germany and Jacques Chirac—France. The military cooperation was evaluated as positive: support to the elections in Congo as well as the involvement in Lebanon within the UNIFIL operation. Commitments were made concerning continued cooperation within NATO, including ISAF force in Afghanistan. A joint declaration to commemorate the 15th anniversary of cooperation within the Triangle was signed.

5 EU Ministers of Internal Affairs decided that as of January 2008 there would be no checks on land and sea borders with other EU members. The enlargement of the Schengen area to include nine new EU states (except Cyprus) would proceed in two stages.

The Parliament of Finland ratified the Constitutional Treaty. 125 deputies voted in favour, while 39 were against the treaty.

6 Poland's Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga took part in the 17th Utrecht Conference, held in Amsterdam, where she met with Holland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot. Bilateral relations, energy issues and EU matters were discussed.

8 In Vilnius an agreement on the construction of the so called energy bridge was signed in the presence of Prime Ministers of Poland and Lithuania, Jarosław Kaczyński and Gediminas Kirkilas. The project provides for the cross-border connection between electrical power systems of both states. The construction of the bridge should be complete in 2011. Energy security was also discussed at the meeting between Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and Prime Ministers of the Baltic Council states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). The construction of a joint power plant was referred to.

Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga visited Tallin, where she held talks with the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs and was received by Estonia's president Toomas Ilves. Bilateral and international matters were discussed, including the EU, cooperation within the Baltic Sea region, energy security and NATO.

The second meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on energy was held in Moscow.

10 "It is bad in Iraq"—admitted US President George W. Bush after a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush announced that he would present a new strategy, the basis for which would be the establishment of the Palestinian state, convincing Iraq's neighbours to cooperate and enforcing the principle of non-discrimination of any minority in Iraq. The President did not want to give any dates for pulling the US troops out of Iraq. "We must win," he said.

12 Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński visited the Holy See, where he met with Pope Benedict XVI in a private audience. The main topics covered were international affairs and the situation of the Catholic Church in Poland.

The process of EU enlargement, including the future of the accession negotiations with Turkey, the progress of the accession negotiations with Croatia as well as the European prospects for Western Balkans, the progress of the discussion on the future status of Kosovo, current events in the Middle East peace process, notably the progress of the formation of the national unity government in Palestine, were discussed at the meeting of the Council for General and External Affairs of the European Union, held in Brussels. Poland was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga.

14 Economic cooperation between Poland and Iraq was the main topic of the meeting held in Warsaw between Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Fawzi Hariri.

15 A summit of the European Union states was held in Brussels, devoted to the decision-making process in the area of justice and internal affairs of the EU, as well as to agreeing on joint actions in the area of migration. The process of further enlargement of the EU and the future of the Constitutional Treaty were discussed. Further enlargement of the EU was considered to be dependent on institutional reforms. In relation to the EU plans regarding the adoption of the package of new

measures focusing on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, it was agreed that common energy policy would be necessary. President Lech Kaczyński, who took part in the summit, opted for the open door policy (also in relation to Turkey), distancing himself from statements by other participants in the summit, who underscored the necessity to meet stringent membership criteria by the candidate countries. He met with the Prime Minister of Finland Matti Vanhanen, who offered “compromise proposals” to Poland regarding the Polish veto on the EU-Russia agreement.

On behalf of 22 individuals, the Prussian Trust drafted and sent to the European Court of Human Rights complaints against Poland for “infringement on human rights by depriving them of their property” (real property left by Germans in Poland).

16 Latvia’s Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis visited Warsaw, where he discussed bilateral cooperation and collaboration within the European Union with the chairman of the Council of Ministers Jarosław Kaczyński.

20 A statement by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was published with reference to the filing by the Prussian Trust of complaints against Poland with the European Court of Human Rights. The statement noted that the displacement of the German population was the result of a decision taken by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, and that both the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland had long underscored the need to solve the problem in legal terms at the interstate level, guided by the spirit of truth and historical responsibility.

21 German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said in Moscow that Germany would try to remove, as quickly as possible, the obstacles preventing the commencement of the negotiations between the European Union and Russia on the new partnership and cooperation agreement. At the meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Steinmeier briefed him on the principles of the German presidency in the European Union.

22 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin visited Kyiv for the first time since the Orange Revolution, where he held talks with President Viktor Yushchenko on economic cooperation, Ukraine’s energy security matters, stationing of the Russia Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. Adoption of the roadmap was announced, to regulate the most complex issues in the mutual relations. An agreement on readmission was signed, along with the Protocol of Amendments and Annexes to the agreement of 1995 on border checkpoints, the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation and the Agreement on Mutual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights.

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